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ABSTRACT 
 
 The Unique Governance Context of the Not For Profit (NFP) Boardroom: 
Construction and Execution of Board Member Roles and Processes. 
 
Presently, only a small body of literature investigates the internal processes of boards 
of directors using a qualitative approach, and the number of Not-For-Profit (NFP) 
sector board studies is even smaller. However, there is a strong argument for 
understanding how governance works in the NFP sector, which is increasing in both 
size and significance. NFP organisations also have unique characteristics that generate 
governance questions. Some of these characteristics include fulfilling altruistic 
missions and values while also remaining financially and operationally sustainable 
and satisfying numerous stakeholder groups. Other challenges confronting many NFP 
entities include legislative and funding change, technological developments and 
different expectations from clients with the advent of user-pays systems in more areas 
of service delivery. Collectively, these changes generate new challenges and 
responsibilities for boards.  
By examining the three board roles of strategy, control and resource dependence, the 
aim of this longitudinal case study is to understand board roles and how board 
members discharge their roles in the NFP environment. This case study is significant 
in that it investigates board roles at both the individual and collective board levels and 
contributes to the board studies that have either applied or called for analysis at 
multiple levels. The multi-level approach recognises that board work is both an 
individual and a collective effort. It could be argued that this study undertakes 
analysis at a third level, the organisational level, as the researcher often considered the 
effect of factors such as the organisation’s characteristics, sector and environment in 
which it was operating.  
A framework of broad accountability was applied to the data collected through 
observation, interviews and document analysis. The researcher spent a year and a half 
observing board meetings, committee meetings and strategic planning days. In 
addition to the considerable participant observation data collected, the researcher 
interviewed all board members including the Chair and all senior managers including 
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the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The researcher also obtained data from secondary 
sources such as board and committee papers, agendas and financial reports.  
An investigation of the theoretical approaches in NFP governance and similar fields 
reveals that a framework of broad accountability is most suitable. This is not a critical 
approach, but applies many of the positive aspects from critical accountability 
perspectives. The broad accountability approach widens the perspective of 
accountability beyond narrow conceptions of responsibility and transparency. It 
considers concepts such as formal and informal accountability, narrative and 
calculative aspects, and negotiable and rule-based accountability.  
A key finding from this study is that the board members in the case study organisation 
focused largely on strategy in response to external and internal factors that 
conditioned the strategic focus. One of the significant themes in the board’s strategic 
focus was the desire to balance achieving the philanthropic mission and values of the 
organisation while also remaining financially and operationally sustainable. The 
board was also sensitive to the need to navigate its professional and political 
relationships with internal and external stakeholders. Much of this centred around the 
board’s ambition to communicate to internal and external stakeholders that the 
organisation’s mission and values were fulfilled as well as the entity’s goal of 
remaining a viable organisation. This demonstrated negotiable accountability in 
action. Narrative and calculative accountability as well as formal accountability 
featured in the exercise of the strategic board role and worked to prevent “mission 
drift”. 
Another principal finding from the present study is the contribution it makes with 
regard to an enhanced understanding of “operational drift” and how board members 
prevent the practice from occurring. It is one of very few studies that investigates and 
identifies the techniques board members use to discharge their three roles without 
encroaching on senior manager roles. Broad accountability concepts of trust 
(negotiable accountability), upwards and downwards accountability, formal and 
informal accountability, and individualizing and socializing accountability were 
employed by board members in their efforts to avoid operational drift. 
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The finding of “blended control” as a practice enacted by board members is a key 
contribution of this study. This concept builds on prior research with respect to 
blended strategising practices enacted by NFP leaders. The present study discovered 
formal and negotiable accountability practices often helped board members ensure 
board and organisational legitimacy existed when their control role was exercised. 
The motivation for achieving legitimacy was not only for the board’s benefit, but also 
to reassure internal and external stakeholders that the organisation was achieving its 
values as well as being financially and operationally sustainable. 
  
 4 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Board members - often referred to as directors in the for-profit (FP) context, play a 
vital role in corporate governance (Pugliese, Nicholson & Bezemer, 2015; Aguilera, 
2005; Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). As this study 
is based in the Not-for-profit (NFP) context, the terminology “board member” and 
“director” will be used interchangeably.  
Board members operate at the highest level of the governance structure of an 
organisation. Long, Dulewicz and Gay (2005, p.668) explain the two primary 
functions of the board member are: “…a long-term, consensus-based decision maker 
(Tricker, 1978; ProNed, 1992), and a custodian of the governance process (Higgs, 
2003)”. A board member can be defined as a director who is independent from the 
organisation on whose board they sit. A Board Chair leads the board members. All 
board members including the Chair have a vote. On the other hand, executive 
directors, known as senior managers in the NFP context, are employed by the entity 
that the board oversees. Senior managers are involved in the day-to-day management 
of the organisation. Senior managers do not have a vote at board meetings, unlike 
board members. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the most senior person from 
the senior management team who leads the senior managers. The CEO normally does 
not have a vote at board meetings either. Typically, the senior management team 
reports to the CEO and the CEO reports to the Chair and the board. 
The decision-making and governance functions of board members require them to 
perform multiple roles. This has generated much discussion in the literature about 
board member roles. For example, do the roles conflict or are they a workable 
combination? (see: Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004a). Furthermore, the type of 
roles performed by board members has led some to question whether there are 
deficiencies in board process. For instance, it is often argued that there is an 
imbalance of information, also known as information asymmetry, between board 
members and senior managers. More governance questions arise for board members 
operating in the NFP context, which will be explored in the Literature Review 
chapter. This study aims to contribute to the debate about board member roles, 
especially in the NFP context. The NFP context has not been investigated to the same 
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extent as the FP context or the public sector. It is hoped that the findings from this 
study will shed more light on how NFP board members operate.  
The literature broadly agrees that directors perform three roles, however the three 
roles are often referred to using inconsistent terminology, which can create some 
confusion. This observation has also been made by Machold and Farquhar (2013, 
p.148) who argue, “there are disagreements in the literature about the number of tasks 
that are theoretically derived, their labels and the activities included within these 
tasks”. For example, a role commonly discussed is the “strategic” (Parker, 2007a) or 
“service” role of the director (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). Theoretical 
perspectives that underpin the strategic role of the director appear to originate from:  
strategic choice perspectives (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992), stewardship theory 
(Hung, 1998), agency theory (Stiles and Taylor, 2002), and a range of cognitive 
and behavioral approaches (see Pugliese et al., 2009 for a summary)” (cited in 
Machold & Farquhar, 2013).  
To add to the confusion, Zahra and Pearce (1989) separate the strategic and service 
role of the director! They argue that the strategic role is concerned with strategy and 
that the service component is the advice and counsel the board member provides to 
the CEO. This study adopts the view that the strategic and service roles are part of the 
same role. The extent of the strategic role undertaken by board members can differ, 
depending on the type of organisation (i.e. FP or NFP) and the skills of the CEO and 
senior managers. The role also entails directors providing “advice and counsel to the 
CEO” which often leads to strategic discussions and decisions (Johnson Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996, p.424; Young et al., 2001, p.225). While conceptions of the role 
differ, most theoretical perspectives of the board agree that the director enacts a 
strategic role. These include Agency theory, Resource Dependence theory and 
Stewardship theory (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.33). This study will refer to this role as 
the strategic role. 
The other board member role that has different terminology employed to describe it is 
the “resource dependence” role (Daily & Ellstrand, 1996) or the “institutional” role 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Heavily influenced by the resource dependency theory 
perspective (Pfeffer, 1972, Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), this role is said 
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to be the board member’s ability to bring resources, information and prestige to the 
organisation. The terminology “resource dependence role” (Johnson Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996, pp.411, 427-429; Young et al., 2001, p.225) is used interchangeably 
in the literature with the board member’s “institutional role” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001; 
Zattoni & Cumo, 2010, p.64; Long Dulewicz and Gay, 2005, p.668). There are also 
references to this role being the “service” role of the director (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
This role is about the board member’s ability to contribute to the organisation by 
bringing additional networks and resources to the organisation (Johnson Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996, p.410). Part of the role involves directors acting as “boundary 
spanners” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001), where they are attuned to the external environment 
in which the organisation operates. This is said to be a valuable resource to an 
organisation because directors can provide insights which employees such as senior 
managers might not have. Such insights are often gained through “director interlocks” 
(Young et al., 2001, p.224) where directors are often members of other boards and 
can provide information about competing organisations (Lang & Lockhart, 1990). It is 
also argued that some directors can increase the prestige of the organisation due to the 
credentials some board members offer (Dalton & Daily, 1999). For the sake of 
consistency, this study will use the term “resource dependence” to describe this role 
of the director, keeping in mind that references to “institutional” functions describe 
the same role. 
The “control” role of directors is probably the most common reference scholars use to 
describe their “monitoring” or “oversight” role (Brennan & Cullen, 2017) The control 
role is largely derived from the agency theory perspective which argues that owners 
(i.e. shareholders) need to be separate from those who control the organisation (i.e. 
senior managers) (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Young et al., 2001, 
p.226; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004, p.123) otherwise opportunistic behaviour can occur 
which will harm the firm. Legalistic perspectives share a similar view to Agency 
theory (Machold & Farquhar, 2013, p.148). Agency theory argues that the likelihood 
of conflicts of interest and opportunistic behaviour of management is mitigated by 
directors who are independent from management. Directors monitor the behaviour of 
management to ensure decisions are made in the best interests of shareholders 
including monitoring the CEO’s performance and salary. The board members can 
“alter…incentive structures, or in extreme cases, dismiss…[the CEO]” (Young et al., 
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2001, p.226). The control role is generally comprised of financial and operational 
control as well as risk management (Parker, 2008). Despite the various references to 
control, monitoring and oversight in the literature, this study will refer to the “control” 
role to describe this role, while also recognising that monitoring and oversight form 
part of the role as well. 
The terminology employed in this thesis to describe the three board member roles is: 
strategic, control and resource dependence. Generally speaking, the board member 
strategy role is about decision-making that affects the long-term future of the 
organisation. It is also linked to the expectation that board members provide advice 
and counsel to senior managers about the strategic direction of the organisation and 
the associated decisions that are made. The control role is where the board member 
ensures the organisation is operating in compliance with its accounting, financial, 
legal and operational responsibilities. The resource dependence role of the board 
member explains the expectation that board members provide networks or valuable 
linkages to the organisation. For more detailed definitions and explanations of the 
three key roles of board members see: Huse (2005) and Bezemer et al. (2007).  
While the three director roles are derived from different theoretical perspectives in the 
literature, it is important to underscore that this study does not apply any of the 
theories mentioned with respect to the roles – agency theory, resource dependence 
theory or stewardship theory. This is because there is a general consensus in the 
governance literature that directors enact the three roles regardless of the theoretical 
perspective. 
It appears that the theoretical perspective adopted for a board study depends on the 
context of the study. According to Pye and Camm (2003, p.57) “the work of 
researchers…points to the proposition that different theories may be more valid in 
different circumstances”. For instance, Parker (2007a) uses institutional theory to 
inform his dual case study of two NFP organisations, where he focused on the 
strategic role of directors. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) focus on how directors 
enact their strategic and control roles using a theoretical framework of accountability. 
Corbetta and Salvato (2004) argue contingency theory is appropriate to explain board 
behaviour in family firms. This array of theoretical approaches suggests that board 
studies which are concerned with how board members enact their roles are generally 
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informed by a theoretical perspective that reflects the circumstances in which the 
board is operating. There is consensus in the literature that no one theory holds the 
key to understanding all board member roles. As Pye (2002, p.193) points out, 
directors’ roles “seem…now to be overlaid with any array of other interests and 
tensions which do not lend themselves to simplistic economic analysis [such as 
Agency theory]”. Machold and Farquhar (2013) explain that more recent governance 
research focused on board process is able to explain how board roles are enacted, 
building on the contributions from conventional governance theories such as Agency 
theory and Resource Dependence theory.  
…Agency and resource-dependency perspectives provide insights into the 
content of board tasks…Combining traditional conceptualizations of board tasks 
with a process-based theoretical lens offers new insight into board tasks and 
how effectively they are performed (Machold & Farquhar, 2013, p.147). 
Following the calls for more board research that examines process, this NFP board 
study uses qualitative techniques to examine how board members enact their strategy, 
control and resource dependence roles. Qualitative methodology is being advocated 
by many scholars to build on the governance research which has predominately 
applied quantitative techniques (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; McNulty, 2013, 
pp.163, 171). While quantitative techniques have been helpful in explaining some 
phenomenon such as what factors condition board effectiveness, “…it is the actual 
conduct of the nonexecutive vis-a`-vis the executive that determines board 
effectiveness” (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005, p.S6).  
Direct methods of data collection such as observation and interviews can shed light on 
board conduct. Some time ago, Pettigrew (1992) noted a need for “direct observation 
of boards in action” (cited in Peck, 1995, p.142) and scholars continue to make 
similar statements more recently. Crow, Lockhart and Lewis (2014) argue that board 
studies examining board structure and composition are inadequate in shedding light 
on how corporate governance works. What is needed is case studies that look directly 
into board process (Stiles, 2001, p.627). Direct methods of data collection such as 
participant observer, interview and document analysis are methods which accounting 
researchers can use to understand board processes. For example, Johnson Daily and 
Ellstrand (1996, p.432-433) encourage researchers to conduct interviews to obtain 
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directors’ perceptions of their roles. Using observations, interview and document 
analysis is argued to be a robust qualitative approach (Peck, 1995) which enables the 
researcher to directly see the data as it happens rather than obtaining it through less 
direct methods such as survey or questionnaire. 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the significance of the board member in 
governance by explaining what roles they enact. While the three roles of the director 
are generally agreed upon in the literature, questions remain about how directors enact 
the three roles. While there are some studies that have begun to answer this question, 
calls for more research have been made. Moreover, there appears to be little in the 
literature about the board member’s resource dependence role in the NFP sector.  
This study is unique to most foregoing studies in that it considers all three roles of the 
board member. Machold and Farquhar (2013, p.151) argue such a holistic approach is 
important as it rejects the notion that board roles are “…discrete categories with 
variable qualities…” Rather, it considers how board tasks evolve over time and the 
impact of context on the discharge of board roles. The theoretical lens applied in this 
study is that of accountability because there is much literature which suggests that 
board effectiveness is understood by applying a lens of accountability (Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles, 2005). The theoretical framework used in this study is discussed 
further in the Theoretical Perspective section in this chapter. The context of this study 
is the NFP sector. This study can be distinguished from previous studies that examine 
the board member or have been conducted in the NFP sector. This is because the 
choice of all three board member roles to study is novel in the NFP context. The 
literature makes a strong case for using theories of accountability in governance 
studies as well as the use of the qualitative methodology to examine board 
phenomena. The next section will expand on some key governance issues identified in 
the literature with respect to board members. The following section then explores the 
significance of the NFP sector. 
 
The research problem 
There is a dearth of board studies that examine how board members discharge their 
strategy, control and resource dependence roles as well as their accountabilities in the 
NFP sector. This study seeks to understand how board members discharge their 
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strategy, control and resource dependence roles, and what processes are present in 
their decision-making and accountabilities, in an NFP1 context.  
This study adds to a small, but growing area of research in the NFP sector that is 
beginning to gather momentum due to the increasing number of governance issues 
inherent in the NFP sector. For example: governance issues in the Australian 
Returned Services League (RSL), issues with governance in the Australian Football 
League (AFL) and the Netball Australia Board (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) 891 Radio Adelaide, 2017; ABC News, 24 August 2017). As Skipper argues, 
“Customers, stakeholders, funders and an organisation’s members are demanding 
greater transparency as to what ‘value proposition’ the NFP provides” (AICD, 2017). 
This is especially so in a society that is becoming more sceptical about where how 
their donations are applied. According to the CEO of Anglicare Western Australia, 
there has been a trend over the past 20 years were more people are “demanding 
information about where their money is going” (Wynne, 2018a).  
As the NFP sector is growing, with many NFP organisations generating annual 
turnovers in the millions of dollars, it is evident that NFPs are significant in economic 
terms (Flack & Ryan, 2005). NFPs also often have considerable asset holdings, both 
in number and in value. They typically have complex business structures including: 
volunteers, donors and employees, various resources and multiple agendas such as 
fundraising, networking and providing services (Brown & Iverson, 2004, p.396; 
Tucker & Parker, 2013b, p.235). NFPs also have a social significance, as they often 
provide services that the government does not provide or has discontinued. NFPs 
provide employment for many thousands of people nationwide including in Australia 
and the United States (US) (Dees & Anderson, 2003a; Drucker, 1989; Ruckle, 1993; 
Parker, 2008). NFPs are also important in the political realm. Influenced to a large 
extent by Australian Federal and State Government policy and funding, NFPs follow 
parliaments closely so that they can remain competitive for government funding and 
grants. Governments are also attuned to NFP organisations, as NFPs can also 
influence policy through their advocacy mechanisms (Dees & Anderson, 2003a, 
p.22). For example, an NFP disability organisation might lobby the Australian 
Government for more resources to manage the transition to the National Disability 
                                                
1 The researcher has chosen the phrase “an NFP” in place of “a NFP” throughout this thesis for ease of 
reading and consistency. 
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Insurance Scheme (NDIS). It is evident that the economic, social and political 
significance of NFP organisations justifies the need to understand their governance 
roles and processes. A better understanding of NFP governance is likely to reveal the 
successful and unsuccessful aspects of governance. Knowing what works and what 
does not work means those involved in the academic and practical aspects of 
governance can ensure the NFP sector operates in an effective and responsible 
manner. 
A unique characteristic of the NFP sector is the focus on the mission, vision and 
values of an organisation (Hume & Hume, 2008). This can create two key challenges 
for board members. First, the literature suggests a challenge for board members in the 
NFP sector balancing their commitment to the cause of the organisation with the need 
to be good governors (Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008). As Hardy and Ballis 
(2013, p.548) point out, “A constant tension in non-profit organisations is to ensure 
money making activities do not take priority over mission goals”. Tuckman and 
Chang (2006, p. 632) call this phenomenon “mission drift”, also known as “mission 
creep” (Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008, p.110).  
Second, the demarcation between management’s role and board members’ roles is not 
particularly pronounced in NFP organisations. Arguably, this occurs because NFP 
governance is generally more informal compared to the FP sector (Parker, 2007a). 
This means that board members in the NFP context have less clearly defined roles 
compared to board members who work in the FP sector. Some scholars have found 
that board members can sometimes drift into the operational aspects of governance as 
a result. This is called “operational drift” (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999, p.357; Parker, 
2007a; Pugliese, Nicholson & Bezemer, 2015). Operational drift means board 
members neglect their higher level strategy, control and resource dependence roles 
and concentrate on short-term, process-oriented tasks. These tasks are usually enacted 
by senior managers and are called “operational” aspects. Another factor that can 
predispose some NFP organisations to operational drift is entities that have a service 
or pastoral care background, as they are not often geared towards operating in a 
competitive environment. The two governance issues of “mission drift” and 
“operational drift” will be considered in this study and an assessment made as to how 
board members deal with both issues. 
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The major changes that the NFP sector in Australia is undergoing generates 
governance questions and responses. There is now competition for service delivery 
between NFP and FP entities in the market. While this was formally managed by 
tender, it has since changed to a user pays system in many areas. Aged care and the 
disability sector are two examples (AICD, 2018; Care insights, 2018). There is also 
increasing demand for service delivery in areas such as aged care with the ageing 
population in Australia. 
The sector is also undergoing major changes in its operational environment. For 
instance, while many NFP entities have a service or pastoral care background, now 
there is often a focus on larger payrolls, revenues, performance and sustainability 
(Stuart, 2017). Like the FP sector, the NFP sector is embracing opportunities to 
reduce inefficiencies and costs. This is often done through technology such as 
Customer Relations Management systems (CRMs). There are costs to implementing 
such systems though and as Stuart (2017, p.50) argues, some NFPs cannot afford such 
opportunities and those that do, “open the door to more competition”. Collectively, 
these changes generate new burdens and responsibilities for boards.  
With the advent of increasing demands on the sector in terms of the shift from public 
to private provision of services and the shift to marketisation, the question is how 
board members respond to these pressures. By examining the three board roles of 
strategy, control and resource dependence, the aim of this study is to understand these 
three board roles in the NFP context and the how board members discharge their roles 
in this NFP environment.  Accountability is a suitable theoretical lens through which 
to assess these changes and their impact on board members. 
This study will use broad concepts of accountability as its informing theoretical lens. 
Accountability in governance is part of a growing body of research in NFP board 
studies. It is argued that applying a theoretical perspective of accountability is 
particularly suitable to use in governance research because accountability is the 
essence of the board member role. Board members are expected to hold senior 
managers to account and board members are accountable to the board and its 
stakeholder groups. There is a broad suite of NFP literature that also argues 
accountability is a suitable theoretical perspective for the context (see for example: 
Valentinov, 2011; Benjamin, 2008; Holland, 2002; Kearns, 1994). Accountability is 
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able to embrace multiple perspectives of stakeholders (Morrison & Salipante, 2007), 
different ways of being held accountable (Roberts, 1991) and different means of 
discharging accountability (Hardy & Ballis, 2013; Joannides, Jaumier & Hoque, 
2009). Moreover, accountability is tied to board performance, which is a key area 
where governance research attention is being focused (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 
2005; Flack & Ryan, 2005). In addition to the subject and context of the study, there 
have been calls for accountability to be applied to board research for over 30 years 
(see for example: O’ Leary, 2016; Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014; Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles, 2005; Ebrahim, 2003; Young, 2002; Parker, 1996). 
Having identified a gap in the qualitative board studies which examine board member 
roles and processes, this study aims to address that deficiency. This study seeks to 
understand the unique aspects of NFP governance compared to the FP sector which 
has generally been the focus of governance research. It focuses on how board 
members in a single case study of a prominent NFP organisation in one state of 
Australia discharge their strategy, control and resource dependence roles. An 
investigation into how board members enact all three roles in an NFP context is novel. 
Further, this study seeks to investigate how board members deal with the complex 
layers of accountability inherent in their three roles while responding to the demands 
in the NFP environment. 
Aim and research questions 
Title of Study  
The unique governance context of the Not-for-Profit (NFP) boardroom: Construction 
and execution of board member roles and processes. 
 
The principal purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of the strategy, 
control and resource dependence roles of board members in the NFP sector. As 
outlined previously, the NFP sector has unique characteristics which create potential 
governance issues for NFP boards. This inquiry is likely to be of value to academics 
in the governance field such as accounting scholars, as well as NFP board members 
and policy-makers.  
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This study contributes to current board research that is concerned with process. 
Process-oriented studies “focus attention on how and why things emerge, develop, 
grow, or terminate over time” (Langley et al., 2013). Central to process studies is the 
context and time at which it is conducted. In the board context, Pye and Pettigrew 
(2005, pp.S31-32) argue that board process studies need to distinguish between outer 
(external) and inner (internal) context (Pettigrew, 1987). This study aims to achieve 
the distinction between external and internal factors when discussing the context.  
In terms of time, this study is longitudinal in nature, spanning a period of 18 months. 
Langley et al. (2013, p.6) argue that longitudinal studies are valuable as they allow 
researchers to observe “how processes unfold over time”. Longitudinal studies are not 
simply “samples of one” (Langley et al. 2013, p.7). The  “temporal bracketing” of 
events and activities over a considerable period of time allows researchers to make 
comparisons and/or contrasts of a particular event or activity over a certain period of 
time. In addition, the methodological value of process studies is that they often 
harness direct methods of collecting data such as participant observation, interview 
and document analysis. It is argued that using such methods ensures researchers 
engage in both induction and deduction (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005, p.S36). 
Process studies also give the researcher the ability to follow a particular event or 
activity, which has the potential to add theoretical value as well. With sufficient 
explanations of context and time, the reader can gauge any changes or periods of 
stability (Langley et al., 2013, p.10). Moreover, the reader can exercise their own 
judgment in determining whether generalising from the findings is reasonable 
(Langley et al., 2013, p.9). “It is important to note that…[process studies] are not just 
telling idiosyncratic tales; their stories carry important theoretical messages” (Langley 
et al., 2013, pp.6-7). Pettigrew (1997) recommends five key criteria which should be 
included in process studies. First, the level of analysis needs to be clear, i.e. is it 
individual, collective or organisational? Second, the timeframe of analysis needs to be 
evident, i.e. past, present and future. Third, the context and setting needs to be 
explained. Fourth, holistic and comprehensive explanations of process need to be 
undertaken. Fifth, the outcomes need to be established (Pettigrew, 1997, p.S34). All 
of these criteria will be taken into account in this study when the researcher analyses 
the data and reports the findings. 
 15 
This study answers calls for more research into board process while also expanding 
the context in which board process is investigated. For example, Bezemer Nicholson 
and Pugliese (2014) and their associated 2015 study are an example of a recent board 
study focused on process. Where this study diverges from the study of Bezemer, 
Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) is the context, as the scholars investigate the FP 
context. Moreover, the methods used by Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) 
differ in some respects to the current study. Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) 
observed video taped board meetings as well as conducting mini-surveys, semi-
structured interviews and document reviews to analyse board member behaviour. The 
current study will use direct participant observation with the researcher present at 
board meetings, committee meetings and strategic planning days, as well as 
interviews and document analysis. Although it can be argued that some process 
studies have been undertaken in the NFP context, this study differs by focusing on the 
board members and adding new theoretical insights using a theory of accountability 
(for examples of NFP board studies see: Parker, 2003, 2007 2008; Tucker & Parker 
2013a, 2013b; and for examples of board studies applying theories of accountability 
see: Joannides, 2012; Gibbon, 2012; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005).  
Board members play a vital role in governance, often comprising a majority of the 
board of directors in NFP organisations. They are responsible for effective high level 
decision-making and ensuring the organisation is discharging its legal and accounting 
responsibilities. Board members work closely with senior managers to discharge their 
responsibilities and in doing so, they carry out three main roles: strategy, control and 
resource dependence. All three board member roles are the focus of this study. 
Despite the significance of board members in governance, little is known about how 
they discharge their roles. This study seeks to understand the processes inherent in the 
three board member roles. 
The unique characteristics of the NFP environment may condition the three board 
member roles as well as their accountability. The NFP context might for example 
create conditions conducive to operational drift and mission drift. In addition, whether 
board members experience a tension in their roles or find them to be a viable 
combination may be influenced to some degree by the nature of the NFP sector. 
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Finally, characteristics unique to NFP organisations might influence how board 
members manage information provided to them from management.  
The Central Objective of this study 
To investigate the construction and execution of board member roles in the unique 
context of the NFP environment with a focus on accountability. 
This study is focused on board members, their roles and the processes they employ in 
the NFP environment. In doing so, it seeks to understand board members’ behaviours, 
interactions and personal perspectives with respect to their roles. The study also 
considers the unique challenges board members encounter in the NFP context and 
how they deal with such challenges. 
While board members are the subject of this study, the literature suggests that senior 
managers are also relevant to gain a holistic picture of the governance scenario. The 
merit in such an approach is outlined by Houle (1989) (cited in Stone, 1991, p.207): 
that data from EDs [or Senior Managers] is valuable in understanding the board, as 
they are “…particularly attuned to the actions and behaviours of boards, making their 
appraisal of board functioning especially relevant”. Following this suggestion, this 
single case study not only observed and interviewed board members, but also senior 
managers. By adopting such an approach, this research is able to gain an 
understanding of board members from the perspective of those people with whom 
board members work with most closely – senior managers. Therefore, this research 
takes a holistic view of the processes inherent in board members’ roles.  
The Central Objective is addressed through three research questions (RQs): 
• RQ 1: How does board members’ conception and approach to their strategic role 
reflect the unique NFP environment? 
• RQ 2: What is the board member control role and how is it enacted in the NFP 
context? 
• RQ 3: What is the board member resource dependence role in the NFP context 
and how is it enacted? 
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RQ 1: How does board members’ conception and approach to their strategic role 
reflect the unique NFP environment? 
This RQ requires gathering and analysing data that pertains to how board members 
think about strategy and how they discharge their strategic role as part of their 
governance responsibilities. The principal motivation for devising this question is the 
divergent opinions in the governance literature with respect to the manner and extent 
of boardroom strategising (Parker, 2007a, p.1455; Brown & Iverson, 2004, p.379). 
Boardroom strategising is argued to take many forms, including formal and informal 
methods of strategising, and strategies in the areas of: finance, service delivery, and 
operations (e.g. Human Resources and infrastructure). Strategising also occurs with 
respect to strategic evaluations (e.g. projects) and risk management. 
The significance of RQ 1 is to shed light on the way in which board members 
conceive their strategic role and how they carry out their strategic roles and make 
decisions. Research into NFP strategic management and performance has been 
undertaken and encouraged by scholars such as Hume and Hume (2008) and Parker 
(2007a, 2007b). In doing so, the question was designed so that the researcher 
observed board meetings, committee meetings and strategic planning days with the 
aim of understanding how board members perform their strategic role. In addition, the 
researcher asked board members and senior mangers for their personal views about 
the board members’ strategy role. Finally, the researcher also considered any board or 
committee papers or handouts, which were useful for enhancing understanding about 
the board member’s strategic role. 
These inquiries provide information about the manner and extent of boardroom 
strategising within the NFP organisation under study. They can reveal practices where 
board members in the organisation act as “gatekeepers” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, pp.40, 
119), approving, revising or rejecting strategic proposals delivered by senior 
managers such as the annual strategic plan. Or they can suggest board members are 
directly involved in strategy, for example formulating the mission and objectives for 
the organisation directly with senior management. Alternatively, the board might play 
a passive role (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.38). According to Stiles and Taylor (2001, 
p.38), what type of strategic role the board plays often depends on the context in 
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which the organisation operates. The researcher will interpret these findings using a 
lens of accountability. 
 
RQ 2: What is the board member control role and how is it enacted in the NFP 
context? 
Valuable insights into the ways in which board members exercise control should be 
elicited by addressing this question. There are three forms of control that board 
members exercise: operational control, financial control and risk management. 
Operational control or organisational control is where board members act as a ‘check’ 
on senior management, making them accountable for their actions (Stiles & Taylor, 
2001, p.121; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Through processes such as questioning 
and challenging “the strategic status quo”, it is argued that NEDs can contribute to 
control in the top-level of an organisation in an effective way (Parker, 2008, p.68; 
Stiles & Taylor, 1993).  
Financial control and risk management is often enacted by board member 
contributions on sub-committees such as the audit and risk committees. Financial 
control is where board members monitor the financial reports, budgets and audits of 
the organisation and approve financial decisions. Risk management is exercised when 
board members assess the risks inherent in certain decisions or activities. Financial 
control and risk management are vital aspects of control exercised by the board 
member (Collier, 1992; Treichler, 1995; Vicknair, Hickman & Carnes, 1993; Parker, 
2008, p.67). This RQ about control should generate insights into the operational, 
financial control and risk management aspects of the board member control role. 
Control can be enacted by board members formally and informally and can be 
focused on short-term and long-term control issues (Parker, 2008, p.65; Stiles & 
Taylor, 2001, pp.63-64). Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.65) also highlight that board 
members exercise control in the strategic realm. For instance, this includes monitoring 
of short-term performance - meeting quantitative and qualitative targets and also 
exercising oversight of medium to long-term strategic plans. The overlap of strategic 
and control issues has led many scholars to argue that there is “…an apparently 
irreconcilable conflict between the board’s role in the strategy process and the board’s 
role in monitoring and controlling the organization…” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.79). 
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It has been argued that there is the risk that board members can stray into senior 
mangers’ territory by focusing too much on operational issues. This has been called 
“operational drift” (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). There is however, another school of 
thought which argues that the two roles are not in conflict and both can be effectively 
discharged (see for example: Kirwan & Brennan, 20172). McNulty (2013, p.172) has 
noticed this difference of opinion in the governance literature and explains that further 
research into this issue is required. Addressing the call for more research into this 
aspect of governance, this RQ aims to assess the credibility of both arguments using 
the data received from this study. 
While aspects of board member control have been identified in the literature, as 
Parker (2008) points out, much of the findings are based on data from less direct 
sources such as the survey questionnaire compared to participant observer methods 
(Parker, 2008, p.68). Given the advantages of using more direct methods of data 
collection such as participant observation in a longitudinal study (Parker, 2008, p.68) 
and calls for this research method to be undertaken in board studies (Heracleous, 
1999), this study examines the director’s control role in the boardroom. 
Of the few qualitative studies into boardroom control, Parker (2008, p.84-5) found 
that board members in the NFP sector focus on both financial and operational control, 
and that risk management is an issue of increasing importance. Most of the discussion 
about control issues occurs informally and the impetus for a focus on control largely 
stems from board members’ understanding and experience with the NFP organisation, 
“…their interactive dialogue and diagnosis of control issues” rather than following a 
prescribed program of control (Parker, 2008, p.85). The debate in the literature about 
whether information asymmetry poses a threat to the control role of the board member 
will also be explored (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.79). This RQ should reveal whether 
the NFP organisation in this study exhibits similar or different characteristics of 
control compared to those identified by Parker (2008). The foregoing control issues 
will be analysed applying a theoretical framework of accountability. 
  
                                                
2 As yet an unpublished conference paper. Referenced with permission of the authors. 
 20 
RQ 3: What is the board member resource dependence role in the NFP context and 
how is it enacted? 
To round off this study’s inquiry into all three director roles, this third RQ is geared 
toward understanding the board member’s resource dependence role in the NFP 
environment. The resource dependence role is about the resource and network 
linkages which board members bring to the organisation. The literature suggests that 
board members are often chosen for their skills, knowledge, expertise and connections 
in the sector. For example, some board members might bring increased profile to the 
board due to their expertise and reputation (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, pp.87, 99). Other 
board members might be selected because they can secure resources that are critical to 
the organisation’s success through their links with financiers or organisations 
operating in a similar field (Johnson Daily & Ellstrand, 1996, pp.427-429). A board 
member with relationships outside the organisation can bring strategic value to the 
board where they not only bring knowledge of the external environment, but also 
opinions. Board member opinions about the external environment are often beneficial 
to the organisation because they provide advice and counsel to the senior managers 
and CEO (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.101). 
This RQ is designed to analyse whether board members in the single NFP case study 
exhibit the resource dependence roles discussed in the literature. The researcher will 
draw upon all three sources of data (observation, interview and document analysis) to 
understand what comprises the resource dependence role and how it is discharged by 
board members.  
To date, there appear to be very few studies that carry out inquiries into the resource 
dependence role in the NFP sector. Stiles and Taylor (2001) conducted 51 interviews 
with board members and 20 interviews with key stakeholder groups to understand 
how board members work in large public companies in the United Kingdom (UK). 
They found that board members often had both formal and informal meetings with 
various stakeholder groups and financial reporting was another means of fostering 
good communications with stakeholders or to consult with stakeholder groups about a 
“change of strategy or major initiative” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.91).  
More recently, Machold and Farquhar (2013) consider the resource dependence role 
of directors in six boards (four NFPs, a public and FP board) in the UK. They refer to 
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the resource dependence role as the “service role” and find that there was less of an 
emphasis on this role compared to the control role, but a greater focus on the resource 
dependence role compared to the strategy role (Machold & Farquhar, 2013, pp.155-
156). While the studies by Stiles and Taylor (2001) and Machold and Farquhar (2013) 
are helpful in a preliminary understanding the resource dependence role of directors, 
they are multiple case studies and have not been conducted in Australia. This study 
can therefore offer a unique contribution to the literature, by uncovering how the 
director’s resource dependence role operates in a single NFP organisation in 
Australia. 
Theoretical perspective 
Earlier discussion of the theoretical perspective in this chapter explained that the 
context of the study can have some bearing on the informing lens adopted. The 
subject of the study can also drive the type of theoretical perspective adopted. For 
example, studies which have the board members as the focus often apply concepts of 
accountability due to the nature of their roles (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005). 
Whereas some studies which have the NFP sector as the focus employ a theoretical 
perspective such as institutional theory (Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008).  
There are other studies in the NFP sector that apply concepts of accountability (see 
for example: Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002; Morrison & Salipante, 2007). It can 
be argued that these studies make a convincing argument for employing 
accountability perspectives. They argue the nature of the sector with its multiple 
stakeholders, organisational mission and values, and social, economic and political 
significance requires an accountability theoretical framework. Therefore, not only the 
subject of this study, but also the NFP context seems to suggest that a theoretical 
framework of accountability is most suitable. There are many definitions of 
accountability in the theoretical literature. One fundamental definition is 
accountability as “the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts & 
Scapens, 1985, p.447). Accountability can also be defined as a social activity in which 
people provide an account for certain activities (Roberts, 1991). The Theoretical 
Framework chapter discusses the definition of accountability and its key elements in 
more detail. 
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There are “persistent and increasing calls for accountability” to be used as the 
informing theory in the NFP sector (Bies, 2001, p.56). Key reasons underpinning 
arguments such as this are first, funding pressures (creating additional accountability 
through service contracts) and second, the “diverse array of constituents and 
stakeholders” (Tucker & Parker, 2013a, p.90) who often have certain expectations 
from the organisation. Ospina Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002, pp.25, 20) highlight that 
concepts of accountability are best placed to understand NFP organisations. They 
argue the service delivery and advocacy roles of NFP entities and their relationship 
with and communication to the community all engender accountability to some 
extent. According to Morrison and Salipante (2007), accountability is equipped to 
take into account the interests of multiple stakeholders. It can also explain the need 
for NFPs to engage in “blended strategy”. This is where both deliberate strategising 
and emergent strategising is exercised by organisational leaders. They engage in this 
behaviour to achieve their own internal objectives as well as fulfilling their missions. 
Part of this practice is ensuring that they communicate their emphasis on fulfilling 
their mission with their stakeholders. Bies (2001) outlines key reasons underpinning 
the need for accountability in the NFP sector:  
…rapid growth [in the NFP sector]…;[the] increasing number of nonprofits; 
increasing size, assets, and influence of nonprofits; increasing reliance on 
nonprofits for delivery of necessary aspects of civil society and social 
programs;…scandals in the nonprofit sector; shift from government funding 
toward direct funding of nonprofits; a belief that increased accountability fosters 
public trust…;…result[s] in greater nonprofit efficiency and 
effectiveness;…[and] accountability is inherently “the right thing to do” (Bies, 
2001, pp.57-59). 
Despite the argument for greater accountability in the NFP sector, there are 
deficiencies in the literature about board member accountability with respect to their 
three roles in NFP organisations (Parker, 2008; Helmig, Jegers & Lapsley, 2004). 
Parker (2008) underscores gaps in understanding accountability in the NFP sector. 
According to Parker (2008, p.85), questions remain about accountability of NFPs 
given “the triggers for and shaping of control” are largely informal rather than formal. 
The same could be said for strategy on NFP boards, as many studies have found that 
strategy tends to be informal rather than formal in NFP organisations (Parker, 2007a). 
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Literature that discusses the resource dependence role in the NFP sector is even less 
clear. Whether the resource dependence role of the board member takes a formal or an 
informal character is not evident in the literature. This study is designed to understand 
how board members enact their three roles using a lens of accountability. 
While generalisations can be made about external factors NFP organisations face, it is 
important to note there are also contextual issues specific to an NFP organisation 
which can support the need for a framework of accountability. Organisational factors 
or internal factors can also play a role in how an NFP entity is accountable. Morrison 
and Salipante (2007) identify a number of contextual factors which condition 
“negotiable accountability” including:  
…organization’s leaders must negotiate among themselves with their own 
particular set of stakeholders appropriate criteria, measures, and interpretations 
of success in ways that respond to the organization’s history, values, and 
mission (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, p.199).  
Collier (2005, p.945) identifies key areas where accountability in his NFP study was 
particularly challenging. Collier (2005) argues that a lack of performance measures 
coupled with a need to satisfy certain stakeholders, informal accounting processes 
with a lack of supervision, tight timeframes and competing demands “…reduces 
informed discussion among board members” (Collier, 2005, p.947). In Collier’s 
(2005) study there were challenging conditions and multiple layers of accountability. 
Finally, Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002, pp.21-22) find that organisational change 
and policy change are key contextual factors which often influences an NFP’s 
accountability to a funding provider.  
NFP organisations that also have a religious or faith-based aspect are often subject to 
additional accountabilities. For example, accountability to a Church authority or a 
national body. The accountability of faith-based NFP organisations is often 
complicated by its idiosyncratic nature. Hardy and Ballis (2013, p.555) confirm 
Mashaw’s (2006, p.125) observation that a salient feature of accountability in NFP 
organisations is its “distinctive character”. In contrast to the FP sector, where 
“adhering to accountability templates associated with the commercial and public 
sector” is fairly well established and straightforward, the means by which NFPs are 
accountable are often idiosyncratic (Hardy & Ballis, 2013, p.540). This can lead to 
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“tensions and anxieties” for some stakeholders because of their unique ways of 
accounting for things and their complex nature (Hardy & Ballis, 2013, p.540-541; 
Carnegie & Wolnizer, 1995).  
The framework of accountability arguably best suited to the NFP sector is a “broad 
accountability”. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005), Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan 
(2002), and Fry (1995) are united in their view that the complexities inherent in NFP 
governance require a broad perspective of accountability. Broadened accountability 
has been used in public management (with regard to public service managers) but 
“only recently has the nonprofit literature begun to address the topic of 
accountability” (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.7; Morrison & Salipante, 2007; 
Parker, 1996). This NFP study will apply a broad accountability framework to assess 
and analyse how accountability operates at the board level of an NFP organisation.  
As well as facilitating an understanding of a complex environment, broad 
accountability enables researchers to understand board processes and behaviours 
(Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005, p.S8; Morrison & Salipante, 2007; Ospina, Diaz & 
O’Sullivan, 2002). Following the many recommendations for broad accountability to 
be applied in NFP governance research, this single NFP board study uses broad 
accountability as its informing theory. 
Methodological approach 
Scholars such as Ahrens and Khalifa (2013) and Parker (2007a) illustrate why 
qualitative research methods are valuable, especially in the area of corporate 
governance. The advantages and suitability of using a qualitative research method are 
expanded upon in the Methodology chapter. Pye (2002) also advocates using a 
qualitative approach in governance research because:  
 
governing implies a social process…To explore governing…means unravelling 
the complex network of relationships amongst those who comprise the…(board 
and/or organisation) whose practice is being observed as well as relationships 
with “outsiders” who observe and comment on this organisation’s governance 
(Pye, 2002, p.156). 
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Very little is known about the processes inherent in board interactions and to what 
extent context can influence governance. Parker (2008) notes this is of particular 
concern because without understanding how boards operate and the context in which 
they operate, advances in governance are not likely to be made. Furthermore, it has 
been argued that understanding process and context informs board effectiveness 
(Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 2005, pp. S5, S11) and performance (Crow Lockhart & 
Lewis, 2014, p.52). Undertaking research into board processes has many supporters 
including those outlined by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005, p.S8) - Demb and 
Neubauer (1992), Hill, (1995), Pettigrew (1992) and Pye (2001). This thesis heeds 
these calls by undertaking a single case study of a prominent NFP organisation in one 
state of Australia. In doing so, this study is one of very few.  
The qualitative research methods applied in this study are participant observer, 
interview and document analysis techniques. Participant observation took place at the 
organisational board level of the NFP organisation (Clarke, 1998; Heracleous, 1999). 
Interviews have been conducted with all board members and all senior managers of 
the organisation. Such an approach should provide “…complementary data to 
understand issues from different perspectives” (Hennick, Hutter & Bailey, 2011, 
p.170) and facilitate triangulation (Waddington 2004, p.156). Document analysis was 
used as a supplementary form of data, when required. 
 
Thematic data analysis has been applied to the primary data and themes from the data 
were inductively developed. The researcher took process notes of all observed 
interactions including meetings between board members and senior managers and 
supplementary process notes of informal meetings between board members and senior 
managers. In addition, secondary sources of material such as minutes of meetings, 
agendas, annual reports, budgets, and other board papers were “…analysed with a 
view to [inductively] identifying key relevant themes and developing associated 
categories” (Parker, 2007a, p.1462).  
 
Memos were made of key categories in which the researcher identified various 
dimensions, contexts, relationships and meanings (Ryan & Bernard, 2000; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). As a result, each category had supporting observational and interview 
evidence. Next, various categories were compared to ascertain similarities and 
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differences. As a result, the data and memos provided a rich source of information, 
shedding light on relationships or behaviours relevant to the study. The researcher 
pursued assurance of data credibility through triangulation. Assessments were also 
made as to whether the data was authentic, reasonable and plausible (Parker & 
Northcott, 2016). 
 
Accounting researchers have the opportunity to contribute to corporate governance in 
a significant way. This is because accounting researchers have the tools and 
techniques at their disposal to be able to investigate and analyse corporate governance 
at its highest level. Qualitative techniques and theoretical lenses such as 
accountability enable accounting researchers to observe and analyse how and why the 
board works. So while independent or statutory bodies such as the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) and the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) can investigate the operations of failed organisations, 
these investigations only happen after something significant needs investigation. This 
response is reactionary in nature rather than taking a proactive approach. This study is 
only one of few which is proactive in nature. It can be distinguished from studies that 
are concerned with uncovering what went wrong. For example, investigations into 
NFP malpractices in the Australian Returned Services League (RSL) by the ACNC. 
This study considers a functional and successful NFP organisation to discover how 
board members enact their three roles in the NFP context.  
 
The valuable nature of a qualitative board study such as the present study is that the 
researcher is at the “coal-face” (Parker, 2011, p.444) of board processes and is able to 
observe, engage and discuss issues with those who are directly involved. In this case, 
those directly involved were the board members and the senior managers. This study 
boasts significant data from within the boardroom and the organisation. The 
researcher observed 37 meetings, total hours being 91.75 hours, spanning seven 
perspectives of the top-level structure of the organisation. Interviews were conducted 
with all board members including the Chair and all senior managers including the 
CEO. In total, there were 14 interviews, which spanned 13.18 hours. Approximately 
322 documents including board papers, handouts, committee papers, annual reports, 
budgets and email correspondence were collected and assessed.  
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Motivation and justification for the research 
Significance and impact of the research 
 
This study is significant in six key respects. 
 
First, this investigation considers board members individually and collectively in the 
NFP sector. The context in which this study is conducted is one of the distinguishing 
features of this research. The present investigation examines an organisation from the 
subset of the NFP sector that is typically classified as charities.3 Unlike most studies 
about directors which are in the FP sector (see for example: Roberts, McNulty & 
Stiles, 2005), the present investigation will outline many reasons that justify 
examining the role of the board member in the NFP sector. As discussed further in the 
Literature Review chapter, there are several characteristics of the NFP sector that 
present unique governance challenges for board members and senior managers. These 
characteristics, coupled with the major and rapid change that the Australian NFP 
sector is undergoing, justify more research in this area. This study aims to address 
some of these issues. 
 
Second, few NFP studies have investigated all three board member roles. This void in 
governance research has been acknowledged by scholars such as Salamon (2010), 
Parker (2007a, p.927) and McNulty and Pettigrew (1996). At this stage, Parker 
(2007a, 2003, 2008) has conducted research into the strategy and control roles of the 
board member in the NFP sector. Where Parker’s studies differ is that they do not 
focus exclusively on the NED, they also consider the CEO and senior managers. 
Furthermore, Parker’s studies apply different theoretical perspectives compared to 
this study. For example, Parker (2007a) applies an institutional lens (Parker, 2007a) 
and a grounded theory perspective (Parker, 2003, 2008) in his research. More 
recently, Kirwan and Brennan (2017), conducted research into the strategy and 
control board member roles in the private sector. Their study can be distinguished 
from the present in terms of the sector and the theory applied. Kirwan and Brennan 
(2017) investigated board members in the private sector and applied a legal theory of 
                                                
3 While the case study organisation can be argued to be especially relevant to the charity sector, this 
thesis will use the terminology “NFP organisation”, “NFP entity” or “NFP” to describe it. 
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guardianship. Furthermore, Kirwan and Brennan (2017) consider the strategy and 
control roles of the board member but the resource dependence role is unexplored. 
While Machold and Farquhar (2013) investigate all three board member roles in six 
boards, the boards were located in the UK and were not all NFP boards. What we do 
not know about board members is how, applying an accountability lens, they carry out 
all three roles in the NFP context in Australia.  
Third, there is a need for more process research into boards, especially NFP boards. 
For instance, Parker (2008) has identified the need more control-related research in 
NFPs. He argues that more research needs to be undertaken to confirm whether there 
are “any features of boardroom operational and financial control that may be unique 
to the non-profit sector” (Parker, 2008, p.84). A void in knowledge of the board 
member strategic role has also been discussed, including the need to understand more 
about interaction between the board Chair and the CEO leading strategic discussions 
(Parker, 2007b). There also appears to be little discussion about the board member’s 
resource dependence role in the NFP sector. Parker (2007b, p.932) touches on it 
stating, “…how nonprofit boards identify, recruit, shape and control their membership 
profile needs further investigation and elaboration”. Questions also remain about NFP 
board accountability (Parker, 2008, p.85). This illustrates that the board member roles 
in the NFP context need further investigation and this study is designed to address 
that deficiency.     
Fourth, another significant aspect of this research is the research method adopted. As 
mentioned earlier, scholars have identified that there is a need for qualitative research 
in corporate governance. While there is no shortage of board studies, the research 
method employed has usually been quantitative or mixed methods. Common 
techniques include using survey, questionnaire, content analysis and secondary data 
such as annual reports. Consequently, most of the research on boards and governance 
is conducted from the outside looking in, mainly trying to regress proxies for 
decisions board members make or organisational outcomes (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005, 
p.S36). We know little about actual governance processes that take place inside the 
boardroom, and this longitudinal case study addresses that vacuum.  
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Fifth, the uniqueness of this study lies not only in the subject of the study and its 
context, but it also draws upon significant amounts of data obtained from three 
different sources: participant observation, interview and documents. This is a single 
case study of a prominent NFP organisation in one state of Australia. The researcher 
had access to all board and committee meetings, as well as email correspondence 
between board members and the Chair. The study is a longitudinal study conducted 
over almost 18 months. A review of the literature reveals there are considerably less 
published participant observer board studies in the NFP context compared to the FP 
context. Furthermore, scholars utilising the combination of participant observer, 
interview and document analysis methods is scarce, yet it has been argued to be one 
of the most robust combinations of qualitative techniques (Peck, 1995). This is 
surprising, given the increasing significance of NFP organisations to the community 
and the value of qualitative research.  
 
Sixth, this study is not only intended to contribute to the growing area of NFP 
governance research and academic debate, it should also generate ideas for 
improvement in governance more generally. Identifying recommendations and 
successful governance approaches should be of value to those who work in the sector 
such as board members, policy-makers and industry bodies such as the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors (AICD) (Ahrens & Khalifa, 2013; Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008; Parker 2012, pp.54, 67). 
 
Contribution of this study 
This study builds on the existing qualitative NFP boardroom studies in six principal 
ways. First, it adds to the small but growing body of literature of board studies 
focused on board process. Second, the focus of the study on the board members and 
their multiple roles is a novel contribution to the governance literature. Third, the 
research methodology applied in this study answers calls for more rigorous qualitative 
research into the board. Fourth, the study contributes to the theoretical literature about 
concepts of accountability and how they apply in the NFP context. Fifth, as this study 
is nested in the NFP sector, it answer calls from scholars to investigate the unique 
characteristics of the NFP sector and the governance challenges it creates for boards. 
Sixth, this study aims to provide useful information for those who work in the NFP 
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sector including board members, policy-makers and industry bodies such as the 
AICD.  
Organisation of chapters 
The Literature Review chapter will compare the characteristics of the NFP and FP 
sectors, making the case for a need to understand governance in the NFP sector. The 
deficiencies in the literature with respect to how board members in NFP organisations 
enact their three roles will also be set out and explored. A Methodology chapter 
covers the qualitative methods used in the study and the advantages and 
disadvantages of such methods. The Theoretical Framework chapter will make the 
case for applying a framework of broad accountability to understand how NFP board 
members enact their three roles. This is followed by an Organisational Context and 
Profile chapter, which provides the background to the study. Three findings chapters 
are next, which explore the findings from theoretical analysis of the data. The 
Discussion and Conclusion chapter summarises the foregoing chapters including what 
the study set out to find, what was found, and the implications from such findings. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This Australian study is based in the NFP sector, where the roles and responsibilities 
of board members may be influenced by a range of internal and external factors. 
While there is increasing interest in governance in the NFP sector, very few studies 
have sought to discover how board members operate in the sector. The objective of 
this qualitative study is to investigate how NFP board members construct and execute 
their strategic, control and resource dependence roles. A review of the relevant 
literature is necessary to place this board study in context. As the literature about 
corporate governance is vast, covering a range of governance mechanisms and topics, 
a select number of mostly qualitative NFP board studies will be discussed in this 
chapter. However, some board studies in the public and private sectors will also be 
discussed because there is some overlap with issues common to the NFP sector. 
A number of papers in the corporate governance literature have already mapped the 
key evolutions in governance research to date. Much has been written about the 
dominant influence of agency theory since Berle and Means’ (1932) case for the 
separation of ownership from control (Brennan, Kirwan & Redmond, 2016, p.138) 
and the implications of using this theoretical lens. Scholars such as Brennan, Kirwan 
and Redmond (2016), Crow, Lockhart and Lewis (2014), Pugliese et al. (2009), 
Morrison and Salipante (2007), Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005), Miller (2002) 
and Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) have all argued that agency theory is limited in its 
utility in examining corporate governance phenomena.  
Agency theory is generally applied in quantitative corporate governance research. 
While useful for certain purposes, such as determining “board structure, composition 
and independence” (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005), agency theory and quantitative 
techniques are not usually used for governance research that is concerned with 
examining board processes. The limitations of quantitative studies have been 
discussed by many scholars who often argue that results from quantitative analyses 
are either inconclusive or they only explain governance phenomena to a partial extent 
(McNulty, 2013, pp.163, 171; Crow, Lockhart & Lewis, 2014; Pugliese et al., 2009). 
Crow, Lockhart and Lewis (2014, p.52) point out that although quantitative research 
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in corporate governance sought to reform the structure and composition of boards in 
response to governance failures, problems with accountability in governance persist. 
As McNulty (2013) asserts,  
One of the frustrations about recent events involving companies is that boards 
with apparently perfect governance arrangements and credentials were 
implicated in major cases of governance failure…[there is] growing evidence 
that it is board process rather than board structure or composition that best 
predict board performance and effects (McNulty, 2013, pp.171-172). 
In response to these inadequacies in governance research, McNulty and Stiles (2015, 
p.514) explain that there is much evidence to suggest that board effectiveness is 
probably better understood by examining the “behavioural dynamics of a board and 
the web of interpersonal and group relationships between the executive and the non-
executive”. 
Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) are an example of scholars who have led the 
way in recent board process studies, particularly in Australia, using qualitative 
techniques to analyse board member interactions in two Australian companies. They 
echo what other qualitative scholars have said about governance studies concerned 
with board composition, highlighting that board member interactions or “roles’ 
execution” could explain why board composition solutions have often provided 
unsatisfactory results (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, p.238). Another pioneer 
who has examined board process applying qualitative techniques is Parker (2003, 
2007a, 2007b, 2008). Parker has conducted longitudinal studies using the Complete 
Member Researcher (CMR) approach to participant observation to examine how 
select NFP boards in Australia operate. It is hoped that this study will complement the 
work of scholars such as Bezemer Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) and Parker (2008) 
by applying qualitative techniques to investigate board member roles in the NFP 
context. 
Despite the acknowledgement in the literature for a need to undertake board process 
studies, at the time of writing, the number of participant observer board studies was 
limited (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, p.239; Samra-Federicks 2000; Pye & 
Pettigrew, 2005). Of particular note is the lack of board process research in Australia 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). The two reasons for the gap in 
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research of this nature is due to the dominant influence of agency theory and the 
challenges of obtaining access to confidential boardroom interactions (Bezemer, 
Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, p.240). The participant observer board studies conducted 
in the NFP sector reveals even less participant observer studies (Parker, 2008; Parker, 
2007a). This Literature Review will mainly focus on select qualitative board studies, 
in the NFP, FP and public sectors, explaining what issues they examined and what 
they found. Areas for further research will also be identified. 
This study contributes to the governance literature in three novel ways. First, it is 
focused on the board members. Second, it investigates how they enact all three roles - 
their strategy, control and resource dependence roles in the NFP context. Part of this 
inquiry is determining whether the roles conflict or are complementary and whether 
there are any problems in discharging the roles. Third, it applies a theoretical lens of 
accountability which has been discussed by other board studies and NFP studies. In 
sum, this Literature Review explores the literature which is relevant to board roles, 
board process and the NFP sector as well as foreshadowing discussion about the 
theoretical perspective and methodology which will be applied. 
The following section introduces the NFP sector, outlining its significance in social, 
economic and political terms which justifies the need to understand governance in the 
sector. The section that follows compares the NFP sector with the FP sector, 
highlighting the similarities and differences and therefore the unique governance 
challenges the NFP sector presents. The Literature Review then turns to considering 
the board member role. In particular, the board member role with respect to board 
effectiveness and accountability is discussed and studies which examine such 
phenomena are analysed. The next section introduces the reader to a more specific 
board roles discussion, where the three key roles of strategy, control and resource 
dependence are discussed in the context of select prior studies. This discussion is 
followed by a section about board performance and the Literature Review then turns 
to sections that discuss the theoretical orientation of the study and the qualitative 
methodology employed. The chapter concludes by summarising the six key areas of 
contribution it aims to make as well as providing a summary of the broad messages 
inherent in the chapter.  
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The NFP sector 
A key distinguishing feature of this investigation is the sector in which the study is 
conducted. Much of the current governance literature is focused upon the private 
sector, the public sector or in institutions such as universities. The governance 
literature is lacking however in the NFP context. Sasso (2003, p.1495) observed there 
is a “dearth of studies on not-for-profit governance”. This deficiency in the 
accounting literature persists to date (Pugliese, Nicholson & Bezemer, 2015). The 
lack of NFP board studies is surprising given the social, economic and political 
significance of such organisations. As government is downsizing and outsourcing 
much service provision to NFPs, the level of services for which NFPs are responsible 
have increased significantly (Parker, 2008; Drucker, 1989; Ruckle, 1993). NFPs are 
often subject to considerable control and regulation through audits and accreditation 
processes to retain their service contracts, as well as having accounting and legal 
responsibilities. 
From a social perspective, NFPs are often pursuing a broad social agenda which spans 
a suite of services including: aged care, assisting the homeless, young people, single 
parents, people with mental illness or intellectual disabilities. The impact of NFP 
entities is often not solely confined to the people they serve. The family and friends of 
those who the NFP organisation assists are also often affected. Arguably, the broader 
community also benefit from the social services NFPs provide as they give people in 
need the support they require. 
From an economic perspective, NFP organisations also have a significant impact. In 
Australia, the NFP sector is worth $200 billion per annum with 56,894 NFP 
organisations operating in 2016 (Cooper, 2016, p.4). The NFP sector employs over 
1,000,000 people in Australia, which represents 8.5% of the Australian workforce 
(Cooper, 2016, p.4). NFP organisations have also often been able to meet areas of 
need where demand is increasing. For example, with an ageing population in 
Australia, there has been an increase in demand for aged care services.  
The NFP sector is also political to some extent. This is because NFPs often heavily 
depend on government funding from both Australian Federal and State Governments. 
As a result, NFP organisations often take a considerable interest in tendering for 
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service contracts designed to serve government policy. As a result, government 
funding usually influences an NFP organisation’s strategy and strategic decision-
making to a considerable degree. On the other hand, NFPs can also influence 
government policy. This can be achieved through lobbying and by discharging their 
advocacy role for certain sectors of society, for instance minority groups (Ospina, 
Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.25).  
The mission, vision and values of NFP organisations presents an additional level of 
complexity to the NFP picture. Carnegie and Wolnizer (1995, pp. 37-38) explain that 
an organisation’s objectives and mission shed light on why organisations account for 
things the way they do. While FP organisations also have a vision, their vision is often 
consistent with their shareholder’s mission – to provide a product or a service which 
has a profit-making motive. NFPs however, often have a mix of non-profit and profit-
making motives, the latter of which is not always congruent with their mission. 
Therefore, the adherence to an NFP mission is usually a challenging issue. Hardy and 
Ballis (2013) note the influence of mission and vision on accountability in their study 
of Health Food Company Sanitarium. They and other scholars encourage further 
research into accountability in religious organisations (Hardy & Ballis, 2013, p.559; 
Quattrone, 2004; Carmona & Ezzamel, 2006). 
The roles board members are expected to enact are likely to be affected by the values 
and mission of an NFP organisation to some extent. The values and mission of an 
NFP organisation is often tied to their strategy (Brennan, 2010) and long-term 
planning. Control is inherently tied to strategy (Tucker & Parker, 2013a) such that 
certain mechanisms should be in place to review how the organisation is achieving its 
long-term, medium-term and short-term goals. Resource dependence factors, 
including the resources and networks available to the organisation, are also usually 
influenced by the values and mission of the NFP. While the literature suggests all 
board member roles are impacted by the values and mission of an NFP organisation, 
questions remain about how board members deal with values and mission in their 
discussions and decisions (Collier, 2005; Morrison & Salipante, 2007; Parker, 2008; 
Holland, 2002). Therefore, there is a case for examining the roles of board members 
in the NFP sector because of the complexities inherent in the values and mission of 
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NFP organisations. The extent to which an NFP board is effective has been argued to 
depend on how well it fulfils its mission and values (Sasso, 2003, p.1499). 
As mentioned earlier, some NFP organisations have the additional challenge of 
dealing with a non-profit and a for-profit component simultaneously. The non-profit 
making motive can be defined as “…motivated by factors that fall outside standard 
commercial and public accountability” (Walker, 1998, p. 488; also see: Quattrone, 
2004; Jacobs & Walker, 2004; Kreander, McPhail & Molyneaux, 2004, pp. 416-418; 
McKernan & McPhail, 2012; Clemens, 2006, p. 212 – cited in Hardy & Ballis, 2013, 
p. 541). From an accounting perspective, this raises interesting corporate governance 
questions, as there are no common rules or methods governing NFP accountability in 
this respect. Shaoul, Stafford and Stapleton (2012) make a similar discovery with 
respect to Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) in the UK and observe that they are 
hybrid in nature, containing elements from both public and private enterprise. Hardy 
and Ballis (2013, p.559) conducted a study into a hybrid organisation Sanitarium 
Health Food Company and found its organisational leaders were able to discharge 
accountability to some of its stakeholders. Sanitarium was found to have an 
idiosyncratic method of financial reporting which used a faith-based, inward looking 
focus on mission. The study revealed while members of the Adventist religion seemed 
content with the method of reporting, it created “tensions and anxieties” for other 
stakeholders who demand a more outward-looking and commercial approach (Hardy 
& Ballis, 2013, pp. 541, 544).  
NFP organisations often have profit centres within their non-profit structure in 
response to the service delivery environment becoming more competitive (Dolnicar, 
Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008). Competition can have consequences for NFPs in terms of 
their mission (Hume & Hume, 2008; Dees & Anderson, 2003b). It is generally 
recognised that in order to remain competitive, NFP organisations have to adapt and 
change (Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008, p.112; Valentinov, 2010; Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2012). This often means becoming more ‘businesslike’ (Dimitrov, 2008, 
p.16). Questions arise as to whether this form of adaption will conflict with their 
original purpose and mission. A problem in recent times in an increasingly 
competitive environment is the corporate model is said to clash “…with the 
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philanthropic values of many nonprofit organizations” (Townley 2001 cited in Tucker 
& Parker, 2013a, p.102).  
The profit-making component of NFP operations can produce a potential conflict 
between NFP mission, vision and values. Further, the increasing commercial 
orientation, which some NFPs adopt to remain competitive can potentially 
compromise the priority given to NFP mission. This raises important governance 
questions which scholars Hardy and Ballis (2013), Harrow and Phillips (2013), 
Tucker and Parker (2013a), Tuckman and Chang (2006), and Dees and Anderson 
(2003a) have begun to consider. For example, how can NFPs successfully juggle their 
mission with the need to remain commercially viable? Parker (2003) has observed 
that while some NFPs have become more commercial to the extent that they mimic 
the private sector, their motivations are usually different and the way they enact their 
responsibilities also differs. Harrow and Phillips (2013, p.608) observe that NFP 
“organizational hybridity is a marked sectoral feature, with governance implications 
that may be far from clear”. This study aims to uncover what the implications are for 
a non-profit organisation which is undergoing a period of high organisational change 
in response to many of the pressures mentioned in the literature – such as the need to 
adapt to an increasingly competitive market.  
Comparing NFP and FP sector characteristics 
The environments in which FP and NFP organisations operate are different in some 
key respects. NFPs generally operate in a dynamic environment that is often subject 
to change and uncertainty (Salamon, 2010; Dimitrov, 2008). Government policy at 
both State and Federal levels influences NFP strategy, and legislative and regulatory 
changes affect how NFPs account for activities (Flack & Ryan, 2005). Service 
contracts, often provided by the Government to NFP entities, can affect NFP 
operations (Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008). With increasing numbers of 
competitors in the sector they can influence what areas of service delivery an 
organisation chooses to focus on, in what areas they exit, and how they deliver their 
services (Hume & Hume, 2008).  
While FPs can also operate in a dynamic environment and are influenced by 
competitors, they are often shielded from such expansive and uncertain change. In 
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particular, they are often not as beholden to government policy compared to NFP 
organisations. For example, when FPs experience change it is generally more discreet 
– being confined to their product or service delivery (Dees & Anderson, 2003a). The 
governance ramifications of NFPs operating in a dynamic environment are yet to be 
fully uncovered, but as the literature suggests, it is likely to impact on the strategic 
and accountability aspects of the NFP board (Harrow & Phillips, 2013, p.609).   
A comparison of the board structures for both NFP and FP organisations reveals 
certain factors that make NFPs more complex than FP organisations (Dees & 
Anderson, 2003a, 2003b). Considering board structure, NFP boards generally 
comprise board members who are often unpaid or paid little compared to board 
members in the FP sector (Parker, 2007a). In faith-based NFP organisations, there are 
sometimes requirements for board members to be members of the religious 
institution, which influences the recruitment of board members to some extent.  
Another point of difference between NFPs and FPs is their stakeholder groups. NFPs 
are likely to have more stakeholder groups compared to other sectors (Tucker & 
Parker, 2013a). FP organisations usually have a smaller group of stakeholders to 
contend with including shareholders and financiers (Salamon, 2010). Stakeholder 
groups in the NFP context include: State and Federal Governments, clients, donors 
and sponsors, staff and volunteers, and the community (Parker, 2008, p.66). Ideally, 
all groups of stakeholders should be satisfied as well as the NFP mission and values 
(Miller, 2002). This has considerable implications for NFP external and internal 
accountability. 
Ownership is usually a complex affair in NFP organisations because of its multiple 
stakeholder groups or its hybrid nature. Hybrid organisations can be defined as an 
organisation which has a combination of both NFP and FP characteristics and is 
subject to neither a market nor a hierarchical model of governance (Valentinov, 2010, 
pp.211-212; Harrow & Phillips. 2013). Consequently, “there is little consensus 
regarding who “owns” the nonprofit” (Miller, 2002, p.442). Sasso (2003, p.1497) 
agrees, contending that while there is some debate about ownership of FP entities “the 
issue becomes even more clouded in the not-for-profit context where – by definition – 
there can be no alienable claims to institutional profits”. 
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Questions about NFP ownership also feature in NFP organisations that are not hybrid 
organisations. The question arises due to the many stakeholder groups involved in 
NFP operations. Miller’s (2002) NFP study shows accountability to be a regular 
consideration and reveals the expectation of:  
…nonprofit boards to be accountable to the competing interests of multiple 
stakeholders with no clear indication of how performance will be assessed and 
no agreement as to who owns the nonprofit organisation (Miller, 2002, p.447). 
By contrast, “Ownership is relatively straightforward” (Miller, 2002, p.439) in FPs 
where shareholders generally own the company. In this sense, FP organisations often 
operate in a simpler fashion because their stakeholders’ interests are often at parity 
with their objectives – to provide a product or service for a profit. 
While both NFP and FP organisations have missions and objectives, they usually 
diverge when considering the purpose underpinning the mission and objectives. The 
mission statements of NFPs are often altruistic in nature and as a result, NFP mission 
tends not to express profit motives. This means that NFPs usually have a broader 
purpose compared to FP organisations because they not only have to fulfil their 
mission, but they also need to remain sustainable and competitive (Rentschler & 
Potter, 1996). A problem arising in recent times in an increasingly competitive 
environment is the corporate model is said to clash “…with the philanthropic values 
of many nonprofit organizations” (Townley 2001 cited in Tucker & Parker, 2013a, 
p.102).  
Measuring performance is another principal difference between NFP and FP entities. 
In the NFP sector this has been the subject of much debate as there are no universally 
accepted means of measuring NFP performance. According to Shaoul, Stafford and 
Stapleton (2012, p.219), similar difficulties in performance measurement prevail in 
PPPs where the expertise and systems to measure performance are lacking. It has 
been suggested that the most appropriate way of addressing performance 
measurement for NFP organisations is to make their mission the priority followed by 
“measures of performance and accountability” (Carnegie & Wolnizer, 1995; Parker, 
1996). On the other hand, FP organisations often have mission and objectives that are 
congruent with being a sustainable and competitive organisation (Rentschler & Potter, 
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1996). Measuring performance of FP entities is comparatively straightforward 
because its mission can more easily be quantified and measured.  
Table 2.1 outlines the main factors of difference for NFP and FP entities and provides 
a summary of the key characteristics for both types of entity. 
Table 2.1 Key characteristics of NFP and FP entities 
Factor NFP characteristics  FP characteristics 
External environment High degree of policy 
change, dynamic, increasing 
competition, service 
contracts. 
Competition may or may not 
be high depending on 
strategy of FP entity (cost 
leadership or product/service 
differentiation).  
Board structure Membership requirements 
sometimes necessary for NFP 
faith-based or membership 
organisations. Remuneration 
of board members increasing 
but comparably smaller 
salaries provided to NFP 
board members compared to 
the FP sector.  
Generally directors do not 
have membership 
requirements to satisfy. 
Directors almost always 
remunerated in some way 
and salaries are nearly 
always more than those 
provided for NFP board 
members.  
Stakeholder groups State and Federal 
Governments, clients, 
donors, staff, volunteers, the 
community. 
Shareholders and financiers. 
Ownership 
 
No consensus as to who 
owns the NFP entity. No 
party has clear claims to any 
profits from the entity. 
Owned by shareholders. 
Mission and values Often altruistic in nature and 
not congruent with profit-
making motives. This is 
being challenged in recent 
times with the need for many 
NFPs to become more 
financially and operationally 
sustainable. 
To make a profit for 
shareholders. 
Measuring performance Much debate about the 
measuring of NFP 
performance. Difficulties in 
quantifying and measuring 
the outcomes of many NFP 
activities. 
Relatively straightforward. 
Follows established practices 
in management accounting 
and finance. 
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Directors and the board: multiple roles 
There is debate in the literature about whether board member roles conflict or are 
complementary. For example, Cornforth (2003, p.14) identified a tension between the 
“controlling” role of the director and their “partnering” task with senior managers. 
The focus on role tensions in the literature stems from the fact that of the three board 
member roles identified, each of them have been influenced by a particular theoretical 
perspective. For instance, as discussed in the Introduction chapter, agency theory 
often drives the focus on the control role of the director. On the other hand, 
stewardship theory argues that directors need to collaborate and partner with senior 
managers (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009, p.26) suggesting a more strategic focus. 
Kirwan and Brennan (2017) provide a more recent perspective on board roles, arguing 
that the two key director roles of control and advice are compatible. While the current 
study is not primarily focused on identifying role conflicts and exploring whether or 
not they are compatible, it is still a relevant consideration when investigating what 
boards do and how effective they may be (Cornforth, 2003, p.15). 
Understanding whether or not director roles are in conflict helps researchers analyse 
board effectiveness. Definitions of board effectiveness differ depending on the 
theoretical perspective adopted (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). As the focus of this 
Literature Review is on qualitative board studies, perspectives informed by agency 
theory and positivist methods will not be discussed at length. Suffice to say that 
governance studies that are positivist tend to assert that board effectiveness is 
achieved when board members are independent from management (Westphal 1999; 
Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004a). Alternatively, applying a theoretical perspective 
which is conducive to examining board process frames board effectiveness as: 
“Effective boards might be described as those that amount to more than a summing of 
individual contributions and where the dynamic of different people working 
together…adds value” (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005, p.S32).  
Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.129) summarise the key components to board effectiveness 
as “…the calibre of its members, their willingness to participate, and the quality of 
relationships between them”. According to Machold and Farquhar (2013, p.147), 
board process studies “offer…new insights into board tasks and how effectively they 
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are performed”. The current study is concerned with examining these aspects of board 
effectiveness applying a process approach. 
The literature, which examines board effectiveness from a process perspective, almost 
always considers board roles and how they are enacted (Bezemer, Nicholson & 
Pugliese, 2014; Machold & Farquhar, 2013; Pye & Camm, 2003, p.60). For example, 
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) in a pilot study of 20 board members examine the 
power and influence of board members to prevent or enable things from happening. In 
particular, it has been found that board member influence increases in times of crisis 
or transition (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Additionally, a series of contextual factors 
such as the behaviour of the Chair and CEO were found to impact on board members’ 
influence (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995, p.870). Board process studies also highlight 
the importance of board process to understanding board effectiveness and 
accountability.  
Behavioural dynamics in and around the boardroom represent one of the keys to 
the effectiveness of NEDs and this is a crucial ingredient in shaping the 
conditions for board and managerial accountability (Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1995, p.871).  
Another example of a board study which investigates how board roles are enacted is 
that by Samra-Fredericks (2000) who conducted a participant observer study of a 
manufacturing firm in the UK. She found that the discourse and behaviours of 
“managerial elites”  - directors and senior managers - often forms part of everyday 
routines that facilitate the execution of board member roles and performance. Samra-
Fredericks (2000, p.324) argues more “boards-in-action” research in governance 
needs to be conducted. 
Parker’s (2007a) complete member researcher participant observer board study of two 
NFP organisations has paved the way to understanding board process since Samra-
Fredericks’ participant observer study. He found that individual board members are 
often “champions” of particular strategies while at the collective board level, 
strategising is a contextual, political and dynamic process (Parker, 2007a, p.1476). 
Parker (2007a) also argues that “deeper understandings” of board process and 
behaviours is attained through participant observer studies and suggests more board 
research of this nature is undertaken to build on the current findings. 
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There are also board studies that are focused on examining the board as a collective 
group and their behaviour. Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015) distinguish their 
research from board studies that examine board member roles by investigating how 
the board as a collective group makes decisions. Like Parker (2007a), they find that 
contributions of directors are dynamic and contextual. Pugliese, Nicholson and 
Bezemer (2015) find factors such as timing and type of agenda items affects board 
dynamics (2015, pp.17, 20). The scholars also argue that an effective board is one that 
is inclusive and has differing levels of participation at different times. Similarly, 
Brennan, Kirwan and Redmond (2016) analyse the impact of information sharing at 
the board level (“group level”) and the director level (“individual level”) in their 
conceptual paper about how accountability processes occur in boardrooms with 
respect to information asymmetry between senior managers and directors. They find 
that information asymmetry between board members and managers is not detrimental 
to directors’ roles. Brennan, Kirwan and Redmond (2016) encourage further research 
into this area of board process, which this study is well placed to address.  
A review of select board studies has uncovered the complexities in understanding 
board roles and in most cases they need to be considered at both the individual board 
member and the collective board level to obtain a more holistic perspective of 
governance. Hill (1995, p.251) explains that directors on a board have equal legal 
responsibility and it is “a collective responsibility”, however, in practice, some 
directors are more influential than others. Pye (2002, p.161) acknowledges that there 
are challenges with examining board member roles due to “individual and collective 
action and how this might be known and evaluated”. In their study of nine directors 
and their strategic roles, O’Neal and Thomas (1995, pp.85-86) dealt with the 
individual and collective aspects of directors by identifying them as “board” and 
“individual directors” and discussing them separately. Pye and Pettigrew (2005) 
encourage and adopt a similar approach. A decade later, Pugliese, Nicholson and 
Bezemer (2015, p.17) still observe that there is a challenge in “determining how to 
operationalize and measure” the dynamics of directors. The scholars argue that they 
attempt to overcome this challenge by providing analysis at different levels – the 
group and individual levels as well as an analysis of the impact of context (i.e. how 
the board meetings are conducted and types of agenda items discussed). Following 
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these board process studies, the distinction between the individual board member and 
the collective board levels will be made in the present study. 
As the current investigation follows in the tradition of board process studies, it too, 
defines board effectiveness as the extent to which a board adds value to the 
organisation through the contributions of both individual board members and the 
board working together. In a similar way to Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015), 
this study uses a combination of the individual board member analysis as well as 
considering how the board functions as a collective whole. Board effectiveness has 
also been defined as the extent to which the board satisfies the mission of the 
organisation (Sasso, 2003, p.1499). This study also considers context – but in a 
different manner to Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015). Context in the current 
study is concerned with the unique characteristics of the NFP organisation and the 
environment in which it operates. 
This multi-level approach is appropriate in light of calls for the same. For example, 
scholars Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) and Pugliese et al. (2009) all 
advocate multi-level analysis in board studies. Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese 
(2014) recommend using multi-level analysis and studying the “micro-interactions 
and contributions” of board members. Pugliese et al. (2009, p.302) also support the 
view for multi-level analysis, including understanding the “macro, meso, and micro 
dynamics, and how these forces jointly shape the relationship between boards of 
directors and strategy”. 
Returning to the debate in the literature about whether the roles of directors conflict or 
are complementary, it is important to consider the theoretical perspective, which 
underpins the literature in this regard. Governance literature which is informed by 
agency theory or similar positivist perspectives often argues that the roles of directors 
create a conflict. This conflict is argued to generate an “independence paradox” 
because the director needs to act as a watchdog as well as being a source of advice 
and counsel to senior managers (Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004a; Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992). On the other hand, Tricker (2009) classifies director roles into two 
groups: conformance and performance. The conformance roles refer to the director’s 
responsibility to control the senior managers whereas the performance roles relate to 
the director’s strategic and resource dependence functions. Tricker (2009) argues that 
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it is possible for directors to discharge both roles. Similarly, board studies focused on 
process usually take the position that the roles are complementary and work together 
(Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005). Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003, p.411) find that 
director roles can be balanced and is not simply a case of board members roles being 
enacted in an “either/or” sense. 
Some NFP literatures argue that a consideration of the contextual factors under which 
the entity is operating is significant, as it can affect the priority given to particular 
board roles. For example, Ostrower and Stone (2006) observe the degree of 
preference given to board roles “will often be determined by a range of diverse factors 
including, for example, an organization’s wider environment and the particular skill 
sets and interests of individual board members” (Ostrower & Stone, 2006 cited in 
Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009, p.22). 
Most board studies that examine board process consider multiple board roles. This 
approach to board research challenges other board research that views board roles as 
separate, discreet tasks (Machold & Farquhar, 2013, p.160). Considering the multiple 
roles of the director usually views the roles operating together, but in different ways, 
depending on the conditions. Machold and Farquhar (2013, p.148) find that all board 
tasks are enacted by the six boards in their multiple case study however they are 
enacted with varying degrees. This was found to depend on how much time is 
allocated to the tasks, the external and internal contingencies the organisation is 
encountering, and the type of organisation (for example, small to medium sized firms 
or NFP organisations).  
Applying a process approach in combination with a theoretical perspective such as 
accountability allows a holistic examination of board tasks and how they are 
performed over time (Pettigrew, 2012). Further research is encouraged using this 
approach in countries other than the UK (Machold & Farquhar, 2013). McNulty 
(2013, p.172) also argues that board studies, which are focused on process, are likely 
to uncover behaviours and relationships, which enhances our understanding of 
influence, accountability and board effectiveness. The present longitudinal case study 
examines board process applying relevant concepts of accountability. This should 
clarify whether board roles are complementary and add additional insights into the 
effect of internal and external factors on the discharge of board member roles. 
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Towards board and director accountability 
The board literature that is focused on examining board process board effectiveness is 
achieved through various forms of accountability. For example, Roberts, McNulty 
and Stiles (2005) argue that by “creating accountability” directors achieve board 
effectiveness in their study of 40 UK Publicly Listed Companies. Roberts, McNulty 
and Stiles (2005) argue that board effectiveness is dependent on how board members 
are accountable for their roles and for keeping senior managers accountable 
(McNulty, 2013, p.167). The scholars suggest further research of this type should be 
conducted in countries other than the UK. The present Australian study can contribute 
to the literature in this regard.  
Holland (2002) considers accountability to be central to how boards from 34 different 
NFP organisations in the US operate, finding six sets of board practices, which 
promote accountability. He argues that if these six practices are followed, then board 
effectiveness is enhanced as value is added to the organisation by board members, as 
well as bolstering public trust. Holland (2002, p.427) explains that further research is 
required into the factors which condition board accountability and the consequences. 
While Holland (2002) finds trust a crucial element in how effective an NFP 
organisation is perceived to be by its external stakeholders, Sasso (2003) finds trust 
between internal stakeholders – the board and senior managers is an important 
ingredient in the effective functioning of the board.  
A three year case study conducted by Collier (2005) into a quasi-public sector 
housing organisation applied Roberts’ theories of accountability and builds on the 
calculative (numbers based) and the narrative (interpretative) forms of accountability 
espoused by Roberts (1991, 1996, 2001). Collier (2005, p.929) argues that a third type 
of accountability exists, called the “non-calculative, non-narrative” space. Collier 
(2005, p.948) suggests further research into accountability employing longitudinal 
studies that use “observational and analytical skills”. It is evident that there are board 
studies which view accountability as crucial to achieving board effectiveness in many 
sectors – private, NFP and quasi-public sectors. 
There are also examples of board studies which either use accountability as an 
informing theoretical framework or are designed to develop a theory of 
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accountability. Directly relevant to the current investigation is the NFP board study 
undertaken by Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002). They undertook a dual case study 
of four Latino NFP organisations in New York City. Their interview data revealed the 
challenges of accountability in the NFP sector and how they were addressed by the 
organisations. They found that the community was a central stakeholder and revealed 
how the NFPs studied discharged their accountability to the community. 
Accountability to other stakeholder groups was also analysed and they argue that a 
“strategic approach to managing accountability” is required (Ospina, Diaz & 
O’Sullivan, 2002, p.29). In a similar way, Morrison and Salipante (2007) support the 
need to use accountability as an informing lens in the NFP context.  
Morrison and Salipante (2007) use grounded theory to contribute to perspectives on 
accountability in the NFP sector with respect to how the Chair of the board and the 
CEO engage in strategising in an NFP organisation. Applying a theoretical 
perspective of broad accountability, Morrison and Salipante (2007) find that “blended 
strategising” describes what occurs in the NFP organisation they studied. This is 
where formal and emergent strategy is enacted by organisational leaders. The formal 
aspects tend to be exercised to demonstrate to stakeholders that the organisation is 
acting in a responsible fashion. Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and 
Salipante (2007) explore the theoretical literature on accountability, arguing that it is 
particularly relevant for board studies in the NFP sector.  
Seminal works about accountability were mostly written in the 1990s when 
accountability started to become a focus in governance studies. Accountability 
concepts from seminal works are discussed, synthesised and applied by Ospina, Diaz 
and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007). Both groups of scholars 
use multiple perspectives of accountability to inform their findings. There are 
similarities in the seminal works both groups of scholars rely upon. Scholars such as 
Kearns (1996) and Behn (2001) are common to both Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan 
(2002) and Morrison and Salipante’s (2007) accountability discussion. Ospina, Diaz 
and O’Sullivan (2002) also consider accountability concepts expressed by Brooks 
(1995) and Romzek (1996).  
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) argue that concepts articulated by accountability 
scholars help researchers understand how accountability is enacted by leaders in an 
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NFP context. In a similar way, Morrison and Salipante (2007) cover accountability 
concepts by Kearns (1996) and Behn (2001) but also refer to Boland and Schultze 
(1996). Morrison and Salipante (2007, pp.198-199) synthesise the common concepts 
from these seminal works and distil them to two key accountability concepts: “rule-
based accountability” and “negotiable accountability”. They argue that the two 
accountability concepts should help researchers understand “how accountability can 
be achieved” “in the governance of organisations”. Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan 
(2002, p.28) and Morrison and Salipante (2007, p.197) are united in their view that a 
“broad” theory of accountability is suitable for NFP board studies. They also argue 
that more qualitative research into NFP entities using a theoretical perspective of 
broad accountability is required. Broad accountability will be discussed later in this 
chapter under the heading “Towards a theoretical perspective”. 
The unique characteristics of NFP organisations often create implications for 
accountability. As discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the unique characteristics 
of the NFP sector is the influence of mission on the board and the organisation. 
Scholars have recently applied accountability to their studies in similar sectors where 
moral responsibilities are important. For example, O’Leary (2017, p.35) in her dual 
case study of two Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), found an accountability 
that she called a “rights-based approach to development”. This form of accountability 
builds on the calls in the literature to consider a broader accountability, an 
accountability that not only considers regulation and control, but also the strategic and 
moral dimensions of giving an account (O’Leary, 2017, pp.35-36). Another example 
of a scholar who has used accountability as an informing lens in understanding how 
leaders of organisations operate is Parker (2014). Parker (2014, p.635) describes 
“accountability through action” as the way the four leading British industrialists in the 
19th and 20th centuries enacted their social and philanthropic motives. Parker (2014) 
finds that all four industrial leaders were able to pursue business, and moral and social 
values at the same time through various strategies.  
NFP organisations that have a faith-based component also raise questions of 
accountability because they often have a deity to whom they are also accountable as 
well the need to fulfil their own mission and values. Furthermore, the absence of 
universal practices of reporting in such settings has motivated some researchers to 
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investigate how accountability works in such organisations. For example, Jayasinghe 
and Soobaroyen (2009, p.1016) used grounded theory methods to investigate how 
accountability is enacted in two NFP organisations - one based in Sri Lanka and the 
other in Mauritius. They find that accountability is largely enacted through informal 
and social practices such as maintaining religious facilities or places of worship such 
as temples. On the other hand, formal accounting practices such as Annual General 
Meetings (AGMs) and annuals reports are ceremonial in nature “aimed at signalling 
their congruence with social expectations” (Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009, p.1015).  
Similar findings of informal account giving were uncovered in a case study of 
Sanitarium Health Food Company, a hybrid organisation in Australia. Hardy and 
Ballis (2013) use primary and secondary archival sources, interviews and media 
reports to determine how Sanitarium discharges its accountability to stakeholder 
groups. Using an accountability framework by Mashaw (2006), they found that 
informal reporting dominates the accountability activities of such an organisation. 
Reporting is communicated in various forms. For example, through church services, 
advertisements or annual conventions. The need to undertake more research into 
faith-based organisations and how they enact accountability is highlighted. 
Investigations of accountability practices in faith-based organisations has not only 
shed light on how accountability is enacted in a particular context, but such studies 
also often contribute to accountability perspectives. For example, Joannides (2012) 
investigates how accountability is practiced in an ethnographic study of the Salvation 
Army in Paris. Joannides (2012, p.249) explored how accountability in a religious 
NFP setting is enacted by the organisation’s “leaders, ministers and soldiers”. He 
found that the difficulties in rendering an account to the highest authority, in this case, 
to God, were overcome by individuals engaging in “accounterability”. The concept of 
accounterability was first devised by Kamuf (2007) and is the process where 
individuals circumvent the limitations and problems of accountability by becoming 
accountable according to their own interpretation of accountability and applying that 
practice consistently. Further academic inquiry is encouraged into how accountability 
is construed and enacted in similar organisational contexts (Joannides, 2012, p.256). 
The current study is likely to be able to make a theoretical contribution to 
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accountability frameworks by either complementing, challenging or building on what 
has been found about accountability in this respect. 
Another key accountability issue identified for further investigation is the 
dissemination of information to and from the board. Adopting an agency theory 
perspective, it is argued that board members are likely to experience information 
asymmetry compared to senior managers who have access to organisation information 
and control, to a fair extent, what information board members are exposed to (Stiles & 
Taylor, 2001).  In addition, the fact that board members are more removed from the 
organisation means they are less exposed to the key issues facing the organisation. 
Taking a different perspective, Brennan Kirwan and Redmond (2016, p.159) have 
asserted that information asymmetry is not detrimental for governance. They argue 
that it is a natural, healthy phenomenon, as it encourages objective critique and 
questioning by board members. Without some asymmetry of information, there would 
be no need for a board, they argue. Such a perspective challenges the dominant view 
of agency theory that information asymmetry is a negative aspect of how governance 
functions.  
In their multiple case study of six UK organisations, Machold and Farquhar (2013, 
pp.160-161) find the dissemination of information occurs in the organisations and 
constitutes what they call a “passive role” of the director where they receive 
information from senior managers. The scholars are critical of this process, arguing 
too much time was spent by senior managers delivering information to the board that 
was already present in the board papers. These findings suggest that some boards try 
to guard against the asymmetry of information between senior managers and board 
members by going to great lengths to ensure information is presented to board 
members. This study will investigate whether information asymmetry is an issue in 
the NFP organisation under study and how it is managed. 
A review of the application of theories of accountability in board research has shown 
its increasing significance in explaining board roles, board process and context. Board 
roles can be explained using an accountability perspective (Huse, 2005, pp. S73-75; 
Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005). Similarly, an accountability lens is able to provide 
insights about board process – for example, the board’s decision-making culture, 
interactions inside and outside the boardroom, and the formal and informal aspects of 
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board work (Huse, 2005, pp. S73-75; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005). The 
influence of contextual factors and the influence of board members on board 
accountability can also be elucidated using theories of accountability (Heracleous, 
2001 cited in Pye & Camm, 2003, p.59).  
While there are sometimes assertions that accountability is not yet a “grand” theory 
(Llewellyn, 2003, p.676), this has not diminished its significance in investigating 
board roles, board process and the contextual factors which impact on boards. Huse 
(2005) argues that more board research investigating board accountability is 
necessary and recommends the use of more direct methods of research such as 
participant observer methods and case studies. “The use of case studies may be 
needed to meet some research questions…[which] may include direct observations…” 
(Huse, 2005, p.S76). As discussed previously, there are other board studies which 
have used accountability as the informing theory as well as qualitative techniques 
including Holland (2002), Collier (2005), Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002), 
Morrison and Salipante (2007), Joannides (2012) and Hardy and Ballis (2013). This 
single case study answers the call for further research and intends to complement and 
build on the board process studies in accountability undertaken by these scholars. 
This overview of some of the key governance literature in accountability reveals a 
convincing case for applying a framework of accountability to understand the issues 
discussed in this study. The complex nature of NFP organisations with their unique 
characteristics and many stakeholder groups suggests a need for theory that can 
analyse board member roles and effectiveness in such an environment. A theory of 
accountability is also well suited to examine board members and their ways of 
enacting the strategy, control and resource dependency roles in the NFP sector. In 
addition, this section has outlined a case for board process studies to examine board 
roles, board process and board context. While some of the foregoing board process 
studies investigate contexts different to the NFP sector, such as Samra-Fredericks 
(2000), Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) or Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer 
(2015), they are valuable in supporting the case for board studies which use 
qualitative methods to directly examine governance phenomena. Furthermore, there 
are qualitative board studies which have been conducted in the NFP sector including 
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Parker (2003, 2007a), Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and 
Salipante (2007). 
Board member roles 
The following section will discuss the three board roles that are discussed in prior 
board studies. A limited selection of board studies which discuss the three board 
member roles will be the focus of the following sections about board roles. While the 
three roles have been separated into three separate sections, this does not imply that 
they are mutually exclusive. As outlined in the preceding section, there is a body of 
governance literature which suggests board roles are complementary and often linked. 
The literature strongly suggests that whether priority is given to one type of board role 
over another is generally due to the external or internal conditions (Machold & 
Farquhar, 2013) or the preference given to board roles as per the governance 
structures such as the board agenda (Pugliese, Nicholson & Bezemer, 2015). This 
study will investigate whether or not such arguments are sound. McNulty (2013) 
encourages more research on this point. He argues more academic research is required 
to confirm whether the board roles are “so distinct in practice, or are they so 
inextricably related as to suggest that by being active in one task you will be active in 
another?” (McNulty, 2013, p.172) 
The strategic role of board members 
With calls in the literature for an increased focus on the strategic role of board 
members, this study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the board member 
strategic role. Heracleous (2001 cited in Pye & Camm, 2003, p.59) agues that more 
research needs to be undertaken with respect to the advice and counsel role of the 
director as well as how directors’ networks influence their role. Hill (1995) provides a 
thorough description of the strategic activities directors undertake. This includes the 
need for directors to be capable of thinking about the future, to be able to assess the 
environment in which they operate as well determining how resources of the 
organisation should be allocated (Hill, 1995, p.250). As Pye and Camm (2003, p.60) 
explain, the preoccupation of the governance literature on the control role of directors 
needs to change so that strategic aspects of their role are also considered. Only 
focusing on the control role of directors implies a focus on controlling activities rather 
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than understanding how directors obtain a competitive advantage for their 
organisation. 
The literature exhibits different perspectives about how board members enact their 
strategy role. Given the interplay of contextual factors with strategy, it appears that a 
single approach for strategy enactment is not possible. Hendry and Kiel (2004) have 
suggested contingency approaches for understanding strategy. Other scholars such as 
Inglis and Weaver (2000, p.69) outline the types of strategic activities directors 
undertake including “…developing and assessing long-range and strategic plans, 
ensuring a mission and vision…developing policy, and using an ongoing 
evaluation…” Some academics adopt the view that the board should have a minimal 
role in strategy – limited to reviewing and approving (O’Neal and Thomas, 1995; 
Andrews, 1979, 1980, 1981; Mintzberg, 1994; Aram & Cowen, 1986; Rosenstein, 
1987). Others argue the board should play a larger role in strategy formulation (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lauenstein, 1982). Crow, Lockhart and 
Lewis (2014) also espouse a large strategic role for board members. They argue that 
the value board members bring to an organisation is through their “active and on-
going involvement in strategic thinking and management processes; strategic 
decision-making; and, the monitoring of strategy implementation…” (2014, p.52). 
In empirical terms, much of the literature about strategy is prescriptive. In other 
words, the literature explains how strategy should be discharged, but does not 
adequately address how it is discharged in practice. Hyndman and McDonnell (2009, 
p.22) give the example of NFP guidelines from the UK which explain that the 
strategic role of the director should be the primary role they enact. In a similar way, 
the AICD (2016) NFP board study highlights the strategic role of board members to 
be one of the most important functions they discharge. While useful for NFP directors 
in guiding the focus of their activities, there still remains the need to better understand 
how board members enact their roles. It is not surprising therefore that calls continue 
for further research into how boards function. 
The qualitative board studies that examine board process reveal multiple approaches 
to strategy. For example, Hill’s (1995) study of directors, CEOs, CFOs and Board 
Chairs found a particular focus of directors on succession management to the board 
and senior manager positions as well as a high interest in monitoring the performance 
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of senior managers. On the other hand, O’Neal and Thomas (1995, p.88) found 
inadequacies in the processes of the selection of directors and succession 
management. They argue that these strategic processes have failed to adapt to “…the 
increasing complexity and increasing need for strategic flexibility…” It appears that 
the differences in findings might be due to the influence of contextual factors. For 
example, Machold and Farquhar (2013) found that one of the six organisations they 
studied differed to the others because its primary focus was on strategic issues, not 
control issues. The scholars argue this difference was due to the “organizational 
crisis” the entity was experiencing (2013, p.157).  
A common theme in many of the NFP board studies is the influence of contextual 
factors on the strategic role of board members. Cornforth and Edwards (1999) argue 
that this is due to a “complex interplay of institutional and organisational factors”. 
Institutional factors, hereafter referred to as “external factors”, include the influence 
of government and regulatory pressures, the state and market pressures. 
Organisational factors, hereafter called “internal factors”, include the selection of 
board members, their skills and how they conceive governance, the provision of 
information to board members, and how board meetings are organised and conducted 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001). O’Neal and Thomas (1995) have also reported that the age of 
the organisation, the size of the board and the number of outside directors can also 
influence the extent to which a board engages in strategy. In the six boards they 
studied in the UK, Machold and Farquhar (2013, p.156) also noted that the conditions 
in which the organisations operated influenced the manner and extent of strategising 
undertaken by board members. This suggests the need to consider the context as well 
as the board roles. 
NFP boards can engage in both formal and informal modes of strategy. Formal 
strategy can be defined as activities that follow the formal procedures such as formal 
reports, board papers or a strategic plan. Informal strategy on the other hand, follows 
avenues that do not adopt formal methods. This could include strategic dialogue prior 
to a board meeting or after a board meeting (Young et al., 2001, p.233; Parker, 2008). 
Parker (2003; 2007b) found that informal strategic planning occurred in two of his 
NFP case studies and again in a dual case study of two large NFP organisations 
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(Parker, 2008). As well as formal and informal strategy, there are also external and 
internal factors to consider.  
Factors external to the board and organisation include the how the organisation fulfils 
its mission, satisfies its stakeholders and remains financially and operationally 
sustainable. Internal factors include internal strategic documents, infrastructure and 
systems to help the organisation so that they can remain a going concern. Morrison 
and Salipante (2007) use the term “blended strategising” to explain their findings of 
an NFP organisation which engaged in both deliberate (formal and external) 
strategising and emergent (informal and internal) strategising.  
Internal governance structures as well as external factors can influence strategy on 
boards. Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.119) make the point that internal mechanisms such 
as the Executive Committee can “filter out many [strategic] proposals” and the board 
similarly ensures strategic proposals are of a high standard. Morrison and Salipante 
(2007, pp.198, 208) argue that stakeholders have a significant influence on the form 
of strategy adopted by an organisation. Furthermore, they argue that strategy which 
blends both deliberate and emergent strategising is needed in NFPs so they can stay 
true to their missions thereby satisfying their stakeholder groups. O’Neal and Thomas 
(1995) argue that strategic boards are ones which are attuned to environmental change 
and uncertainty, undertake performance evaluations of management, analyse 
corporate strategy and provide advice and counsel to management. Crow, Lockhart 
and Lewis (2014) argue that strategy drives performance and knowing how this 
process occurs can be useful for keeping organisations sustainable.  
In sum, it is known that board members in NFP organisations perform a strategic role 
with varying degrees, which is largely dependent on a number of contextual factors. 
When NFP board members discharge their strategic roles in the NFP sector, they tend 
to do it in an informal manner. When formal strategy comes into play it is often 
undertaken as a “comforting” measure or form of “window dressing” to keep 
stakeholder groups satisfied. Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) refer to “a strategic 
approach to managing accountability” to describe the actions of NFP managers which 
are geared towards satisfying their stakeholders. The broad accountability concept 
that refers to this practice is negotiable accountability. It will be interesting to see 
 56 
whether negotiable accountability occurs at the board level as well. This study intends 
on finding whether that is the case. 
More board studies investigating how boards deal with strategy have been 
encouraged. In particular, Tucker and Parker (2013a) observe that how strategy and 
control roles work together in NFP organisations has not been considered at length in 
the literature and requires further investigation Parker (2008, p.86) notes “…an urgent 
need for further insider research that penetrates the very heart of director thinking and 
behaviour”. Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015, p.20) highlight a need to 
undertake further research in realms outside the board meetings, including 
“committee meetings or informal mechanisms”. This study is likely to be able to 
contribute in this regard, as the researcher attended committee meetings and 
gatherings outside of the boardroom. 
The control role of board members 
There is a considerable body of literature that examines the control role of board 
members. Much of this focus on the control role can be attributed to the influence of 
agency theory and its emphasis on control aspects of governance. Control in this 
respect is argued to curb opportunities for managers to misappropriate resources of 
the firm. There is a body of literature, however, which suggests that assessing control 
in the NFP context is different (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009, p.14). Miller (2002) 
finds that agency theory is insufficient to “explain the nonprofit board’s monitoring 
behaviour” (2002, p.446). This is because control is usually more complex in the NFP 
setting due to the many different stakeholders involved and a lack of clarity about 
ownership.  
This study aims to shed light on the forms of control that take place at the board level 
of the organisation and understand how control activities are enacted by directors. 
The control role of board members in the NFP sector has also generated considerable 
discussion. In some studies, control has been found to be the primary role enacted by 
board members. For example, Machold and Farquhar (2013) find that control related 
activities such as monitoring, “scrutiny of budgets; financial, market, and employee 
performance; risk registers; and organizational policies and procedures review” are 
the most commonly performed board task. On the other hand, Harrow and Phillips 
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(2013) explain the increasing pressure on NFP organisations to conform to regulations 
– particularly in the case of NFP organisations which are hybrid in nature and have a 
profit component. Considering the contextual factors at play, there is little doubt that 
there are forces which encourage boards to focus on control. For instance, the 
increasing attention to NFP organisations given their significant influence as well as 
recent governance problems in the NFP sector are factors which encourage a control 
focus. The question for this study is whether these forces have an impact on the board 
in such a way to encourage a control focus, or whether there are other reasons why 
control is enacted. Moreover, this study is focused on understanding how board 
members in the NFP board enact their control role. 
The literature argues control can be divided into two types: operational control and 
financial control (Parker, 2008). The literature suggests that control is both a 
management and a board member role (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.121). In a 
longitudinal field study of two large NFP professional organisations, Parker (2008, 
p.85) notes that operational control is in the domain of both managers and the 
directors. As control straddles both board members’ and senior managers’ roles, 
potential problems can surface. For example, at what point does the senior manager’s 
role start and end? What point does the board member’s role start and end? How do 
board members know where the boundary is between their role and that of senior 
managers? On the face of it, these questions suggest a lack of demarcation in the roles 
board members are expected to discharge. Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.79) identify an 
“…apparently irreconcilable conflict between the board’s role in the strategy process 
and the board’s role in monitoring and controlling the organization…” 
It has been argued that there is a risk that board members can stay into operational 
territory which is typically the realm of the senior manager. This is called 
“operational drift” (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). Some research has been conducted 
in this regard into the NFP board. Parker (2007a) finds that board members may or 
may not be aware that they are drifting into activities which are in the domain of 
management. In Parker’s (2007a) dual board study, one board acknowledged that they 
sometimes strayed into management’s realm, whereas the other board was not aware 
of this behaviour. Cornforth and Edwards (1999) also report the blurring of board 
roles and management roles in their four board studies. A key factor that was found to 
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encourage operational drift was the historical development of the organisation. For 
example, if the organisation was originally run by volunteers and had “a philosophy 
of collective working” between board members and staff, it was likely that board 
members were more accustomed to dealing with operational issues rather than 
strategic issues (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999, p.356). This suggests the possibility that 
this occurs in NFP organisations given their more informal tendencies (see Parker 
2003; 2007b; 2008). It is likely this study will contribute to understanding whether 
operational drift occurs and if so, why it occurs and how board members manage this 
practice. 
While it has been established that certain factors can cause operational drift and that 
some organisations are aware of it, questions arise as to whether operational drift can 
be managed so that boards can be more effective. Crow, Lockhart and Lewis (2014, 
p.55) have answered this question to some extent, “…by ensuring the board-
management boundary is well defined, via a board-led discovery process, to ensure 
the appropriate division of labour (Lockhart, 2012) is established”. They do not say 
however, how to make the board-management boundary clear. As a result, it appears 
that there is not yet a clear, satisfactory solution to operational drift. The techniques 
board members use to manage operational drift need to be more clearly identified. 
This study will consider whether suggestions can be made about better appreciating 
the boundary between board member and senior manager roles in control. 
Consistent with the board process view that board roles are complementary, control 
has been found to work in a complementary fashion to strategy. Parker (2008) finds 
that control is often instigated by strategy. Control is usually a “strategically induced, 
interactively generated, informally structured process” according to Parker (2008, 
p.85). Similarly, Tucker and Parker (2013b) find control is usually intertwined with 
strategic issues in the NFP sector and control is often enacted in an informal manner 
in preference to formal control methods. Such findings support the idea that 
examining board roles as separate activities and simply a case of “either/or” role is 
too simplistic for understanding board process (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003, 
p.411). This study recognises that board roles cannot be considered as isolated 
inquiries, but rather as a comprehensive inquiry which considers all three board roles 
and how they may or may not relate to each other. 
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Like the board member strategic role, there are findings, which strongly suggest that 
the control role is also influenced by external and internal factors. Some parallels with 
the strategic role of boards in NFPs can be drawn at this point. Like strategy, external 
factors such as legislation prescribing the ways in which board members should 
exercise control are recognised as having an impact on control in NFPs (Tucker & 
Parker, 2013a, p.97). The literature also suggests that internal factors also play a role 
in influencing control. The complexity of the NFP organisation with its “multiple 
stakeholders with no clear indication of how performance will be assessed and no 
agreement as to who owns the nonprofit organization” (Miller, 2002, p.447) makes 
monitoring much more challenging than the FP sector (Parker, 2008). Whether 
external and internal factors have this impact on the discharge of the board member 
control role will be examined in the current study.  
The need to consider the influence of formal and informal practices also applies to the 
control role. It has been found that control is generally exercised in an informal 
fashion in NFP organisations (Parker, 2008; Parker, 2003; Collier, 2005; Stone; 
1991). This means that rather than board members focusing on formal control systems 
such as internal controls, financial and legal regulation (Morrison & Salipante, 2007; 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002), control is exercised through board members 
questioning, probing, and clarifying issues with management as and when they arise 
in informal and formal settings (Parker, 2008, p.75). According to Golden-Biddle and 
Rao (1997), being a “vigilant monitor” as well as discharging a friendly, supportive 
collegial role is what board members need to do in successful NFP organisations. 
Parker (2007a, p.1474) also found board members exercised “…a strong sense of 
collegiality and mutual support” in his dual case study. “Vigorous discussion, analysis 
and debate concerning strategic and other issues did not disturb or threaten this 
accord” (Parker, 2007a, p.1474). Parker (2008, pp.84-85) identifies the need for more 
research to find what features of operational and financial control are unique to the 
NFP sector and what the implications are for accountability given “the triggers for 
and shaping of control” are largely informal rather than formal. This NFP board study 
will consider whether the findings from previous NFP board studies apply with 
respect to the reported prevalence of informal control. 
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Comments have been expressed in the literature about boards being less effective in 
their control role due to asymmetry of information between the board members and 
the senior managers. Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.79) discuss the potential issue of 
boards being furnished with incomplete information from senior managers, such that 
their ability to make judgments and decisions may compromise their control function. 
Taking an opposing view, scholars Brennan, Kirwan and Redmond (2016) argue 
information asymmetry is a necessary condition so that board members do ask 
questions, probe and clarify information given to them by senior managers. They 
assert that without information asymmetry, there would be no need to have a board, as 
the need to ask questions and have discussions would be made redundant. This study 
considers both perspectives and will assess which has more credence in light of the 
data collected in this single case study. 
Assessing the potential impact of information on the control role of the director is one 
perspective, but another angle is discussed in the literature that is particularly relevant 
to the NFP sector. There are challenges in determining which stakeholders require 
information and in what form. Such a challenge is linked to accountability (Hyndman 
& McDonnell, 2009, p.8). It also involves the control role of the director also, as 
directors need to determine who requires information and in what form. This can 
possibly lead to an over-provision of information which is costly and time-consuming 
or an under-provision of information which can be risky in some scenarios (Edwards 
& Hulme, 1995). Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) use the example of an NFP 
organisation providing information to a donor about how their monies are being 
applied. They argue that provision of such information may or may not be significant 
and appreciated, depending on the donor. In the case of small donors, they argue that 
such information is not required. On the other hand, in the case of a funder, there are 
likely to be requirements stipulated in a service agreement that compels the NFP 
organisation to produce information about how the funds are being applied. This 
study will consider whether this occurs and how board members enact their role in 
such situations. 
To summarise, we know that the board member control role is valuable to ensure the 
organisation is financially and operationally sustainable and plays a role in the 
communication of this information to stakeholder groups. However, there appears to 
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be the potential for issues such as operational drift which can compromise the board 
member’s control role. It also appears that in similar way to strategy, the board 
member control role is contingent on a number of external and internal factors. 
Another issue discussed in the literature is asymmetry of information between the 
board members and the senior managers. The control of and provision of information 
is also likely to apply in the case of an NFP board communicating with its 
stakeholders. It is generally argued that information asymmetry reduces the 
effectiveness of the control role of the board member. However, newer perspectives 
consider information asymmetry to be a natural and necessary condition of 
governance. This case study will examine these issues further and aim to increase 
understanding about such issues. 
The resource dependence role of board members 
The resource dependence role of the board member is to bring knowledge and 
resources from the external environment to the organisation. It is argued that by 
conducting this role, the organisation benefits, as information and knowledge is 
increased (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). For example, board members might be able to shed 
light on what competing organisations are doing in the sector. Another example is that 
some board members might have links to capital or “constituencies that are important 
in terms of resource acquisition or enabling the conduct of business” (Stiles & Taylor, 
2001, p.87). In a similar way to the control role, the literature suggests that the 
resource dependence role is both a senior management role and a board member role 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001, pp.100, 121; Machold & Farquhar, 2013, p.156). The point at 
which the role is both a senior manager and board member role is with regard to 
“boundary spanning” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.104). This is where a person’s 
networks and contacts with the external environment assist the organisation with its 
strategic decisions and investments. Once again, a potential for the blurring of board 
member and senior manager roles arises with the resource dependence role. This 
suggests operational drift may occur in this respect. 
Trust between the board members and the senior managers is argued to be a crucial 
ingredient in facilitating the effective conduct of the resource dependence role. Stiles 
and Taylor (2001, p.101) argue that it is important board members and senior 
managers work together “to ensure the motivation of non-executives to share their 
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capabilities and knowledge and to be confident that their advice and counsel will be 
valued”. For example, rather than simply providing information about the external 
environment, board members are expected to provide opinions about it as well (Long, 
Dulewicz & Gay, 2005). This is argued to lead to strategic discussions which can 
influence continuous learning or organisational learning (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, 
p.121). Sasso (2003) presents a similar argument, explaining that trust between board 
members and senior managers is essential to a successful NFP. If there is trust 
between these parties, the information provided can be willingly shared and 
questioned in non-threatening and respectful ways. 
In a similar fashion to the board member strategy and control roles, external and 
internal factors have been noted to influence the resource dependence role. For 
example, stakeholders with competing agendas have been shown to create pressure on 
boards such that they feel that they need to engage in “trade-offs” – assessing which 
stakeholders’ concerns cannot be met in order to preserve those who matter most 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.103). Importantly, Stiles and Taylor (2001, p.101) state, 
“Details of how the boards factored in stakeholders to decision-making remained 
hazy, leaving a sense of as hoc, case-by-case assessment, rather than any considered 
approach to stakeholder groups”. In a more recent board study, Machold and Farquhar 
(2013) find that emphasis on the resource dependence role in the boards of NFP 
organisations is the least compared to the board’s focus on control and strategy. The 
scholars also argue that the board’s attention to the resource dependence issues, which 
they call “service” tasks, were focused on issues which were short to medium-term in 
nature such as the need to obtain legal advice.  
It does appear that further research into the resource dependence role of the director is 
required. Harrow and Phillips (2013, p.608) explain that there is a particular emphasis 
on boundary spanning in the NFP sector due to the hybrid nature of such 
organisations and the “governance implications…[are] far from clear” in this respect. 
Caution must be noted here because in some board studies, strategy and resource 
dependence roles are discussed together, as mentioned in the Introduction chapter. 
Despite this, it appears that findings pertaining to the resource dependence role of the 
board member feature the least. This study aims to address this area about the 
resource dependence role where knowledge is lacking.  
 63 
Board accountability performance 
Since governance sagas have been publicised in the FP and NFP sectors (for example: 
Enron see: Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; the Global Financial Crisis see: McNulty & 
Stewart, 2015 and governance issues in NFP entities such as the Essendon team from 
the AFL see: Nichol & Duffy, 2017) it can be argued that there has been an increased 
focus on the accountability and performance of organisations (Rentschler & Potter, 
1996). Critically however, there has been a preoccupation with accountability of 
organisations to external stakeholders and this is generally seen as accountability of 
actors in an upward sense (Ebrahim, 2003, p.208). As a consequence, many 
accountability attempts have been about legislating or regulating how organisations 
operate and ensuring they are accountable to a higher body for their actions. This 
approach to accountability fails to take into consideration the other accountability 
aspects such as downwards and sideways accountability. The implications of such a 
response to accountability has often meant that while there is an increased focus on 
organisational performance, often board performance is given less attention. Holland 
(2002, p.409) has commented that while accountability is typically viewed as board 
members keeping management accountable, board members rarely apply such 
rigorous expectations of performance to themselves.  
More recently, since about the 2000s, it appears that boards too, are coming under 
additional scrutiny for their performance. For example, Cornwall, Lucas and Pasteur 
(2000, p.194), broaden the accountability perspective by highlighting that 
accountability is not only about ensuring others are “held responsible”, but it is also 
about “taking responsibility”. Other scholars have echoed the call for increased 
attention to the performance of leaders. For example, Romzek and Dubnik (1987), 
Behn (2001), Koppell (2005), O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) and Brown (2008). 
While in theory boards are supposed to be accountable to an entity or actor, questions 
arise as to who this is and how it is done. Holland (2002, p.412) points out that boards 
being accountable to themselves is rarely the case in the NFP sector: “Even when the 
nonprofit board addresses accountability, it seems to focus attention only on the 
executive, seldom on the board itself”. In a study of 34 NFP organisations, Holland 
(2002, pp.409, 414-421) found inconsistencies in the use of six sets of practices 
designed to make NFP boards more accountable. Internal and external approaches to 
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increasing the accountability of the board have been developed, but as Holland (2002, 
p.410) notes, “…the nonprofit sector rigorously applies few of these”. An example of 
an internal approach is total quality management. An example of an external approach 
is legal regulation (Holland, 2002, p.411). Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) argue 
that the focus of board accountability has generally been focused on external and rule-
based accountability to the detriment of various stakeholder groups.  
The literature assigns a large role to the board in being accountable externally, 
[but] many boards fail to adequately represent stakeholders, constituents, and 
communities of citizens and therefore may have no means to respond to their 
accountability pulls (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, pp.9-10). 
In response to the challenges of measuring board performance, some scholars have 
devised accountability concepts or frameworks, which promote consideration of 
board performance. For instance, Williams and Taylor (2013, p.569) recognise the 
need to consider board accountability and so their framework of “holistic 
accountability” defines ‘performance’ as that which takes into account quantitative 
and qualitative factors to measure to what extent organisational mission is achieved. 
Rentschler and Potter (1996) highlight the particular challenge of measuring 
performance in the NFP sector. The missions of most NFP organisations are often 
difficult to account for because they usually are focused on achieving things which 
are not aligned with “financial statement orientation to judge performance and 
discharge accountability” (1996, p.104). Rentschler and Potter (1996, p.105) argue 
that this can be addressed by applying a “broader notion of accountability” which 
takes into account the mission statement of the organisation when evaluating 
performance. Responding to the deficiencies identified in the literature with respect to 
board performance, the current study attempts to better understand board 
accountability in the NFP environment. 
Towards a theoretical orientation 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, there are a number of board studies which apply 
accountability concepts or frameworks. It has been established therefore that 
accountability concepts can explain phenomena such as board roles, board process 
and board context. This section expands on the theoretical perspective of 
accountability further, refining the accountability discussions in the literature to one 
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key framework of accountability which has been identified as useful to this study. 
This section introduces the framework of “broad accountability” which is discussed in 
several board studies and the other NFP literatures. The concluding part of this 
section argues that the concepts of broad accountability are required as the informing 
lens in this longitudinal single NFP qualitative case study. 
Negotiable accountability is considered important in broad accountability, as it takes 
into account how the organisation discharges accountability to stakeholders and the 
environment over the longer-term (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002). Additionally, 
trust is deemed critical to maintaining good relationships with internal and external 
stakeholders (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan 2002, p.9; Sasso, 2003). A multiple case 
study by Cordery, Baskerville and Porter (2010) reinforces the view that trust is 
critical between stakeholders in achieving “holistic accountability” and a focus on 
control retards holistic accountability from being achieved. Other scholars who argue 
that trust is an essential component of accountability, which requires examination 
include Romzek (1996) and Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen (2009). 
This study will apply a “broad accountability” framework to inform the data. Broad 
accountability or broadened accountability is an accountability perspective that argues 
that traditional measures of performance such as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
are often inadequate for the NFP sector (Valentinov, 2011, p.33). In addition, broad 
accountability argues the need to consider how organisational mission is achieved and 
how the demands of multiple stakeholder groups are addressed (Morrison & 
Salipante, 2007, p.196). Finally, broad accountability is cognisant of the influence of 
the negotiable aspects of accountability, not simply its rule-based aspects (Kearns, 
1996; Morrison & Salipante, 2007). The negotiable aspects of accountability are 
where organisational leaders have to manage and respond to multiple stakeholder 
groups (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan 2002, p.9). Negotiated accountability involves 
discretion and judgment on the part of the leaders of the NFP organisation and it is 
often a continual process, changing when circumstances change (Morrison & 
Salipante, 2007, pp.197, 199). By contrast, rule-based aspects of accountability are 
those which are enumerated in legislation or some other form of regulation such as 
the accounting standards (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, p.199). Ospina, Diaz and 
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O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007) identify the negotiable aspects 
of accountability as those most in need of research. 
A review of the accountability literatures reveals a shift from a narrow conception of 
accountability to a broad conception of accountability. O’Leary (2017, pp.21-22) 
explains that narrow conceptions of accountability were often focused on traditional 
avenues of accountability – in its hierarchical sense where actors are accountable to a 
higher authority. Broader notions of accountability considered the social aspects of 
accountability including the relationship an NFP entity has with its beneficiaries and 
how the NFP is accountable in a downwards fashion (O’Leary, 2017, p.23)  
In elementary discussions about accountability, the literature often applied a focus on 
governance issues related to control. For instance, there was an emphasis on financial 
control and risk management. Scholars were interested in “…process concerns such 
as finances, internal controls, and regulatory compliance” (Morrison & Salipante, 
2007, p. 197). While control is not irrelevant to governance, there are “social, 
political, and moral processes” which also engender accountability and need to be 
explored (Coule, 2015, p.90).  
Since early discussions of accountability in the 1990s, some governance scholars such 
as Carnegie and Wolnizer (1995), Parker (1996) and Rentschler and Potter (1996) 
advocated broad accountability as a way of tackling the often complex governance 
challenges faced by NFP organisations. These challenges include a need to consider 
organisational mission, board performance, strategy and multiple stakeholders. The 
calls for a broad accountability continue in the 2000s, with some scholars applying 
frameworks or concepts of broad accountability to their research. See for example: 
Coule (2015), Valentinov (2011), Morrison and Salipante (2007), Ebrahim (2003) and 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002).   
This section has provided a brief overview of the accountability framework which 
will inform this study. The broad accountability framework will be explored more 
extensively in the Theoretical Framework chapter. The suitability of broad 
accountability concepts is not only supported by the NFP literature as discussed in 
this section, but also by the board studies literature, outlined earlier in this chapter. 
Board studies focused on process tend to argue that board effectiveness is achieved 
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through accountability (for example: Collier, 2005; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 
2005; Holland, 2002). Board studies of this nature have also used accountability to 
examine how organisational leaders manage governance challenges unique to the 
NFP sector. Moreover, board studies that use a process approach are usually geared 
towards a “holistic” perspective of governance (Machold & Farquhar, 2013, p.147), 
which supports the need for a broad accountability framework for a study of this 
nature. It is evident that the accountability issues examined in the board studies 
literature and the NFP literatures overlap, which sends a strong signal that 
accountability perspectives are relevant to this NFP board study.  
An insider view of board process 
The need to examine board processes, board member behaviours and associated social 
interaction has been highlighted in the literature recently (Pugliese, Nicholson & 
Bezemer, 2015) and within the past 20 years (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, 
p.240). As mentioned previously, the gap in board process research is largely due to 
the conventional focus on agency theory studies and difficulties in accessing the 
boardroom (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, p.240; Crow & Lockhart, 2014). 
The body of board process research that exists can be classified into two streams: 
first, a stream which applies mixed-methods and is focused on board performance and 
second, a stream which uses qualitative methods to analyse board member behaviours 
and how they impact on decision-making (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, 
p.241; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004, p.22). As articulated in the Introduction chapter 
and this chapter, this study is primarily concerned with board member roles and how 
they are enacted. Therefore, this study can be said to form part of the second stream 
of board process research. There is however, some overlap with the first stream of 
research in this study too, since part of the analysis does involve considerations of 
board performance and effectiveness. 
The participant observer aspect of the present study is a critical and unique dimension 
and is key to the researcher understanding board process. Leblanc and Schwartz 
(2007, p.845) explain that while there are qualitative studies which interview board 
members and company directors, researchers gaining access to the boardroom in 
which they can observe board members is a rarer and valuable phenomenon. In their 
review of 127 governance journal articles, Gabrielsson and Huse (2004, pp.21, 25) 
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found board process studies accounted for five percent of governance studies and 
“…insights into the processes would add significantly to our knowledge of effective 
boards and governance”. It appears that understandings of board process are still 
elementary. According to Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015, p.3) “…We still 
have a very limited understanding of what happens in the boardroom: what the 
interactions are like, and how they differ from other workgroups”.  
In their qualitative study of the role and performance of the Company Secretary, 
McNulty and Stewart (2015, p.531) contribute to the literature about board process 
and effectiveness. They argue that examining the ‘lived experience’ of actors in the 
boardroom, including their roles, relationships and behaviours, reveals the quality and 
effectiveness of the board. Similarly, Machold and Farquhar (2013, p.162) conduct 
board research “in situ, to create a holistic picture of what boards do”. The current 
qualitative longitudinal case study presented in this thesis is therefore one of a small 
body of board studies which contributes to understandings of how boards work.  
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005, p. S11) argue that board effectiveness is 
dependent on the social processes which condition how boards operate, including 
behaviour and relationships between board members and senior managers. Huse 
(2005, p. S72) also underscores the need to open the “black box of the boardroom” 
which means uncovering “actual board behaviour…the board’s decision-making 
culture, formal and informal structures and norms, and the interactions inside and 
outside the boardroom…” Huse (2005, pp. S72, 75) notes very little is known about 
board behaviour. Echoing this sentiment is Zattoni and Cuomo (2010, pp. 75-76) who 
encourage accounting researchers to investigate board debates, roles and 
contributions. Ahrens and Khalifa (2013, pp. 6-9, 10-16, 16-17, 25) not only support 
the need to look at board process but also argue that qualitative research techniques 
are best equipped to deal with such inquiries. This study answers the calls for more 
qualitative research into board behaviour and process. 
Progress in corporate governance research can be made if there is a better 
understanding of what it is about the processes of a board’s interactions which makes 
them successful. This study tackles this issue head-on, as the researcher had direct 
access to board meetings, committee meetings, board member and senior manager 
deliberations at strategic planning days, and formal and informal interviews with 
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board members and senior managers. Document analysis was also used by the 
researcher as a supplementary source of data.  
 
This qualitative study is one of few board studies which looks into the black box of 
the board of directors. Board studies by Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014), 
Collier (2005), Holland (2002), Machold and Farquhar (2013), Parker (2003, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008) and Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) have laid the foundations 
which are in need of building upon. Apart from these few board studies, most 
research on boards and governance is conducted from the outside looking in, usually 
attempting to regress proxies for board decisions or organisational outcomes. 
Consequently, we know little about actual governance processes that take place inside 
the boardroom. This qualitative board study addresses that vacuum. As such, it 
considers a relatively new phenomenon, something that is difficult to access and 
investigate due to the confidential nature of board operations. Scholars such as those 
listed in the opening of this paragraph have been able to shed light on this black box, 
illuminating areas in boards that need further examination. This study intends to build 
on this research, providing valuable insights into how boards operate and why they 
operate in the ways that they do. More specifically, this NFP board study will 
investigate the strategy, control and resource dependence roles of the board member 
and the accountability processes in a single case study of a prominent NFP 
organisation in one state of Australia. 
 
The utility of this corporate governance study in an NFP board is that it contributes to 
a relatively small, but growing area of NFP board research. This study has unique 
contributions to make to the current literature in terms of research design, research 
methods and theoretical framework. It seeks to encourage further scholarly research 
and discussion in the area of NFP corporate governance. The research findings and 
associated recommendations should also assist those who are directors in similar NFP 
organisations, with respect to understanding their roles and practices. Policy-makers 
and industry bodies such as the AICD are also likely to benefit from some of the 
findings and recommendations of this study (Ahrens & Khalifa, 2013; Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008; Parker 2012, pp.54, 67). 
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Conclusion 
There is little doubt that corporate governance is a key topic of significant interest and 
importance. Very recently, there have been major investigations into governance 
failures in the Australian banking and superannuation sectors through the Hayne 
Royal Commission (Boyd, 2018). Australia’s national broadcaster, the ABC, has also 
recently been criticised for governance failures (Boyd, 2018). An area of increasing 
awareness, governance is also where much research is being undertaken by scholars 
to better understand how companies and organisations function. The forms of 
research have changed over time, beginning with an emphasis on economic theories 
such as agency theory and moving to other, broader theoretical perspectives over 
time.  
 
This literature review has illustrated the significance of corporate governance in the 
boardroom and highlighted the two main streams of research: traditional perspectives 
and more recent perspectives. Traditional perspectives are often underpinned by an 
agency theory perspective, which highlights the importance of board member 
independence and board composition, both of which are argued to influence board 
effectiveness. More recent perspectives are often informed by theories such as 
frameworks of accountability, which can take the form of either a narrow or a broad 
accountability perspective. By adopting an accountability perspective, it should be 
possible for this study to analyse the strategy, control and resource dependence roles 
of the board member in the NFP environment. The data is informed by a lens of broad 
accountability and the findings chapters of this study will reveal whether and how 
accountability is discharged in the NFP organisation under study. 
 
Directly relevant to corporate governance perspectives of the board member is the 
context in which they operate. Considering the sector and the external and internal 
factors where board members work is also important as it can condition how the 
board member undertakes their roles. This literature review has also provided an 
insight into the NFP sector and the unique characteristics it possesses, which create 
considerable governance challenges for board members. The lack of research into 
how board members operate in the NFP sector is what this study aims to address.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
Qualitative research methodology is arguably the most suitable methodology for 
capturing the rich data that is often present in the boardroom. A review of board 
studies in accountability reveals the application of qualitative techniques to analyse 
board behaviour. For example, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005, pp. S11-2) 
conducted in-depth interviews of 40 company directors to better understand their 
behaviours and how, through processes of accountability, they contribute to board 
effectiveness. Similarly, Holland (2002) used data from interviews, consultations and 
observations to determine accountability practices of the board. Collier (2005) is 
another example of a scholar who uses qualitative techniques to investigate 
accountability in the board setting. Collier (2005) conducted a participant observer 
study supplemented with data from board papers and industry publications. Ahrens 
(1996) suggests that qualitative research is the superior methodology to apply when 
examining governance practices in organisations. A small number of studies in 
boardrooms undertaken by governance researchers such as Machold and Farquhar 
(2013), Parker (2007b, 2003) and Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015) have also 
used qualitative techniques to obtain data from the boardroom in different contexts.  
This study appears to form part of a small and growing body of board research that 
applies qualitative techniques. Most board studies are either quantitative in nature 
(Long, Dulewicz & Gay 2005, p.668) or use mixed-methods research (see 
Hooghiemstra & van Manen 2002, 2004b). More recently however, there has been a 
shift in focus in the literature from quantitative methods to qualitative methods. Pye 
(2002, p.156) mounts a strong case for empirical research, arguing that governance is 
a “social process and collective phenomenon, i.e. done with and through relationships 
with other people”.  
 
Given the complexities inherent in boardroom dynamics, this study will use at least 
two levels of analysis through which to understand board members’ roles in this 
single NFP case study. The two levels of analysis will be the individual board 
member level and the collective board level. While the RQs for this study suggest a 
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focus on individual board members, the board as a collective group will also be of 
interest. Internal organisational factors and external institutional factors will require 
another level of analysis at the organisational level (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 
2014, p.251). There have been calls for data to be analysed at multiple levels in board 
studies because of the complex nature of governance (Bezemer, Nicholson & 
Pugliese, 2014). This study heeds this advice by taking into account analyses at the 
individual director level and the board level, as well as taking into account internal 
and external factors that may condition board roles.  
 
As outlined in the Introduction chapter, this Central Objective of this study is to 
examine the construction and execution of board member strategy, control and 
resource dependence roles in the unique context of the NFP environment using a lens 
of accountability. It is evident from the Central Objective that the processes in the 
boardroom are a key aspect of this research. Scholars advocating the examination of 
board process are many, including Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015), Ahrens 
and Khalifa (2013), Pugliese et al. (2009), and Huse (2005). Most scholars who have 
conducted qualitative board studies explain that understanding boardroom processes 
is the fundamental step in investigating governance phenomena. This is because 
processes in the boardroom are currently still deemed to be a “black box” in 
governance research (Huse, 2005).   
 
There are two key reasons why the board is still considered to be a black box. First, 
access to boardrooms is significantly difficult to obtain (Crow & Lockhart, 2014). 
Second, the direction of board research toward investigating board process has only 
occurred within the past 10 years or so (Pugliese, Nicholson & Bezemer, 2015; 
Aguilera, 2005). Previously, most board studies were focused on board composition 
or conducting surveys of board members about their roles (for example: McDonald & 
Westphal, 2010; Cornforth, 2001).  
 
This study contributes to a growing but relatively small body of governance research 
which is concerned with investigating board process. It does this using multiple 
qualitative techniques of participant observation, interviews and document analysis. 
This chapter will discuss these data collection techniques in more detail, outlining 
how the techniques were used as well as exploring the strengths and limitations of 
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each method. The Methodology chapter will also explain the data analysis processes 
including coding and memo writing. Methods involved in data interpretation and 
trustworthiness are then assessed. The chapter closes by acknowledging the link 
between methodology and theory. This provides the basis for the upcoming 
discussion of concepts of accountability in the Theoretical Framework chapter. 
Calling for qualitative investigation 
There are now many arguments for qualitative studies, especially those with access to 
the boardroom, being both a rare and valuable phenomenon. Brennan and Solomon 
(2008) argue that the methodology of corporate governance research needs 
expanding. This view is shared by Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) who 
contend that while there has been increasing attention devoted to the board over the 
past 40 years, little progress has been made in terms of understanding how and why 
boards operate. They argue that there are two key reasons that account for why there 
has been little advancement in this area of board research. First, agency theory 
conceptions of governance have encouraged researchers to focus on aspects of 
governance such as director independence rather than processes. Second, the 
challenge of obtaining access to boardrooms has often frustrated attempts to progress 
research in this area (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese. 2014, p. 240)  
Governance studies that adopt a processual approach tend to view governance as a 
dynamic and changing process, conditioned by social and cultural processes. For 
example, Pye (2002) explains there is a difference between:  
“governance” and “governing”…governance implies something static and a box 
that can be ticked, whereas governing implies a social process and collective 
phenomenon, i.e. done with and through relationships with other people (Pye, 
2002, p.156).  
Additionally, process research is largely concerned with how phenomena are enacted 
(Kirkbride, Letza & Sun, 2005, p. 63). It is this aspect, which the literature argues 
needs further examination in boardrooms. Accordingly, this study is designed to add 
to the limited understanding of boards and how they work by conducting research in a 
prominent NFP organisation in one Australian state. 
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A key reason for examining boardroom processes is that it is able to offer a wealth of 
new information which traditional research has been unable to uncover. For instance, 
“…Group level processes such as open and critical debate, directors’ commitment to 
fulfil their roles, and the coordination of directors’ contributions” (Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2010, p. 75) are examples of areas which have been highlighted for further and 
different research. Corley (2005, p. S2, S3) has noted the shift from agency 
conceptions of corporate governance to investigating board processes and dynamics.  
Examining boardroom process also enables researchers to be proactive. For example, 
a vast body of governance research has been focused on investigating board failures. 
This process study takes a different approach. It examines a fully functioning, 
successful NFP organisation. The researcher was therefore exposed to board process 
at a particular point in time rather than investigating an entity in response to 
governance concerns. Viewing the board in this manner enables the researcher to 
observe aspects of governance that are successful as well as identifying features that 
may need improvement. 
Brennan, Kirwan and Redmond (2016) use a process approach in their conceptual 
article about the information asymmetry that boards experience. They displace 
traditional views that information asymmetry is detrimental to board members. 
Focusing on board process, Brennan, Kirwan and Redmond (2016) reveal that it is not 
the quantity of information that improves the independence and effectiveness of the 
board – it is how board members clarify, probe and question executive directors that 
determines board effectiveness. Kirkbride, Letza and Sun (2005) explain that a 
processual approach to governance is essential if researchers wish to make progress in 
understanding how it functions. A process approach is arguably better equipped to 
take into account contextual phenomena while also acknowledging that no single 
perspective for governance will suffice (Kirkbride, Letza & Sun, 2005, p. 62). By 
focusing on the process of governance, a more rigorous and comprehensive approach 
to understanding governance is likely to be produced. 
In response to the calls for qualitative board research, this board study is designed to 
apply a single case study approach using qualitative methods of participant observer, 
interviews and document analysis. Such a combination of methods will add to the 
richness of the data, the rigor and robust nature of the research. Furthermore, the 
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length of time of the single case study is longitudinal – spanning one year and six 
months. There is considerable value in a longitudinal case study. The impact of the 
researcher on the process is mitigated as board members and senior managers become 
accustomed to the researcher’s presence and the researcher gains a deeper and more 
comprehensive understanding of the organisation.  
This study also takes into account suggestions from scholars to undertake board 
research considering other actors in the process. Most common is the point that board 
member research should also consider senior managers and the CEO. There is a 
strong argument for board members to be studied in conjunction with top 
management teams including senior managers (Pettigrew, 1992; Finkelstein, 1992; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984 in Huse, 2005, p. S73; Stone, 1991; Houle, 1989). This is 
because data from executive directors (or senior management) is valuable in 
understanding the board, as they are “…particularly attuned to the actions and 
behaviours of boards, making their appraisal of board functioning especially relevant” 
(Stone, 1991, p. 207). This study has addressed these calls, as all board members, 
senior managers and the CEO of the organisation were observed and interviewed over 
the 18-month period. 
Ethics 
The Ethics Committee from RMIT University granted ethics approval for this study 
on 6 August 2015 (ethics approval number: 19445). For the ethics approval letter, 
please see Appendix 1. Ethics Annual Reports of progress have been submitted every 
year since 2015 in accordance with the University's ethics requirements. Apart from 
minor amendments to the title of the study, no additional ethics approvals were 
required.  
 
Initial contact with the board was made in May 2015 where the researcher, her Senior 
Supervisor and Associate Supervisor contacted the board in writing, notifying them of 
the researcher’s intention to study the organisation. Shortly after, the researcher had a 
preliminary meeting with the Board Chair. At this meeting, the researcher explained 
the nature of the study in more detail and what the research would entail in terms of 
access to data. The Chair reported this information to the board and sought their 
approval to have the researcher attend the organisation to undertake data collection. 
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The board decided unanimously to allow the researcher access to the board and its 
committees. Access was granted subject to occasional confidential board discussions. 
The researcher was not permitted to audio or video record meetings, but she was 
allowed to take handwritten notes. 
 
All board members including the Board Chair and all senior managers, including the 
CEO, signed a Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF) prior to the 
researcher collecting data from the organisation. The PICF outlined the nature of the 
research work which would be undertaken including the observations of board and 
committee meetings, interviews with each of the board members and senior managers 
as well as access to board and committee documentation. The PICF, which was 
distributed to board members and senior managers, is in Appendix 2.  
 
Selecting the case study organisation 
This single NFP case study used qualitative sampling to select the NFP organisation 
and board to study. In contrast to the quantitative technique of random sampling, 
qualitative techniques adopt purposeful sampling where the researcher selects a 
research setting and participants that can best inform the RQs of the study (Creswell, 
2014). In this sense, generalisability is not the primary objective of the study. The 
primary objective is to increase knowledge and understanding of directors’ roles and 
behaviours in the NFP context. A secondary objective is to offer some limited 
generalisations, which are possible with single case studies. Types of generalising in 
qualitative research include analytical, theoretical, analogical and naturalistic (see 
Parker & Northcott, 2016, pp.1110-1114). These will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
So that meaningful data could be collected, the board of one of the largest NFP 
organisations in one state of Australia was selected. The organisation is large in terms 
of its total asset holdings, which were just under $150 million Australian dollars for 
the financial year ended 30 June 2016. Its net assets were just under $100 million 
dollars. The annual turnover of the organisation for financial year 2015-2016 was just 
under $1.5 million dollars.  Its physical presence was also significant – operating in 
31 sites in one Australian state. Similarly, the organisation has a considerable impact 
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on consumers. In the financial year 2015-2016, the organisation serviced over 13,000 
individuals and employed close to 1,000 individuals and over 150 volunteers.  
 
Case study method 
This study employs a single case focus, investigated through interview, participant 
observation and document analysis. Case studies are particularly useful in 
ascertaining peoples’ behviours and the processes involved. In this NFP case study, 
the focus is on examining board roles and processes. “Qualitative research…is 
understanding…specific circumstances, how and why things actually happen in a 
complex world” (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, pp.38-39). A review of the RQs from the 
Introduction Chapter shows that “how” and “why” questions are central to this study. 
Hartley (2004, p.328) argues that the case study method is useful in addressing the 
“how” and “why” questions. 
  
A distinguishing feature of this study from the current board literature is the data 
source (Grix 2002, p.180). Previous studies about board members tend to be in 
publicly listed companies or FP entities. For example, Bezemer et al. (2007) examine 
board members in the top 100 listed companies in the Netherlands, and Pugliese, 
Nicholson and Bezemer (2015) observe directors in two Australian corporations. This 
investigation will study an Australian NFP entity. It heeds calls by scholars such as 
Brennan and Solomon (2008) and Subramaniam et al. (2013, p.947) that more 
research needs to be undertaken in the NFP sector as it “…provide[s] rich data 
sources and diverse accountability mechanisms which are in need of research”. 
Holland (2002, p.409) echoes the importance of undertaking research in the NFP 
sector, especially with respect to accountability of boards so that NFP organisations 
can “…increase the value they add to their organizations as well as to strengthen 
public trust”.  
 
This study contributes to a small, but growing body of literature which examines how 
boards operate in the NFP sector. It follows the example of scholars who are 
pioneering research in the NFP sector such as Collier (2005), Holland (2002), Parker 
(2007a, 2007b) and Tucker and Parker (2013a; 2013b). It also heeds the calls from 
scholars who investigate board process such as Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer 
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(2015), Machold and Farquhar (2013), and Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005). What 
makes this study unique is that it focuses exclusively on board members and their 
roles in the NFP context while also being sensitive to the experiences and 
perspectives of senior managers. While NFP board studies are increasing in number, 
there are few which focus exclusively on board members, their roles and how the NFP 
environment impacts on their three roles using a theoretical lens of accountability. 
 
The objectives of case study methods are to provide “rich” descriptions of process and 
context (Lukka & Modell, 2010, p.464). Rich description means that the researcher is 
able to convey not only detailed explanations of phenomena, but also facilitate 
understanding of the subject being studied and its context (Parker & Northcott, 2016, 
p.1103). Conveying rich descriptions in this study is particularly relevant because 
access to and knowledge of boards of directors is limited due to the confidential 
nature of the boardroom. Case studies are also able to shed light on subject areas such 
as accounting and management, by putting them in context. As such, it is argued that 
case studies are able to provide a “holistic, inductive, contextual approach” (Patton, 
1982, p.9). “Thick, rich descriptions of contexts, practices and processes” are often 
obtainable in field research due to its “direct in-depth involvement with organisational 
actors” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, pp.128-9; Geertz, 1973).  
 
The focused and particular nature of qualitative research has the ability to uncover 
phenomenon previously unknown or unable to be accessed using other methods such 
as quantitative methods (Crow & Lockhart, 2014). Such insights can create new 
knowledge or challenge previously uncontested knowledge (Payne and Williams, 
2005). Another strength of single case studies is that they permit the researcher to 
focus on the issues particular to the organisation under study. This suggests that the 
researcher spends more time with such issues, giving them greater treatment than 
otherwise might be the case with a multiple or comparative case study (Denzin, 
1978).  
 
Single case studies are sometimes criticised for being too narrow in focus, failing to 
capture data from methods such as a multiple case study. Consequently, it is argued 
that generalisation is often not possible in case studies. However, it is important to 
recognise that single case studies can represent characteristics typical of a segment of 
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the population such as a particular type of organisation. Parker and Northcott (2016, 
pp.1111-1112) call this type of generalisation “analogical and communicative 
generalisation”. Atypical or unusual cases can also offer valuable insights, as it might 
challenge conventional wisdom and it is also possible to generalise from unique cases 
providing the findings are justifiable (Parker & Northcott, 2016, p.1117-1118; Rubin 
& Rubin, 2012).  
 
The inductive nature of field research allows the researcher to draw general 
conclusions from particular instances (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 1987). Similarly, 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) argue that often there are certain themes that can apply 
in similar circumstances or contexts. Even if similar circumstances or contexts do not 
yet exist, they may arise in the future (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). This suggests 
considerable potential for the findings from single case studies. Caution does need to 
be exercised however, to guard against over-generalising (Boeije, 2010) or under-
generalising (Parker & Northcott, 2016). This means qualitative researchers need to 
strike a balance between over-generalising and not generalising. Denscombe (2010) 
supports this approach, explaining that qualitative researchers achieve a balance 
between perculiarisation and generalisation by providing rich, contextual accounts 
and wider forms of generalisation.  
 
Other types of generalisation that can be made from qualitative studies include 
analytical generalisation where the researcher draws comparisons with certain social 
settings or practices. Theoretical generalisation is also possible where the findings 
contribute to existing theoretical concepts or frameworks. Finally, naturalistic 
generalisation can be undertaken where the researcher argues that their findings have 
resonance in practice, for example in accounting (Parker & Northcott, 2016). 
 
An ethnographic approach 
The qualitative approach applied in this study investigates board processes. It is 
concerned with the interpretation of observable phenomena in their naturalistic 
setting, such as organisational processes and organisational change, social settings 
and behaviours (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 1987). Ethnography is the style of 
qualitative research (Brewer, 2004, p.313) adopted in this project, where the 
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researcher not only seeks to understand the phenomenon under study but also to 
understand the social, economic and political context in which they occur (Hennick, 
Hutter & Bailey, 2011, p.46) Fieldwork is usually conducted for a considerable period 
of time so that the researcher can more accurately map behaviours and processes, 
being able to distinguish the exceptional from the mundane. Ethnographic work often 
involves a number of important activities on the part of the researcher such as 
establishing a rapport with the research subjects, and building relationships of trust 
and respect (Hennick, Hutter & Bailey, 2011, p.46). Another critical activity which 
ethnography demands is triangulation. Triangulation is the process of using multiple 
methods of data collection to cross-check the data (Brewer, 2004, p.313). This chapter 
discusses triangulation later in the section “Data interpretation and establishing 
trustworthiness”. 
 
In this single qualitative case study, ethnography is the approach used to understand 
board roles and processes at the individual director level and the board level. 
Angrosino (2007) explains that ethnography is used by researchers to understand 
patterns of human behaviour. It involves identifying what the subjects in the study 
consider to be “reality”, how “…it is constructed, maintained and changed” (2007, 
p.14). There have been a number of qualitative board studies that have applied such 
techniques, for example: Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014), Coule (2015), 
Collier (2005), Parker (2007a, 2007b, 2008) and Holland (2002). These board studies 
have collected data through methods such as observation, interview and document 
analysis, all of which are used in this study. Denzin (1989, pp.157-8) suggests the 
“simultaneous combination” of “…document analysis, interviewing…direct 
participation and observation, and introspection” are powerful methods in 
understanding phenomena in research. Peck (1995, p.154) also strongly supports the 
use of a combination of observation, interview and document analysis to increase 
confidence in the researcher’s findings. 
 
Participant observation 
A primary qualitative data collection method that has been applied in this study is 
participant observation. Participant observation is a method used “…to gain insight 
into cultural practices and phenomena” (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, p.141). The 
 81 
term “ethnography” is often used interchangeably with participant observation. Thyer 
(2001, p.6) supports this definition, highlighting that the purpose of ethnography is 
“…to understand another way of life from the native point of view” (citing Spradley, 
1980, p.3). It is a direct method of collecting data where the researcher is involved in 
the research site for “an extended period of time”, ranging from several weeks to 
years (Angrosino, 2007, p.21) The length of time in the field is important, as it 
enables the researcher to better make sense of the “…range of norms, practices, and 
values, official and unofficial alike, which characterize that research setting” (Watson, 
2011, p.207). The other benefit of a longitudinal study is that it also enables the 
research participants to become accustomed to the researcher’s presence (Maitlis, 
2004). In this study, the researcher spent one and a half years in the organisation. 
 
Participant observation requires the researcher to immerse themselves in the natural 
habitat of the phenomenon being studied. The degree of researcher participation in the 
setting depends on the situation and can vary from a minimal role to a considerable 
degree of involvement. Corbetta (2003, p.5) citing Davis (1973) describes the varying 
degrees of researcher participation as being “the martian” and “the convert”. The 
martian describes a researcher who is a foreigner in the research setting and the 
convert refers to a researcher who becomes one of the subjects. Corbetta (2003, pp.5-
6) argues that a balance between the two extremes of researcher involvement is most 
suitable. Thyer (2001, pp.5-6) categorises the varying degrees of researcher 
participant as: “complete observer”, “observer-as-participant”, and “participant-as-
observer”. For the purposes of this research, the researcher was a complete observer. 
It was decided that the researcher taking a passive role would be most suitable in this 
case as it would enable the observation of directors and senior managers in their 
natural environment. As Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008, p.141) explain, participant 
observation is often the starting point for ethnographic research, followed by other 
research methods such as interviews and document analysis. The researcher has 
followed this sequence of research methods – beginning with observations as the 
primary source of data followed by interviews and document analysis. 
 
As the boardroom is the primary forum where director roles are discharged and 
decisions take place, it is a particularly valuable source of data. Studies that have the 
privilege of accessing the boardroom are able to provide rich insights into director 
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behaviour (LeBlanc & Schwartz, 2007; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). This study 
follows in that tradition. Data has been collected from the entire top-level structure of 
the case study organisation. Participant observation took place at the board meetings 
level as well as the committees level and strategic planning days (Clarke, 1998; 
Heracleous, 1999; Parker, 2007a, p.1460).  
 
There were seven committees in the organisation when the researcher was present. 
These were: Finance & Audit, Governance (formerly the Executive Committee), 
Aged Care & Community Housing, Risk, Strategic Advisory Committee, Aged Care 
& Property, and Community Services. Two of the seven committees were short-term 
and established for the purposes of guiding the board and the senior managers through 
the strategic planning process. These committees were the Strategic Advisory 
Committee and the Aged Care & Community Housing Strategies Committees. The 
other five committees were long-term committees however a decision was made 
while the researcher was present to discontinue two of the long-term committees. 
These committees were the Aged Care & Property Committee and the Community 
Services Committee. 
 
The researcher also attended two strategic planning days, the first of which involved 
board members only. The second strategic planning day had both board members and 
senior managers present. The categories of meetings attended by the researcher 
covered eight perspectives of the top-level structure of the organisation. The eight 
perspectives, types and numbers of meetings observed are outlined in table 3.1 below. 
Exposure to these several governance structures meant that the researcher was able to 
gain a more holistic appreciation of how the organisation operated, especially with 
respect to the board members and senior managers.  
 
Table 3.1 Participant observation in board and committee meetings 
Type of meeting observed 
Number of 
meetings 
observed 
 
Board meetings 14 
Finance & Audit Committee 7 
Governance Committee 4 
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Aged Care & Community Housing Strategies Committee 5 
Risk Committee 2 
Strategic Advisory Committee 2 
Aged Care & Property Committee (later disbanded) 1 
Community Services Committee (later disbanded) 0 
Strategic Planning Days 2 
 
In total, the researcher observed 37 meetings. The researcher was only permitted to 
take handwritten notes during meetings. Detailed field notes however were sufficient 
for recording director roles, behaviours and key decisions. The field notes were 
supplemented by memos which were also written within 24 hours of each meeting. 
The memos provided a form of preliminary data analysis whereby the researcher 
recorded reflections and interpretations about what was observed. As observations 
progressed, the researcher was able to identify common themes and kept a record of 
these themes. This record of key themes (example in Appendix 3) was developed over 
time and was amended where necessary. There were only a handful of instances 
where the researcher was asked to leave the boardroom due to the discussion of 
confidential matters. These discussions lasted an average of 10 minutes. The time the 
researcher observed board meetings and committee meetings generated a total of 92 
hours, with the average length of meetings being 2 hours and 45 minutes. Meetings 
were attended since August 2015 and ended on December 2016.  
 
The coding of boardroom observations was conducted at two levels: individual 
director level and the collective board level. While coding will be expanded upon 
later in the chapter, it is important to acknowledge the board process studies which 
argue the complexity of the board is better understood by applying multi-level 
analysis techniques (Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese, 2014). Codes were developed 
to identify board member roles including those that are the subject of the three RQs: 
director strategy, control and resource dependence roles. Codes also identified 
accountability issues including stakeholders and governance aspects. Further details 
of the coding process is located in the section “Data analysis: coding and memo 
writing”. 
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There are notable strengths of the participant observer method that are worth 
highlighting. Participant observer methods permit access to the data in its natural 
setting, at the time that it occurs (Ahrens & Khalifa, 2013, p.7). This limits the 
potential for bias, which is more likely to occur in surveys and questionnaires 
(Denzin, 1978). Additionally, observer methods expose the researcher to the expected 
and the unexpected, the formal and the informal aspects of the phenomenon under 
study (Parker, 2007b). As observations are generally over an extended period of time, 
the researcher is able to identify key themes or issues which commonly arise (Parker, 
2007b; Rosen, 1991). The researcher is also able to follow certain issues and observe 
how they develop over time.  
 
Observations also expose the researcher to occurrences which might be deemed to be 
insignificant by the participants, but are valuable to the researcher, as they are 
generally not able to obtain such data from other sources (Payne & Williams, 2005). 
Such an example might be operational aspects of the organisation which the 
researcher can see in action, but which board members might take for granted (Baxter 
& Chua, 2008). Finally, participant observer methods are suitable for this board study 
as it enables the researcher to achieve a depth of penetration to the data source more 
so than other methods (Denzin, 1978). This is significant in the governance context, 
as boards are usually not open to the public and little is known about their processes. 
Much has been written about the hurdles to researchers accessing boards and the need 
to gain access to advance corporate governance research (see: Crow & Lockhart, 
2014, pp.34-40). 
 
A common criticism of participant observer methods of data collection is that they 
may change the dynamics of the phenomenon under study (Iacono, Brown & 
Holtham, 2009, p.43; Domenico & Phillips, 2010, p.6). As a result, the data collected 
by the researcher may not take the same form as it would if the researcher were not 
present. While this might be true in some settings, there is no evidence of this 
occurring in the case study undertaken. Evidence in support of this conclusion can be 
summarised in three categories. First, the amount of access granted to the researcher 
is notable. The researcher attended a total of 37 meetings, including 14 board 
meetings and 23 committee meetings. Second, the frequency of the researcher’s 
attendance at board meetings, committee meetings and organisation events was likely 
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to mitigate any possible feelings of change or unfamiliarity on the part of the research 
participants. Greater time in the field also “…allows the researcher more time to 
acclimate to the environment and learn behaviours and customs” (Domenico & 
Phillips, 2010, p.6). Third, the continuing friendly attitude of all board members and 
senior managers strongly suggests that the researcher did not have a negative impact 
on the board’s activities. The effectiveness of this approach is illustrated by a 
comment by one of the actors in the process: 
 
“It’s been good to have you on board…I think it’s been, you’ve been very 
unobtrusive to the process, and people have just been very open with you 
there, which is good to know, that you’re trusted enough to be part of the 
process”. 
The resource-intensive nature of participant observation is a criticism which is 
sometimes discussed in the literature (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006, p.495) Particularly 
in the case of longitudinal research, some argue that participant observer methods take 
a significant amount of time and use a considerable number of resources such as 
records of observations (often hardcopy notes and electronic copies). Expenses 
including as travel to and from the research site also has to be factored in the process. 
While these aspects might pose a problem for some researchers, these limitations have 
not been an impediment to the researcher undertaking this study. The researcher had 
the time to conduct the necessary fieldwork for the study. The researcher also had 
access to suitable record keeping facilities. Finally, the research site was accessible to 
the researcher for regular visits. 
 
Another limitation sometimes expressed about participant observer methods is that 
the researcher might be absent when a crucial event occurs (McKinnon, 1988, p.38) 
Although this might have occurred, the probability of such an occurrence is likely to 
be small given the volume and frequency of meetings the researcher has attended. 
Importantly, the regularity with which the researcher attended board and committee 
meetings was able to reveal director roles and behaviours which were the norm and 
those that were unique. The benefit of conducting boardroom observations over the 
period of a year and six months is that there was the opportunity to catch up on any 
issues that were discussed in the researcher’s absence. Attending both board and 
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committee meetings meant that there was some overlap with topics discussed by 
board members. If a topic was missed in the first instance, it usually became apparent 
in other meetings. Roulston (2010) explains that if the researcher spends a significant 
period at the research site, the quality of the research is likely to increase. In this 
study, the researcher spent 18 months in the field, collecting observation, interview 
and documentary evidence. This supports the notion that the research undertaken is 
authentic and plausible (Lukka & Modell, 2010, p.464). 
 
Some argue that boardroom observations only capture the formal aspects of board 
process. As the literature suggests, the informal aspects of director behaviour are less 
obvious as they often take place outside the boardroom (Samra-Fredericks, 2000). 
The researcher was able to address this limitation by taking every opportunity to 
observe what occurred in informal exchanges between board members outside the 
boardroom. For example, upon arrival at the research site, the researcher would either 
speak with or observe board members and senior managers. She adopted the same 
approach when the board had a break at the halfway point in the agenda. The 
researcher also observed or spoke with board members after board or committee 
meetings finished. In addition, discussions at the board and committee meetings, at 
times, revealed informal correspondence that had taken place between the board 
members and senior managers. Finally, the access that the researcher had been given 
to the email correspondence between the board Chair and directors shed light on 
informal interactions between the board members. 
 
Interviews 
Another method of data collection used in this study was interviews. A key feature of 
interview method is that it permits the researcher to “reach areas of reality which that 
would otherwise remain inaccessible such as people’s subjective experiences and 
attitudes” (Perakyla & Ruusuvuori, 2011, p.529). A combination of different types of 
interview questions - for example, open questions, probing questions, direct and 
indirect questions (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p.6; Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p.72) were put 
to interview participants by the researcher. These questions are explained in more 
detail in this section shortly.  
 
 87 
In this study, semi-structured interviews were used as they permit a balance between a 
planned structure and spontaneity (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Semi-structured 
interviews enable issues relevant to the study to be uncovered, while also allowing for 
explanation that might shed light on new or unexpected issues. The researcher devised 
a series of interview questions that were designed to address the study’s RQs as well 
as focusing on key issues raised in board studies and the theoretical literature about 
accountability (Roulston, 2010, pp.203-204). The interview questions were reviewed 
by two senior academics and some minor adjustments made. During the three months 
of interviewing participants (May to July 2016 inclusive), the researcher refined some 
interview questions to a small extent. For example, it became apparent that a 
particular issue with respect to the structure of board meetings continued to arise. To 
collect more information about the change and its implications the researcher added 
two additional interview questions. Appendix 4 contains the original interview guide 
and amended interview guide used for board members and senior managers. 
 
The purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to obtain board members’ and 
senior managers’ perspectives about director roles in the NFP context. The researcher 
commenced by asking participants to outline their role in the organisation and their 
experience. The questions that followed were divided into five sections. The first 
section asked interview participants to provide their own definition a board member. 
The second section inquired about the accountability and resource dependence aspects 
of directors’ roles. Section three was designed to elicit discussion about the strategy 
role of board members. The fourth section explored the board members’ control role 
and also incorporated a question about a recent governance change. Section five 
inquired about the enactment of the multiple roles of board members. The researcher 
concluded the interview by giving interviewees the opportunity to discuss anything 
that in their view the researcher did not cover. Such a technique is valuable in 
providing participants the opportunity to discuss any issues that they would like to 
contribute (King & Horrocks, 2010). Some important insights were achieved through 
this technique including comments about the ways in which the board had addressed 
various challenges in the NFP sector.  
 
The interview questions were framed in such a way that they allowed participants to 
have a conversation with the interviewer (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). For example, 
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many of the questions were open questions, allowing interviewees the freedom to 
articulate. In cases where responses were brief or unclear, the researcher encouraged 
participants to provide further explanation or examples to illustrate their point. All 
interview questions were audio recorded and transcribed. 
 
A professional transcriber performed the transcription of the audio recordings from 
the 14 interviews. Reassurance of data confidentiality was attained through a Privacy 
and Confidentiality Policy that was part of the engagement process with the 
professional transcriber. This agreement can be seen at Appendix 5. Furthermore, to 
ensure security and confidentiality of data, the researcher requested that all Word 
document transcription files were purged from the transcription system upon 
payment. When the researcher received the transcription documents, care was 
exercised to check them against the original audio recordings. This enabled the 
researcher to make any corrections or complete text where the audio was 
indecipherable to the transcriber. This process was undertaken to ensure that the 
interview transcripts were reliable, valid and ethical (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p.219). 
The 14 interviews generated a total of 212 pages of transcribed text. 
While the focus of this study is on the directors, the researcher chose to also include 
senior managers in the interview process for two reasons. First, senior managers are in 
a position to provide a useful alternative perspective on directors’ roles given they 
work closely with the board. Second, the literature supports the practice of obtaining 
interview data from other parties where possible (Huse, 2005; Finkelstein, 1992; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Roberts 1991; Stone, 1991; Houle, 1989). Additionally, this 
approach enhances triangulation by obtaining accounts from other people who are 
relevant to the subject under study (Roberts, 1991, p.361).  
 
There was a slight difference in interview questions for senior managers compared to 
the board members. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p.134) explain that different 
participants might require different types of interview questions. In this study, a key 
point of difference in the interview questions was that senior managers were invited to 
reflect on the roles of board members and then explain how directors’ roles compare 
to their senior manager roles. Apart from this principal difference, all other interview 
questions remained the same. 
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The number of interviews and the selection of interview participants has been a point 
of discussion. Reputable sample sizes have been said to be between six and 12 
participants (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006), five and 25 participants (Creswell, 
1998) or two to 10 (Boyd, 2001). The caveat to these rules of thumb is that 
“saturation” of the data is reached (Glaser & Strauss, 1967 cited in Rubin & Rubin, 
2012, p.63). “Saturation” is a term used to describe the point at which the researcher 
no longer finds any new themes or concepts from the data (Creswell, 2007). “Data 
replication” or “redundancy” are similar terms which support the idea that when the 
researcher continues to encounter the same data, saturation is reached. To achieve 
saturation, participants or new observations continue to be added to the data set until a 
complete picture is constructed (Bowen, 2008, p.140). Commensurate with 
recommendations of an appropriate sample size from the interview literature, this 
qualitative case study features 14 interviews. Nine were conducted with all board 
members and five were conducted with all senior managers. This means interviews 
were conducted with NFP directors from all levels in the entity, including the board 
members, Board Chair, senior managers and the CEO of the NFP organisation 
(Parker, 2007a, p.1462). Such an approach should provide “…complementary data to 
understand issues from different perspectives” (Hennick, Hutter & Bailey, 2011, 
p.170) and facilitate triangulation (Waddington, 2004, p.156). 
 
Purposeful sampling was used in this qualitative study. In qualitative research, 
sampling is often purposive (Parker & Northcott, 2016, pp.1115-1116). It prioritises 
data quality and relevance to the project’s RQs rather than random selection and large 
numbers of respondents. In other words, “…participants are selected according to 
predetermined criteria relevant to a particular research objective” (Guest, Bunce & 
Johnson, 2006, p.61). This approach has been applied by Bowen (2008, p.142) who 
“…selected ‘information-rich cases’ for study in depth’ (as recommended by Patton 
1990, p.169, emphasis in original). Selecting interview participants with knowledge 
and experience or those “who best represent” the phenomenon under study, 
significantly assists in obtaining an “appropriate sample” (Bowen, 2008, p.140). 
Arguably, the most significant factor to consider is the objectives of the study. As this 
is a board study, it is appropriate to select participants who work in the context of the 
board of directors. Therefore, board members were an obvious choice. 
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In this study, interviews were conducted with all directors in the organisation, the 
senior management team, the CEO and members of committees (who comprise board 
members and some senior managers) (Parker, 2007a, p.1462). The researcher 
arranged interviews with the board members and senior managers by advising them 
verbally at a board meeting that she would contact them by email to arrange a 
mutually convenient date and time for interview. Every board member and senior 
manager communicated with the researcher either by email or in person at meetings to 
arrange a time for a face-to-face interview. Interviews were held at a place that was 
convenient to the research participant. All interviews for board members were 
conducted in the capital city of the state in which the organisation operates. All 
interviews for the senior managers were conducted at the Head Office of the 
organisation. 
 
In total, the interviews spanned 13 hours. The board was comprised of nine board 
members (including the Chair), all of whom were independent from the organisation 
and five senior managers (including the CEO). Independent directors were not 
remunerated for their services during the year 2015. A decision was made by the 
board in late 2015 to remunerate independent board members from January 2016. Of 
the independent directors, five were women and four were men. The senior managers 
comprised four women and one male. Interviews were undertaken during the period 
of May to July 2016 inclusive. The total length of interviews was 791 minutes (13 
hours) with an average length of interviews being 56 minutes. No repeat interviews 
were conducted. 
 
When conducting interviews, the researcher’s ontological perspective was 
acknowledged and an assessment of how they were likely to influence interviews was 
made (Ahrens & Khalifa, 2013, p.8; Parker, 2008, p.73). In this study, the researcher 
reflected on her qualifications and experience in accounting and law. She considered 
that these factors were likely to heighten her perception of accounting and legal issues 
- perhaps more so than other issues such as administrative or operational issues. As 
mentioned previously with respect to participant observation, the researcher’s 
presence appeared to have no significant impact on the interviews.  
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In order to mitigate the impact of the researcher on the interviewees, the researcher 
explained the purpose of the interview and reminded the participants that their 
interviews were confidential. The researcher also met interviewees at a place at which 
they chose, which has also been suggested to make interviewees more comfortable 
and likely to provide useful information (Patton, 2002) - including sensitive 
information (Grey, 2009). Additionally, all interview participants provided written 
and verbal consent to be interviewed and to have their responses audio recorded by an 
MP3 recording device (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004, p.111). The interviewer explained 
to participants that she would also take notes during the interview to guard against the 
audio recorder failing. All participants agreed to the researcher taking 
contemporaneous notes.  
 
Audio recordings were transcribed verbatim by a professional transcription service. 
The researcher reviewed all transcriptions and identified occasional places throughout 
some interviews that required amendments or adjustments (King & Horrocks, 2010). 
For example, completing missing content or correcting misspelt words. The 
researcher was mindful that tidying up interview transcriptions could in some cases 
jeopardise the quality of the transcription (King & Horrocks, 2010, p.144). This 
however does not apply to the current study, as minimal and only minor changes to 
the transcripts were required. The researcher was also able to overcome such risks by 
replaying the audio recording and referring to her handwritten notes taken at the time 
of interview. This gave the researcher the opportunity to capture what was said and 
also check the context by referring to her handwritten notes taken at the time of 
interview. Memo writing of significant issues raised in the interview was undertaken 
post-interview by the researcher. 
 
The utility of interviews is that they can draw out rich detail. Interviews are able to 
obtain two important and related responses – the story (“what” happened) and the 
discourse (“how” it happened) (Parker, 2012, pp.66-67). The “what” and “how” 
questions are important to this study as outlined in the RQs section in the Introduction 
chapter. Additionally, interviews provide the researcher with a certain degree of 
control. For instance, the interviewer can ask questions where they are interested to 
obtain an explanation. Flexibility in re-visiting questions or further probing is another 
strength of interviewing.  
 92 
 
There was a degree of flexibility in dealing with unexpected issues using the semi-
structured interview model (Singleton & Straits, 2005). For example, the researcher 
was able to ask unplanned, spontaneous questions and obtain more data than 
previously anticipated (Charmaz, 2014, p.85). Another strength of this method of data 
collection is that the interviewer can gauge the interviewee’s non-verbal response by 
observing their reactions, behaviour and body language (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004, 
p.114). Therefore, interviews can extract interviewees’ attitudes, beliefs, behaviour 
and nuances. 
 
Limitations of interviews are generally directed at its costly nature in terms of time 
and money (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.168; Seidman, 2006, p.12). More 
specifically, conducting interviews is time consuming and the transcription of 
interviews is often costly. This weakness was addressed in this study by the ability of 
the researcher to conduct interviews with relative ease, as interviewees elected to be 
interviewed in places that were accessible to the researcher. In addition, the cost of 
transcription services was alleviated because the researcher obtained university 
funding for the service.  
 
Another commonly cited weakness of interviews is failure on the part of the 
interviewer and/or the interviewee (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.168). For example, 
the interviewer may not be adequately prepared for the interview or they may have 
some bearing on the interviewee’s responses. This could be either intentional through 
influence or unintentional through misinterpretation of responses. These weaknesses 
were mitigated by the researcher undertaking diligent preparation of interview 
questions in consultation with two senior academics as well as reading literature about 
interview method. Moreover, the potential for the researcher to have bearing on the 
interviewee’s responses was mitigated by the researcher being reflexive about their 
potential impact on the interview, as well as the researcher seeking clarification if an 
interviewee’s response was unclear. Clarification of responses was sought at the time, 
where possible, and all interviewees agreed to further follow-up clarification, if 
required. In addition, the researcher verified all interview transcripts by reviewing the 
audio recording to reduce the chance of misinterpretation of responses.  
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It has been argued that another limitation of interview method is that the interviewee 
may also affect the interview process to some degree. There is the possibility that the 
interviewee might make verbal claims which differ to their actual behaviour or 
opinions (Glesne, 2006; Horton, Macve & Struyven, 2004). A technique suggested to 
prevent this is to give the interviewee the choice of place of interview. By adopting 
this approach, it is more likely that the interviewee will be comfortable and will 
convey more accurate statements than if they felt constrained by their environment 
(Horton, Macve & Struyven, 2004). The researcher followed this advice and all 14 
interviewees chose where they would like the interview conducted. Other techniques 
the researcher used to limit the likelihood of interviewees making verbal claims which 
were not congruent with their behaviour or opinions included: explaining the purpose 
of the interview, re-iterating its confidential nature and asking interviewees for their 
permission to audio record the interview. All participants agreed in writing and 
verbally to have their interview audio recorded. 
 
Data analysis: coding and memo writing 
Data analysis followed a number of key steps and it is the repeated application of the 
data analysis steps of coding and memo writing which eventually leads to saturation. 
Coding is the process where the researcher identifies commonly recurring themes or 
categories from the data. Many qualitative researchers also use a “sensitising device” 
(Bowen, 2008, p.142; Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, p.355). The sensitising device is a 
tool which is not only useful for heightening the researcher’s awareness of concepts 
or themes in the data, but it also prompts the researcher to consciously acknowledge  
“…the constructions – including preconceptions and assumptions – that inform their 
inquiry” (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, p.355). A sensitising device was used in this 
study, as recommended by Bowen (2008, p.142). However, the researcher was 
mindful that the sensitising device was not the only way that themes are 
acknowledged (Bowen, 2008, p.142).  
 
The sensitising device was developed from the literature including board process 
studies and accountability studies. Themes were also acknowledged by taking 
“particular care” to allow new concepts to emerge when undertaking data collection 
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and analysis (Bowen, 2008, p.142). When this happened, the researcher amended the 
sensitising device so that themes particular to the field were incorporated. Guest, 
Bunce and Johnson (2006, p.67) explain that the development of codes is a dynamic 
process and is often subject to change or refinement throughout the data collection 
and analysis process. The researcher kept a record of themes (subjects and topics) that 
were evident from board and committee observations. The themes were later refined 
into codes which were designed to encapsulate or describe similar or related themes. 
Appendix 6 provides an example of some of the original themes and the refined 
codes. 
 
When analysing interview transcripts, scholars usually recommend line-by-line 
coding and an iterative process, moving back and forward between the data and the 
codes to identify “similarities, differences, and general patterns” (Bowen, 2008, 
p.144; Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, p.356). Seidman (1998) explains the researcher 
should often ask what they have learned from the transcriptions. In particular: 
 
• What connective threads are there…?  
• What do they understand now that they did not understand before…?  
• What surprises have there been?  
• How have their interviews been consistent with the literature? How 
inconsistent? (Seidman, 1998, pp.110-111). 
 
The researcher applied this technique when analysing observational notes, memos and 
interview transcripts. Where documentary evidence was relied upon as a 
supplementary source of data, this technique was also used. This way, any gaps in the 
data could be addressed through theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling means 
returning to the field, such as observing another meeting with “more focused, even 
pointed questions…” (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, pp.358-9). Gaps in the data can 
also be addressed by developing new categories and re-visiting other data sources 
with a view to locating the newly developed category (Bowen, 2008, p.144). In this 
case, the researcher did not have to conduct repeat interviews, but new categories 
were developed over time, as the data set became larger and more issues became 
apparent. The researcher also refined some previous categories, putting them under 
the headings: “strategy”, “control”, “resource dependence” and “accountability”.  
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Three types of coding have been applied in this study in the following order: open 
(initial) coding, axial and selective (focused) coding (see Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, 
p.356 and Bowen, 2008, p.143). The open coding process occurs where the researcher 
begins the analysis of the data by mapping out codes or “preliminary concepts” that 
appear relevant to the phenomenon under study (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, p.356; 
Bowen, 2008, p.143). Axial coding is the process where “more abstract” data is 
identified as being linked to the concepts identified in the open coding process 
(Bowen, 2008, p.144). This entails the transition “…from descriptive to an 
interpretative and explanatory mode” (Bowen, 2008, p.145). The third type of coding 
is referred to as selective coding. Selective coding is the final process where the most 
frequently occurring codes (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006, p.72) or the most 
significant codes are selected and linkages between the codes are examined (Bowen, 
2008, p.145; Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, p.357).  
 
Data analysis in this study was undertaken manually and not electronically through 
computer programs such as NVivo. There are advantages adopting the manual process 
including the ability of the researcher to identify more specific categories and to 
analyse categories with contextual understanding. NVivo has been criticised for 
compromising data validity including leading researchers in a particular direction 
(Seidel, 1991 cited in Deakin, Wakefield & Gregorius, 2012, p.605) and prescribing 
particular categories to information which researchers might find difficult to alter 
(Robson, 2002 cited in Bergin, 2011, p.6). Certainly, a limitation of manual data 
analysis is that it is time consuming, however the researcher had sufficient time to 
undertake the task.  
The researcher applied thematic data techniques to the observation notes, memos and 
interview transcripts. This involved the researcher being attuned to processes and 
concepts that emerged from the data. These processes and concepts were developed 
inductively and often re-visited throughout the data collection and data analysis 
process. Over time, the researcher developed more themes and re-assessed the 
previous themes. In some cases, themes were consolidated. For example, legal or 
governance issues were consolidated under the theme of “control”. Summaries of 
themes were progressively made and incrementally developed throughout the data 
collection and data analysis processes. The researcher also identified similarities and 
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differences in the data through the process which Strauss and Corbin (2008, p.298) 
call the “constant comparative method”. 
The complex nature of boardroom operations called for data analysis to be undertaken 
at more than one level. As board members behave individually and make decisions as 
a group, it is necessary to understand the data at both the individual director level and 
the collective board level (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014). This was 
especially necessary when analysing the observation notes and memos from board 
and committee meetings. To achieve this, the researcher coded meetings by agenda 
items relevant to the study (strategy, control, resource dependence and accountability) 
and identifying the group decisions attached to the three key director roles. The 
individual level processes were ascertained through board member behaviours which 
pertained to their strategy, control and resource dependence roles. 
The codes pertaining to the three board roles and the accountabilities provided the 
researcher with a broad structure for the open coding analysis. Such a structure is 
logical because it follows RQs 1-3 as well as capturing relevant data that did not fit 
neatly into the three board roles. This structure was refined throughout the data 
analysis process where the researcher added inductively developed sub-codes. The 
sub-codes were designed to group and combine the codes developed in the open 
coding phase. Sub-codes were given a couple of words or a phrase to describe the 
activity which the sub-code represented. This process marked a point of consolidation 
of codes and made dealing with data analysis more manageable.  
Equipped with the sub-codes, the researcher commenced a second round of data 
analysis – axial coding, to all board and committee observations and memos as well 
as the interview transcripts. This process was a refining of the broader process that 
took place with open coding. The researcher ensured that each sub-code related to the 
research question and/or the theoretical framework. This practice achieved two 
objectives. First, it assisted the researcher to focus on relevant data and not be 
overwhelmed by “data asphyxiation” (Pettigrew, 1990, p.281). Second, it allowed the 
researcher to not only code according to the literature and the three board roles, but it 
also produced insights that related to the theoretical framework of accountability.  
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The third phase of coding, selective coding was the final round of data analysis 
performed. At this point, the researcher further refined the sub-codes into a set of 
more discreet codes and the most significant or commonly recurring codes were then 
focused on so that they could form the subject of the findings chapter discussions. 
Throughout all three coding processes, the researcher moved iteratively between the 
codes and continued coding or refining codes until no new data emerged (Creswell, 
2007). 
The researcher selected the observational notes and memos as the first form of data to 
analyse. This is because the primary objective of the study is to understand board 
member roles and behaviours. Observations from the boardroom were most likely to 
provide this type of data. As data was collected from the board, committees and 
strategic planning days, the researcher commenced at the board level first, analysing 
board meeting observations. Once complete, the committee meeting and strategic 
planning day observations were analysed. The next stage of data analysis involved the 
researcher analysing all interview transcripts. She did this in conjunction with her 
own handwritten notes taken at the time of interview. The interview data was a 
valuable data source, providing insights on issues particular to the interview 
participant or clarifying aspects which might not have been clear in the observations. 
Finally, on occasion, data analysis was applied to board or committee documents such 
as agendas and minutes where the researcher required clarification or more 
information.  
The researcher pursued assurance of data credibility through triangulation by using 
multiple sources of data including document analysis where clarification or context 
was required. The multiple data sources included: data from the researcher’s 
observations during board and committee meetings, data from the perspective of 
participants during interviews, and data from documents produced by senior managers 
and board members. Assessments were also made as to whether the data is authentic 
and plausible (Lukka & Modell, 2010; Smaling, 2003; Shank, 2006). This was 
achieved by ensuring that sufficient contextual understanding was provided in the 
findings chapters. Additionally, the data was assessed in terms of its credibility and 
trustworthiness (Hammersley, 1992, 1995; Golafshani, 2003; Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). 
This involved the researcher assessing the data analysis and findings to ensure they 
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apply logic and provide a realistic interpretation (Golafshani, 2003). Data 
interpretation and trustworthiness is discussed further in the section below “Data 
interpretation and establishing trustworthiness”.  
In the latter stages of data analysis (axial and selective coding), the researcher used 
Microsoft Excel to map all the codes and the linkages back to the original data 
sources. This enabled the researcher to have an electronic copy of the data to hand 
and assisted with retrieving electronic copies of observation notes, memos or 
interview transcripts. The other advantage of using Excel was to provide the 
researcher with a spreadsheet to “eyeball” the commonly and least commonly 
occurring themes in the data. An example of this process is provided in Appendix 7.  
 
After observations and during the data analysis process the researcher wrote memos. 
The primary purpose of memo writing is to encourage the researcher to engage with 
the data by thinking, analysing and recording their thoughts about the data (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008, p.118). Memos can range from “freewrites” to “tightly reasoned 
analytic statements” (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, p.357). Such a technique is 
valuable because it creates a traceable trial of the researcher’s thoughts at various 
points throughout the data collection process and therefore makes it much easier for 
the researcher to “…retrace the process by which researchers arrived at their final 
findings” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p.119).  
 
Memo writing builds upon codes by expanding on the codes, giving evidence in 
support. Such evidence might be excerpts from interviews (Charmaz & Belgrave, 
2012, p.358) and the researcher’s thoughts about a particular code (Wengraf, 2001 
cited in Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012, p.357). Comparisons and connections were also 
recorded in memos – linking or distinguishing from previous “…data, codes, ideas 
and hunches” (Charmaz, 2014, p.162).  
 
For this qualitative case study, memos were made of key categories in which the 
researcher identified various dimensions, contexts, relationships and meanings (Ryan 
& Bernard, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Consequently, each category has 
observational and interview evidence in support. Next, various categories were 
compared to ascertain similarities and differences. As a result, the data and memos 
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provide a rich source of information, shedding light on relationships or behaviours 
relevant to the study. 
Document analysis 
A form of secondary data used in this study was documents. Documents included 
minutes of meetings, agendas, board and committee papers, annual reports, and email 
correspondence between board members. Documents were examined for two key 
purposes. First, the documents augment the researcher’s understanding of board 
processes and the issues under consideration (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, 
p.244). Second, the documents enhanced the researcher’s understanding of the 
research site, settings and the people being studied. In this study, documents served a 
supplementary purpose, building on data collected from observations and interviews.  
Some scholars who have used documentary analysis in their board studies include 
Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014) who primarily use video observations as 
well as secondary data collection methods including document analysis techniques to 
collect data about board member interactions in two Australian companies. Parker 
(2008) is another scholar who uses board documents as a supplementary data source. 
Parker (2008) employs participant observer techniques as the primary method to 
assess operational and financial control in two NFP organisations. In a similar vein, 
this NFP case study uses document analysis as a secondary or supplementary source 
of data. Approximately 322 documents including board papers, handouts, committee 
papers, annual reports, budgets and email correspondence were collected and 
assessed. Table 3.2 on the following two pages outlines the category of documents 
inspected, number, period of time they cover, and average length of documents. 
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Table 3.2 Document analysis 
 
  
Document category Number per category Period covered Average length 
(pages) 
Board papers  
 
E.g.: Agenda, minutes of 
previous meeting, business 
arising, action items, Chair’s 
report, CEO’s report, 
strategic issues, items for 
decision, items for 
Discussion, items for Noting. 
 
12 board papers (papers = a 
bundle per meeting) 
August 2015 – 
December 2016  
(16 months) 
120 pages 
Committee papers  
Finance & Audit; 
Governance; Risk; Aged 
Care & Property; Strategy 
Advisory, Community 
services; Aged Care & 
Community Housing 
Strategies, and Strategic 
Planning Days. 
 
22 committee papers (papers 
= a bundle per meeting) 
August 2015 – 
December 2016 (16 
months) 
13 pages for all 
Committees except 
100 pages for Finance 
and Audit Committee 
(due to accounting 
documents including 
budgets, financial 
reports and audits) 
Handouts during board 
meetings  
E.g.: Strategic partnerships; 
CLG questions to ask 
Lawyers; Draft Strategic Plan 
2017-2021 (mission/vision 
statement and commence 
KPIs to monitor progress 
against goals). 
 
26 board handouts October 2015 – 
December 2016  
(14 months) 
10 pages 
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Table 3.2 Document analysis continued… 
  
Document category Number per category Period covered Average length 
(pages) 
Handouts during committee 
meetings  
E.g.: Risk Committee: KMPG 
Understanding and Articulating 
Risk Appetite: Advisory;           
 
Finance and Audit Committee: 
Investment Portfolio position;               
Governance Committee: Draft 
advertisement for two Board 
members. 
  
20 committee handouts September 2015 – 
December 2016  
(15 months) 
10 pages 
Email correspondence 
E.g.: Calendar updates for 
meetings, documents and 
minutes of previous meetings. 
 
232 emails August 2015 – 
December 2016  
(16 months) 
 
9 pages 
Invitations to organisation 
events  
E.g.: Fundraising events, 
information sessions and guest 
speakers for the organisation. 
 
10 events  August 2015 – 
December 2016  
(16 months) 
 
1 page 
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Summary of the data sources 
To summarise, primary data was collected from participant observation and semi-
structured interviews. Secondary data in the form of documents were also collected. A 
summary of the data sources including the data collection technique and data 
objectives are outlined in Table 3.3 below. 
 
Table 3.3 Data sources 
Method 
Data type Data source Collection 
technique 
 
Data objective 
Boardroom 
observations 
Primary 14 board 
meetings 
23 committee 
meetings 
 
In person 
Field notes 
Memos 
Preliminary 
coding of 
director roles 
Directly observe 
the behaviours, 
discourse and 
context of board 
and committee 
meetings. 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Primary 9 board 
members 
5 senior 
managers 
 
In person 
Field notes 
Memos 
Audio recordings 
Transcriptions 
Directly engage 
with individual 
board members 
and senior 
managers about 
the roles and 
functions of 
board members 
and senior 
managers. 
 
Documents Secondary Board papers; 
Committee 
papers; 
Handouts;  
Email 
correspondence 
In person 
By post 
Electronically by 
email 
A supplementary 
technique used 
to give context 
and meaning to 
items for data 
analysis. 
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Data interpretation and establishing trustworthiness 
Qualitative studies acknowledge that it is not possible to achieve objectivity in 
research as it is laden with conceptions and interpretations. Ethnography is therefore 
“…an interpretative rather than a positivist perspective on the nature of social reality” 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011, p.198). Instead of being seen as a hurdle to achieving 
sound data, qualitative techniques embrace complexity, tackling the “value-laden 
nature” of research by applying techniques such as reflexivity and rigor (Goulding, 
2005, p.300). Reflexivity is the ability of the researcher to reflect critically on the 
impact of their experience, qualifications and beliefs on the phenomena being studied. 
The equivalent concept in quantitative research is construct validity (Thomas & 
Magilvy, 2011, p.154). Often reflexive practices mean considering “preconceptions 
and assumptions – that inform…[the researcher’s] inquiry” (Charmaz & Belgrave, 
2012, p.355). As Carbaugh et al. (2011, pp.153-4) explain reflexivity involves the 
researcher having a sense of humility – an awareness of how they will be viewed by 
others, more than how they view others. Rigor in the context of qualitative research 
means the ability of the researcher to be consistent in their assessments of the data so 
as to establish confidence or trustworthiness in the findings (Thomas & Magilvy, 
2011).  
The researcher applied the techniques of reflexivity and rigor by recording memos 
about her qualifications, values and experiences that might inform the study. These 
notes were often written after observations and interviews during the data write-up 
process. The chance of any preconceptions or assumptions were also recorded in data 
write-up in square brackets so the researcher could quickly identify any possible areas 
where the data might be informed by the researcher’s views. The memo writing 
process is a method of directly and consciously acknowledging researcher biases, 
preconceptions or values (Ortlipp, 2008). 
A key seminal paper about establishing trustworthiness in qualitative research was 
written by Lincoln and Guba (1985). They argue that there are four components to 
trustworthiness: (a) credibility, (b) transferability, (c) dependability and (d) 
confirmability. Each of these components will be defined. Credibility is concerned 
with whether the findings reflect reality and the concept is “similar to internal validity 
in quantitative research” (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.152). Transferability is 
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whether the findings can be transferred to similar contexts and the equivalent concept 
in quantitative research is external validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.290). 
Dependability, known as reliability in quantitative research, asks researchers to 
consider whether their findings would be reproduced if the same study were 
undertaken again (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.153). Confirmability requires 
qualitative researchers to ensure the findings of the study reflect the participants’ 
preferences rather than that of the researcher and the related concept in quantitative 
research is objectivity (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.154). Each of these components 
will be discussed below with reference to the methods used in this study to achieve 
trustworthiness. 
(a) Credibility 
Triangulation is a technique qualitative researchers employ to provide confidence that 
the findings are credible. Triangulation, also known as “structural corroboration” 
(Pepper, 1942, p.48), is the process of using multiple sources to cross-check the data 
so that it matches or at least fits within reasonable parameters of what is evident in 
various sources of data. Beitin (2012, p.248) provides a list of sources that are often 
used in triangulation: “the combining of multiple methods, measures, researchers, 
theories, and perspectives”. By undertaking the triangulation process and ensuring the 
data matches or best fits the other data (Beitin, 2012, p.251), the reader’s confidence 
can be increased with respect to the findings. This study uses triangulation, as 
multiple sources of data have been utilised to study an NFP board. By using 
observation, interview and document data in tandem, researchers are likely to gain a 
more accurate and fuller view of the phenomenon under study (Peck, 1995, p.154). 
Furthermore, triangulation allows data from different perspectives to be obtained and 
analysed. In this study, the researcher observed both board members and senior 
managers, obtained board members’ and senior managers’ perspectives during 
interviews, and viewed documents written by senior managers and board members. 
Credibility of research was also established through peer scrutiny and feedback over 
the duration of the researcher’s study. The researcher presented at three international 
Doctoral Symposia and three school research conferences at RMIT University. These 
forums provided the researcher with a range of feedback from colleagues and senior 
academics. Appendix 8 outlines the academic colloquia and conferences the 
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researcher attended. Finally, the researcher established credibility by having the 
Board Chair review the opening chapters, context, findings, discussion and 
conclusions from the study. 
(b) Transferability 
The researcher provides “thick description” or “dense description” to assist with the 
transferability of findings (Parker & Northcott, 2016, p.1103; Thomas & Magilvy, 
2011, p.153) Thick or dense description is where the researcher provides contextual 
detail in the findings to enable the reader to have confidence in the conclusions drawn 
(Parker & Northcott, 2016). By providing rich descriptions of situations and contexts, 
there is also a practical implication. As Bowen (2008, p.148) asserts there is potential 
for, “…the findings…[to] be applied to new situations or experiences”. While this is 
possible to a degree in this study, it is important to acknowledge the limitation here. 
This is a single case study and therefore confined to a single organisation. The 
objective of this study is not to obtain a range of contexts that are transferrable to 
other situations or experiences, but to achieve a depth of understanding of the 
phenomena studied (Yin, 2009). 
(c) Dependability 
Dependability of the findings is enhanced if the researcher explains the processes 
involved in data collection and data analysis. This should enable other researchers to 
achieve similar results if the data collection and analysis were performed again in the 
same context (Shenton, 2004). Thomas and Magilvy (2011, p.153) explain that the 
researcher needs to describe: the purpose of the study, how and why the participants 
were selected, the data collection methods, the time period of data collection, how the 
data was analysed, the interpretation and presentation of findings, and the techniques 
used to establish trustworthiness of the data. To establish dependability, the researcher 
has followed this advice by providing detailed explanations and examples of the 
research methods of data collection and analysis used in the study. 
(d) Confirmability 
A strategy often used by qualitative researchers to achieve confirmability is 
reflexivity. Reflexivity “requires a self-critical attitude on the part of the researcher 
about how one’s own preconceptions affect the research” (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, 
p.154). The researcher was reflexive in the memos she wrote about the data collected. 
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For example, in her field notes, she made comments in brackets or if it warranted 
more extensive discussion, she made a separate memo about her feelings or potential 
bias. The second strategy used by the researcher to enhance confirmability was to 
conduct interviews in a way that enabled the participants to contribute in an 
unconstrained and spontaneous manner. The researcher’s use of open-ended questions 
and the semi-structured nature of the interview facilitated this process. Additionally, 
the researcher gave every participant the opportunity to raise any issues or questions 
for discussion. As a result, the data collected from the interviews is reflective of 
participants’ views and experiences rather than those of the researcher. The final 
technique the researcher used to ensure confirmability was the inductive nature of the 
data analysis process. More specifically, the coding process was thematic and 
iterative, enabling the data to speak to the researcher rather than using a 
predetermined method of data analysis.  
Methodology and theory 
There is a close link between methodology and theory. Theory is used either to inform 
the data collected or theory emerges from the data collected (Parker & Roffey, 1997). 
Research methodology often contributes to theory – whether it strengthens the 
existing theoretical foundation, adds to or changes it to some degree (Goulding, 2005, 
p.300). Willis and Trondman (2002, p.399) argue that research methods alone cannot 
explain phenomenon, neither can theory. Both methodology and theory are needed to 
provide evidence and explanation. For example, the ethnographic research style has 
become associated with sociocultural theories such as Critical Theory, Feminism, 
Marxism and Postmodernism (Angrosino, 2007, p.5). The present qualitative case 
study contributes to existing concepts and frameworks in accountability and enhances 
understandings of governance in the NFP sector (Williams & Taylor, 2013; Morrison 
& Salipante, 2007; Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002). The Literature Review chapter 
highlighted the need for more qualitative research, as there is a lack of understanding 
about how NFP boards work. Second, there is a need to contribute to the theoretical 
perspective of accountability as applied to interpret governance phenomena. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the data collection and data analysis techniques used in 
this study to answer its three RQs. To address the RQs, primary data was obtained 
from 37 meetings and 14 interviews. Secondary sources included board and 
committee papers, handouts during meetings and email correspondence.  
 
The Methodology chapter opened by outlining the case for qualitative research and 
explaining the preliminary aspects of the methodology including the ethical aspects, 
data storage and how the case study organisation was selected. The chapter then 
explained the three methods of data collection as well as the strengths and limitations 
of each research method. The chapter also described the data collection and analysis 
techniques in detail including the coding and memo writing aspects. A summary of 
the data sources has been provided as well as assessments of and discussion about the 
trustworthiness of the data. The chapter concludes by explaining the link between 
methodology and theory and flags the upcoming discussion of concepts of 
accountability in the Theoretical Framework chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by explaining the five levels of theoretical contributions that 
accounting qualitative studies can make to the literature. It then provides an overview 
of accountability in governance and the NFP context. It also explains the theoretical 
framework that will be applied in this study. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
theoretical framework will also be explored. The chapter then outlines the research 
agenda for the study including a synthesis of the key elements of the broad 
accountability framework that will be used. In closing, the chapter presents a 
summary outlining the reasons why broad accountability is suitable for this 
investigation. 
Llewellyn’s (2003) five levels of theorising illustrate the types of theoretical 
contributions that can be made in the qualitative accounting and management 
literatures. Llewellyn (2003) classifies the theoretical contributions into five levels. 
Level one is metaphor theories; level two is differentiation theories; level three is 
conceptualisation theories; level four is theorising of settings and level five is 
theorising structures (Llewellyn, 2003, p.667). These types of theorising will be 
discussed in this section.  
Metaphor theorising is called level one theorising and is used by a researcher to 
illustrate a theoretical concept. In this case, the researcher uses a well-known scenario 
to explain how a theoretical point applies in that context. This way, the researcher is 
leading the reader through a familiar idea and then linking a new idea. This technique 
enables the researcher to effectively communicate their theoretical contribution. For 
example, Gibbon (2012) uses metaphor theorising to explain how NFP organisations 
deal with the challenge of generating social accounts. The technique of metaphor 
theorising that Gibbon (2012) applies is through her personal reflections on her two 
different approaches to and understandings of accountability in writing social 
accounts for an NFP organisation. It is through the reflection process where the reader 
can relate to the narrative. Gibbon (2012, p.201) calls this a “sense-making process”. 
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Differentiation theories are considered theorising at level two and are employed when 
a researcher wishes to highlight the difference between the phenomenon under study 
and a contrasting phenomenon. While the two concepts are usually considered 
opposites, they usually have the same subject in common. For instance, the example 
of public-private. The subject both phenomena have in common is the sector. Or for 
another example, consider formal-informal. The subject the two phenomena share is 
the manner in which behaviour is conducted. Parker (2014) uses differentiation theory 
in his article “corporate social accountability through action” where he discusses the 
linked but different concepts of the business case and social accounting. Parker (2014) 
explains while the two concepts are generally not compatible, he argues they co-exist 
in his study. 
Level three theorising is referred to as concepts theorising. It occurs when a 
researcher uses a practice such as accountability to explain a scenario and during this 
process, novel contributions to theory are made. For instance, Joannides (2012, 
pp.245, 255) explores the integration of social accounting into the Salvation Army’s 
mechanisms of accountability. In doing so, he contributes to the understanding of the 
concept “accounterability” coined by Kamuf (2007). Joannides (2012) also adds new 
insights to the critical accounting perspectives by scholars such as Messner (2009) 
and Roberts (2009). Joannides’ (2012) study also applies the concept of 
accounterability to a new setting so theorising at level four – theorising of settings – is 
also undertaken by the researcher. 
At level four theorising is the theorising of settings. This occurs when a researcher 
analyses the contextual aspects which impact on how actors or entities pursue their 
goals. Researchers also exercise theorising of settings when they analyse behaviours 
or find relationships at different levels. For instance, when analysing board behaviour, 
the individual level might reveal certain behaviours that are different to those present 
at the collective level. This type of analysis is also evident in Ospina, Diaz and 
O’Sullivan’s (2002) study of how NFP leaders deal with the various and sometimes 
competing contextual factors to discharge their accountability to various stakeholder 
groups.  
Finally, theorising of structures occurs at level five and happens when more abstract 
and broad theories are applied to “enduring structural aspects of experience”, which 
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are not limited to time or space (Llewellyn, 2003, p.678). Often called “grand 
theories”, this form of theorising is where a theoretical perspective is generally 
accepted to explain phenomena in multiple disciplines or settings. An example of 
grand theorising is Miller’s (2002) application of agency theory to NFP setting. 
Agency theory originally developed from the corporate context but has since been 
used in other contexts and time periods (Berle & Means, 1932). As Llewellyn (2003, 
p.664) notes, grand theories have been given the most attention in the accounting 
theory literature. More focus on theorising at levels one to four is encouraged by 
Llewellyn (2003). 
This single qualitative NFP case study employs theorising as outlined by Llewellyn 
(2003) from levels two to four inclusive. Level two theorising – differentiation 
theories will feature as the broad accountability concepts of informal and formal 
accountability, negotiable and rule-based aspects, narrative and calculative, and 
individualizing and socializing aspects of accountability are taken into account (see 
section in this chapter “Broad accountability: synthesising concepts and the research 
agenda”). Concepts theorising at level three is particularly relevant to this study, as it 
applies accountability concepts contained in a framework of accountability 
(Llewellyn, 2003, p.680). Finally, investigating how governance is enacted in the 
NFP context is going to require level four theorising – theorising settings. The 
enactment of accountability at both the individual board member level and the 
collective board level will be considered. External and internal factors in the NFP 
environment will also be central to this study when examining the discharge of board 
member roles. This is because the objective of this study is not only to understand 
board members’ roles but also how they might be conditioned or influenced by the 
context in which the organisation is operating. 
Accountability in corporate governance 
Two primary responsibilities of board members are: to hold the senior managers to 
account for their actions as well as being accountable as an individual to the board as 
a collective. O’Neal and Thomas (1995, p.79) argue this is achieved when the board 
member discharges their strategy, control and resource dependence roles. When these 
roles are exercised, in most cases, senior managers are held to account. Importantly, 
however, board members also are held to account by the board and their stakeholders.  
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As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, this is also known as “board 
accountability” and is achieved through mechanisms such as board performance 
reviews and governance reviews. At this stage, it is apparent that accountability acts 
in two ways with respect to the board. First, the board is responsible for keeping 
senior managers to account. Second, the board is also held to account by various 
stakeholder groups and also the board as a collective whole. In the present case study 
there is also a higher religious authority (please refer to Context chapter) to which the 
board must also consider. As revealed in interviews with board members and senior 
managers, this accountability is ‘soft’ in nature. In other words, rather than the hard, 
obvious rule-based accountability, the board has a more flexible and relaxed 
accountability to the higher authority. The higher authority only becomes involved if 
the NFP entity deviates from the ethos of the religious institution, otherwise it is 
granted considerable discretion in its operations. 
Considering the subject of the study and the context of this research, there is a strong 
argument in favour of adopting a framework of accountability to analyse an NFP 
board. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) argue that the subject of the study often 
guides the researcher in their choice of theoretical perspective. In their study, Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles (2005) examined 40 company directors in the UK. Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles (2005) use accountability concepts to explain how boards operate. 
Holland (2002) applies a similar approach, examining board accountability in NFP 
organisations in the US.  
There is also the argument that the context of the study influences the theoretical 
perspective (Collier, 2005). A considerable body of accountability literature exists in 
the NFP sector, much of which has been discussed in the Literature Review chapter. 
Scholars who adopt this view argue context is important for accountability as it can 
influence the manner and extent of accountability that operates (O’Leary, 2017; 
Young, 2002, p.3; Ebrahim, 2003; Gray & Jenkins, 1993; Parker, 1996).  
In a similar vein to the studies outlined above, this study applies an accountability 
lens because the board and the NFP context are partial to accountability perspectives. 
It can be argued that accountability underpins board member roles and how they are 
enacted. Similarly, the conditions in which the board operates are likely to influence 
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the types of accountability relationships it has with its external and internal 
stakeholders and how accountability is discharged to their stakeholders. 
Accountability: key elements and a definition 
There are numerous definitions of “accountability” in the accounting literature. The 
seminal work by Roberts and Scapens (1985) and Roberts (1991) are often cited as 
starting points (McKernan & McPhail, 2012, p.177). Accountability can be argued to 
embody “the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts & Scapens, 
1985, p.447). Roberts (1991) asserts that accountability is a social activity in which 
people provide an account for certain activities. The challenge to agree on a universal 
definition of accountability is embodied in the article of Ebrahim (2003). Ebrahim 
(2003, p.194) explains that the dynamic and contextual nature of accountability adds 
to the difficulty of achieving consensus on a definition. Gray and Jenkins (1993, p.65) 
support this assertion, arguing that definitions of accountability are often value-laden 
“…which can affect the balance of advantage within the management process”.  
According to Hoskin (1996, pp.267-268), “accountability” originated in the 
educational system in the 18th century and later became influential in the business 
sector. Tracking how accountability has changed over the 19th and 20th centuries, 
Hoskin (1996, pp.275-276) explains that initially accountability was backward 
looking and concerned with the past, however in North America during the 1830s, it 
came to embody notions of performance. Accountability developed to a point where it 
considered present and future issues as well as past issues, for example, budgeted 
items as well as actuals. Accountability in the accounting context may be thought of 
as being comprised of two components. McKernan and McPhail (2012, p.177) 
explain that these are  “calculation and narration”. Calculation is concerned with 
accounting for phenomena using numbers and objective measures that simply report 
facts. Narration is often delivered in the written word and conveys subjective 
measures, which often involve the use of intuition and discretion (McKernan & 
McPhail, 2012, pp.178-9). 
The many definitions of accountability in the literature over the years have led 
scholars to extract key elements of accountability common to definitions in an attempt 
to distil and simplify the concept. Gray and Jenkins (1993, p.55) argue: “In essence, 
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accountability is an obligation to present an account of and answer for the execution 
of responsibilities to those who entrusted those responsibilities”. Parker and Gould 
(1999, p.117) agree, identifying two key similarities with most definitions of 
accountability: “the account and the holding to account; and two parties – the 
accountor (or ‘agent’…) and the accountee (or ‘principal’…)”.  
The implications of providing an account is also commonly discussed in the 
accountability literatures. Fuller and Roffey (1993) explain that accountability occurs 
when an entity provides an account to a party for their actions and the consequences 
of such actions. Similarly, Brown and Fraser (2006, p.107) assert that accountability 
entails the power of the constituents to “reward and sanction” or “praise and blame” 
those entrusted to represent constituents (Gray & Jenkins, 1993, p.55). Lindberg 
(2013, p.202) also recognises that consequences feature in accountability. Lindberg 
(2013) asserts accountability is: 
• an agent giving an account; 
• the account is given to a principal; 
• the agent acts in a particular area of expertise; 
• the principal has the right to demand an explanation from the agent; and 
• the principal has the ability to sanction or reward the agent. 
 
A useful discussion in the literature is the distinction between accountability and 
responsibility. Hoskin (1996, p.265) argues that accountability is wider “in its 
operation and scope” and it is ubiquitous. “Accountability ranges more freely over 
space and time, focusing as much on future potential as on past…Its reach runs both 
vertically and horizontally…” (Hoskin, 1996, p.265). Responsibility, on the other 
hand, is more confined and is simply being held to account for specified 
responsibilities. Parker and Gould (1999, p.117) support the demarcation between 
accountability and responsibility as expressed by Hoskin (1996), observing that 
accountability entails the additional element of performance. Parker and Gould (1999) 
contend that accountability should also entail “activities including setting goals, 
providing and reporting on results and the visible consequences for getting things 
right or wrong” (Core, 1993 cited in Parker & Gould, 1999, p.118). 
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While a definition of accountability has been outlined, it is important to recognise that 
the context in which accountability operates influences accountability as well. Fuller 
and Roffey (1993, p.151) highlight that definitions of accountability depend on the 
context, relationships with parties and mechanisms of accountability. With respect to 
the influence of context on accountability, it has been argued that with the advent of 
New Public Management (NPM) in the public sector, accountability has expanded so 
that efficiency and effectiveness needs to be demonstrated by public entities (Parker 
& Gould, 1999). NPM is also largely responsible for the increased focus on the 
customer/client (Fuller & Roffey, 1993; Lewis, O’Flynn & Sullivan, 2014). It can be 
argued that NPM features in the NFP sector as well, with the service delivery 
environment becoming increasingly more competitive (Stone & Ostrower, 2007, 
p.417; Young, 2002). Writing in relation to the NFP sector, Ebrahim (2003, p.200) 
states, “…accountability is relational in nature and can properly be understood only in 
the context of a nonprofit’s interactions with members of its organisational 
environment”. This includes the various stakeholder groups NFP organisations aim to 
satisfy such as donors, governments, clients and the community. It is important to 
understand the context of these relationships and the expectations from stakeholders. 
There is widespread consensus in the accountability literatures that accountability is 
context-dependent (for example see: Young, 2002, p.3; Gray & Jenkins, 1993; 
Sinclair, 1995; Parker, 1996; Ebrahim, 2003; Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009). 
Accountability in the NFP board context 
A definition of NFP accountability is provided by Carver (1997, p.2) who argues, 
“nonprofit boards hold the “ultimate accountability” for organizational action”. This 
single case study in an Australian NFP organisation examines the board to gain more 
insight into how board members enact their three roles using a lens of accountability. 
As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, NFP organisations possess many 
characteristics that are unique and have implications for governance. Some of these 
characteristics include: operating in a dynamic environment, complex organisational 
structures, multiple stakeholder groups, altruistic missions and objectives, and 
receiving profits. The accountability literature highlights the importance of taking into 
account contextual factors when analysing accountability.  
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There are many who argue that context is a significant factor to consider when 
assessing accountability. Ebrahim (2003, p.203) observes, “…accountability is highly 
contingent on relationships and on mechanisms put in place to ensure it”. Young 
(2002, p.3) also argues that accountability in the NFP sector is contextual. “One needs 
to specify: “accountable to whom and for what?” Young (2002) explains that in the 
business and public sectors, answers to these questions are fairly straightforward. In 
contrast, the complex nature of the NFP sector makes answering these questions more 
challenging. This is because “Nonprofits are established for a wide spectrum of 
public-serving or collective purposes, they are financed in a variety of ways, and they 
involve many different but important stakeholder groups” (Young, 2002, p.4). Fuller 
and Roffey (1993, p.151) suggest that accountability differs depending on the sector, 
relationships with other actors and mechanisms of accountability. According to Parker 
and Gould (1999), how and when the mechanisms of accountability are used is 
critical. “While accountability systems provide structure and continuity over time, 
their use in practice is context dependent…different groups at different times perceive 
accountability and enact it in different ways” (Parker & Gould, 1999, p.128). Context 
remains as a critical element in accountability in more recent times. Lindberg (2013, 
p.211) also argues accountability depends on context, calling it “context-specific”.  
The foregoing discussion underscores the importance of considering context when 
using an accountability perspective. This Theoretical Framework chapter considers a 
select group of studies which argue that a framework of accountability is required 
when examining NFP phenomena. The section below will explain the concept of 
“broad accountability” and how it applies to the NFP context. 
The concept of broad accountability 
The NFP governance literature strongly makes the case for applying a “broader 
accountability” (Shearer, 2002, pp.543, 569; Parker, 1996, p.9; Ebrahim, 2003; Stone 
& Ostrower, 2007; Fuller & Roffey, 1993; O’Leary, 2017). Broad accountability may 
be defined as the need to expand the scope of accountability so that it encapsulates 
phenomena such as the strategic and negotiable aspects of accountability involved in 
managing multiple stakeholder groups (Gibbon, 2012, p.202; Ospina, Diaz & 
O’Sullivan, 2002; Morrison & Salipante, 2007). Broad accountability also captures 
board effectiveness and the contextual nature of accountability in the NFP sector. By 
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contrast, traditional conceptions of accountability tend to be narrower in focus and 
favour examining the control aspects of governance or improving board composition 
including board size and structure. Coule (2015, p.84) categorises the broad and 
narrow conceptions of accountability as two governance “logics”: pluralist and 
unitary. Pluralist governance is that which takes into account stakeholders either by 
involving them in board decision-making or by generating narratives to reassure 
stakeholders that the philanthropic objectives of the organisation are being achieved. 
Unitary governance models tend to operate where control is discharged from the 
broad of the organisation downwards with the effect of creating hierarchical 
accountability relationships and marginalising stakeholders.  
A spate of governance issues with NFP organisations has provided the impetus for the 
theoretical literature to shift in emphasis from a narrow view of accountability to a 
broader view (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.8). Narrow perspectives of 
accountability are typically concerned with increasing the transparency of boards and 
the responsibilities of organisational leaders such as board members (Roberts, 2009; 
Messner, 2002). While calls for increasing accountability in this respect might be 
justified in some contexts, it can be argued that viewing accountability from a narrow 
view overlooks other important features of accountability which broad accountability 
can embrace. For example, context (Ebrahim, 2003), strategic aspects such as 
managing multiple stakeholders (Morrison & Salipante, 2007; Balser & McClusky, 
2005), different accountability relationships (Lewis, O’Flynn & Sullivan, 2014), the 
community as a stakeholder (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002), informal as well as 
formal aspects (Roberts, 1991), social as well as conventional accounting practices 
(Boland & Schultze, 1996; Roberts, 1991; Collier, 2005), negotiable aspects (trust, 
judgment and discretion of organisational leaders) (Morrison & Salipante, 2007; 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002), and idiosyncratic accounting practices (Hardy & 
Ballis, 2013; Joannides, Jaumier  & Hoque, 2015). 
The shift in the theoretical literature from a narrow to a broad conception of 
accountability can be argued to parallel the development of governance perspectives 
from narrow views to a broader notion of governance (Shearer, 2002). In the FP 
context, governance in a narrow sense is where the board makes a profit for the 
shareholders of the company (Parker, 1996). However, a broader view of governance 
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appreciates that the board is accountable to a wider field of actors than just 
shareholders (i.e. stakeholders). In a similar way to narrow conceptions of 
accountability, narrow perspectives of governance have been criticised for being too 
focused on aspects of control and disregarding broader strategic aspects such as 
satisfying multiple stakeholders. Holland (2002, p.411) highlights the problems with 
applying a narrow perspective of governance to the NFP sector. He argues that simply 
tightening legislation and regulation pertaining to NFP boards is likely to have 
detrimental effects by encouraging board members and staff to focus on compliance 
rather than thinking at a higher, strategic and creative level. 
The shortcomings of a narrow perspective of accountability mirror those of narrow 
conceptions of governance. Shearer (2002, p.570) argues that accountability needs to 
be broadened so organisational leaders are accountable to actors other than simply the 
owners of the company. Lewis, O’Flynn and Sullivan (2014, p.402) explain that the 
conventional, narrow view of accountability has been changed to encapsulate other 
components of accountability such that its “meaning and reach” have been expanded. 
This is particularly so in sectors which are dynamic and subject to change such as the 
NFP and public sectors (Parker & Gould, 1999). Ebrahim (2003, p.191) argues in a 
similar fashion, remarking, “an emphasis on external oversight and control misses 
other dimensions of accountability essential to nonprofit organizations”. Ebrahim 
(2003) suggests that internal contextual factors such as the leadership styles of the 
Board Chair, the life cycle of the organisation and the skills sets of the board 
members can also influence how accountability is enacted in NFP entities. More 
recently, Coule (2015) supports a framework of broad accountability to investigate 
governance practices in NFP organisations. The foregoing discussion illustrates why 
it is important to apply a broad framework of accountability to consider all three roles 
of the board member in the NFP context. 
This study adds to a small, but growing area of research in the NFP sector, which is 
beginning to gather momentum due to the increasing number of governance issues 
inherent in the sector. For some recent examples, consider the governance issues in 
the RSL, issues with governance in the AFL and the Netball Australia Board (ABC 
891 Radio Adelaide, 2017). Other examples of allegations of misconduct in NFP 
entities are present in other countries such as the US where the Red Cross, some 
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financing institutions and health care providers have been scrutinised for governance 
anomalies (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, p.196). These examples have encouraged an 
increasing emphasis on accountability of NFP leaders including the board and senior 
managers. A key reason for the increasing scrutiny is because confidence has been 
undermined in some NFPs. Many scholars explain how important it is for NFP 
entities to have trust from the community (see: Farwell, Shier & Handy, 2018; Balser 
& McClusky, 2005; Ebrahim, 2003; Holland, 2002). If trust in an NFP organisation is 
eroded, it tends to have a negative impact on the involvement of the community in 
NFP initiatives, events or fundraising activities (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009, p.28).  
Broad accountability is defined as accountability that flows upwards and downwards, 
as well as horizontally. Horizontal accountability is also known as “sideways” 
accountability (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.23). Upwards accountability 
occurs when an entity is accountable to a higher authority. In the case of the board in 
this study, it is accountable to the peak body of the religious institution and its 
associated advocacy and lobby group. An example of downward accountability is 
where an NFP organisation is accountable to its beneficiaries (O’Leary, 2017, pp.22-
23). In the present study, beneficiaries include the consumers, their families and the 
community. In Collier’s (2005, p.948) study of a social housing agency transitioning 
into a complex business, downward accountability to the primary beneficiaries 
occurred but “the tenant, and to some extent the tax-paying public” was largely 
neglected. While upward and downward directions of accountability are well 
established in the theoretical literature, Lewis, O’Flynn and Sullivan (2014, p.402) 
highlight that more modern forms of governing like NPM, have introduced horizontal 
accountability relationships (Rhodes, 1997; Considine, 2002).  
It has been argued that horizontal accountability relationships feature in the NFP 
context (Stone & Ostrower, 2007, p.417). For example, horizontal accountability 
features in the organisation’s ability to fulfil its mission (Ebrahim, 2003). This means 
that the board is responsible for ensuring the organisation does what it was designed 
to do. If the organisation’s mission is fulfilled, it often satisfies stakeholder groups 
who either partake in its activities or become involved through affiliated organisations 
that share a common mission. The example of horizontal accountability provided by 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002, p.23) supports this idea, explaining sideways 
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accountability features in alliances or partnerships that an NFP organisation may have 
with another similar organisation(s). 
Broad accountability expands notions of the context of accountability to include the 
informal ways of discharging accountability as well as the formal means (Ebrahim, 
2003). Roberts (1991, 2003) highlights the importance of understanding formal and 
informal accountability. He explains that accountability is not only achieved in a 
formal sense such as reporting to stakeholders, but it also achieved in a less formal 
manner, such as through interactions with others. Stone and Ostrower (2007, pp.418-
419) agree, arguing that governance has both constraining and enabling factors, 
including both formal and informal elements. Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen’s (2009) 
dual case study of a Hindu and Buddhist temple in Mauritius and Sri Lanka revealed 
that informal accountability practices often featured when investigating accountability 
systems in both cases. According to Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen (2009, p.997), “…the 
accountability system in the religious organisations is largely visible as an informal 
and social practice rather than a stakeholder-oriented rational mechanism”. 
Behaviours such as “trust, aspirations, patronage and loyalty relations, social status, 
power and rivalries” inform the religious practices and discharge of accountability 
(Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009, p.1021).  
Informal accountability was also found to feature prominently in a large hybrid 
organisation studied by Hardy and Ballis (2013, p.539). Furthermore, Shenkin and 
Coulson’s (2007, p.297) conceptual article has encouraged investigation of the 
informal aspects of accountability applying “Bourdieu’s critical ethnography” (2007, 
p.311). Such an approach considers the “informal, non-institutional and non-
administered forms of practice” and emphasises the need to focus on the community 
and how it impacts on accountability (2007, pp.299, 311). The need to look beyond 
formal accountability – where an organisation acts according to prescribed rules, and 
to consider informal means of accountability, is particularly relevant to this NFP 
study.  
The benefit of a broad accountability framework is that it takes into account 
traditional views of formal accountability such as financial reporting, “internal 
controls, and regulatory compliance” (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.8) as well 
as the informal aspects including how an organisation is perceived by various 
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stakeholder groups in achieving its mission, vision and values. Morrison and 
Salipante (2007) also advocate the use of a broad accountability in the NFP context as 
it engenders a more sophisticated view of strategy. This is potentially relevant to the 
strategic role of board members. By examining “formal and emergent strategy”, as 
well as its “negotiable, not just its rule-based aspects” (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, 
p.196), broad accountability is well-suited to a board member operating in the NFP 
sector. Negotiable aspects of accountability are articulated by Kearns (1994) who 
explains that this form of accountability can exist in more subtle, but equally as 
powerful ways compared to rule-based accountability. Conventions or norms are 
examples of negotiable accountability that tend to feature in the operations of NFP 
organisations in addition to prescribed rules. Prescribed rules are often referred to as 
either rule-based or compliance based accountability (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, 
p.199; Kearns, 1994, p.188). Conventions or norms are modes of conduct that are not 
prescribed but are enacted by board members to achieve legitimacy. For example, an 
NFP board might communicate with stakeholder group A differently to stakeholder 
group B depending on their relationship, degree of dependence and other political 
factors (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002). 
Considering accountability from a broader perspective also means that the impact of 
multiple stakeholders on accountability can be assessed. Young (2002) notes the 
preoccupation of the literature with satisfying external stakeholder groups. Instead, 
Young (2002, pp.14, 18) argues that if NFP organisations increase their emphasis on 
internal accountability, i.e. “addressing…[the] ability to be accountable to 
themselves”, by understanding staff and client perceptions of mission, broader 
accountability is achieved.  
Building on a small body of religious accountability research, Hardy and Ballis 
(2013) investigated how Sanitarium Health Food Company was accountable through 
informal account giving and how the accounts were perceived by its stakeholders. 
Hardy and Ballis (2013) found that Sanitarium had idiosyncratic ways of informal 
account giving and more research into this practice should be conducted in similar 
organisations (2013, p.559). A broad accountability approach has spawned other 
suggestions for dealing with a large set of stakeholder groups. Fuller and Roffey 
(1993, p.159) argue that having “iterative auditing processes as well as multiple 
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qualitative and quantitative measurement criteria” assists when an organisation has a 
large pool of stakeholders. In addition, Balser and McClusky (2005) note that the key 
challenge for organisations is the interpretation of stakeholders’ expectations, the 
application of discretion, the means of identifying expectations and aligning them 
with the organisation’s mission and values (Balser & McClusky, 2005, pp.295-296).  
There are accountability studies that suggest the community is a principal stakeholder 
and such arguments often use concepts of broad accountability. Parker (2014) argues 
a broader perspective of accountability, which takes into account social action as well 
as financial and economic factors is necessary to view certain phenomena. In his 
historical study, Parker (2014) viewed the actions of the four leading British 
industrialists in the 19th and 20th centuries. He discovered that often the behaviours of 
the British industrial leaders comprised of social action which benefited the 
community in some way. Parker calls this practice “accountability through action” 
(Parker, 2014, p.632). The focus on community is a form of accountability which 
emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries and goes beyond traditional notions of 
economic or financial reporting, embracing moral responsibility (Parker, 2014, p.635; 
Roberts, 1992). Some contemporary examples of organisations that provide benefits 
to the community are museums and performing arts organisations (Rentschler & 
Potter, 1996). Carnegie and West (2005, p.910) discuss how services such as those 
provided by public museums benefit “…the community in accordance with the 
representations of their mission/objective statements”.  
A broad perspective of accountability enables business leaders and researchers to 
consider both the social aspects of accountability and the traditional accounting 
aspects. Gibbon (2012, p.201) encourages researchers who are investigating the NFP 
sector to apply a broader theory of accountability which encapsulates the non-
calculative aspects of accountability in addition to the “dominan[t]…calculative forms 
of accountability from the ‘business case’ perspective”. The notion of accountability 
through action argues that it is possible for business objectives and social objectives 
to be pursued simultaneously (Parker, 2014, p.639). Other scholars support this view, 
arguing the way to fulfil both the social mission of the organisation and to remain 
viable is achieved by adopting a broad view of accountability. For example, Carnegie 
and Tuck (2010, p.432) assert that universities need to engage in “broad scope 
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governance” to prevent a “narrow” focus on quantitative aspects and to allow the 
institutions to achieve their broader social agenda. Similarly, Rentschler and Potter 
(1996, p.101) explain that performing arts organisations and museums need “a 
broadened scope of accountability” to ensure they achieve their mission to community 
as well as being sustainable in the long-term. 
A recent NFP multiple case study has shown that if pluralist perspectives of 
governance are followed, the organisation can achieve its strategic goals while also 
satisfying its stakeholder groups. Coule (2015) argues that two of the four NFPs she 
studied displayed a pluralist perspective of governance rather than a unitary form of 
governance. As a result, stakeholders of the NFP two organisations were involved or 
considered to a large extent in the board’s decision making. According to Coule 
(2015), one organisation involved its stakeholders by having them participate in 
decision-making at the board level. This was either through the election of trustees or 
co-option models where representatives from statutory bodies were involved. The 
other NFP entity focused on generating narratives that reassure its stakeholders that it 
was fulfilling its charitable mission. The present single case study will consider 
whether a pluralist governance perspective exists and how it is enacted.   
Two groups of scholars who examine accountability in the NFP context argue that 
another benefit of the broad accountability framework is its ability to consider the 
rule-based and negotiable components of accountability (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 
2002; Morrison & Salipante, 2007). Rule-based accountability is accountability with 
respect to “finances, internal controls, and regulatory compliance” (Morrison & 
Salipante, 2007, p.197). Accountability in this sense is often measurable in a clearly 
defined way and the measures are normally easier to understand compared to the 
negotiable aspects of accountability (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, p.198).  
Negotiable accountability, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with 
responsiveness to stakeholders, involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by 
leaders such as board members (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, p.197). Negotiable 
aspects of accountability are often not so commonly accounted for due to the 
challenges in measuring performance. “These involve more or less implicit and 
subjective standards of assessment” (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, p.197). It could be 
said that rule-based accountability is more focused on the quantitative aspects of 
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governance whereas the negotiable aspects of accountability are concerned with the 
qualitative perspectives. The shift from a narrow to a broad conception of 
accountability is largely attributable to the lack of well-defined, universal standards of 
regulation “or market forces (to create measurable goals for the [NFP] organization 
(Bowen, 1994)” cited in Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002, p.8) (see also Parker & 
Gould 1999). 
The negotiable aspects of accountability that broad accountability perspectives 
capture include considering the significance of trust in accountability relationships. 
To maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders, many NFP organisations like 
to foster a relationship of trust. Stakeholders tend to be both internal and external to 
the organisation. In the NFP organisation that is the subject of the present 
investigation, internal stakeholders include staff and external stakeholders are 
consumers, the government and community. Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002, p.9) 
characterise internal and external stakeholders as professional and political 
respectively.  
According to Sasso (2003), trust is a crucial element in NFP accountability as it gives 
stakeholders of the organisation confidence that the mission of the entity is being 
fulfilled. Trust is equally critical for internal stakeholders as it facilitates effective and 
productive partnerships between the board and its senior managers and staff. Sasso 
(2003) comments,  
Developing and sustaining trust between the director and professional staff is 
one of the most difficult challenges confronting a not-for-profit, yet this trust is 
essential to formulating and enforcing a standard of accountability that 
promotes the entity’s ongoing relevancy (Sasso, 2003, p.1488).  
Trust may be an important aspect of accountability in this NFP case study.  
While the case for trust between professional or internal stakeholders has been 
outlined, there is also a case for trust between the board and its political or external 
stakeholders. According to Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) this is especially the 
case with the community, given taxpayers’ money is often used to fund NFP activities 
(Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.27). In their dual case study of a Hindu temple 
in Mauritius and a Buddhist temple in Sri Lanka, Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen, (2009) 
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found that trust was integral to how both faith-based institutions operated. Trust was 
argued to be an informal social practice exercised through religious rituals. These 
studies suggest trust is likely to play a role in accountability of the board to its 
external stakeholders in its political relationships and its internal stakeholders in its 
professional relationships. Broad accountability enables researchers to not only 
appreciate the role of trust with different stakeholders but also to understand it in 
different settings. Qualitative rather than quantitative, socializing rather than 
individualizing (Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009, p.1016), this broader appreciation 
of accountability enables researchers to understand how accountability is practiced in 
less conventional ways. 
A broad framework of accountability enables researchers to find that accountability is 
sometimes achieved in unorthodox ways. In a qualitative NFP study conducted in the 
Salvation Army, Joannides (2012) “finds that individuals develop counter-abilities 
and counter-practices in resistance to the unattainable, impossible, demands of an 
ideal accountability” (McKernan & McPhail, 2012, p.181). In Joannides’ (2012) case 
study, he found that individuals developed practical alternatives to being accountable 
to God. What this suggests is that individuals in some NFP contexts are able to 
develop coping mechanisms if a significant or unrealistic accountability is expected 
from them. Roberts’ (2009) “intelligent accountability” which consists of 
“individualizing” and “socializing” accountability also permits the adaptation of 
accounting practices so that accountability is discharged.  
“Individualizing accountability” takes place often in formal situations such as the 
workplace where there are established positions of influence and power, of varying 
degrees, depending on one’s place in the hierarchy. The effect of such a situation is 
that individuals often feel compelled to constantly compare themselves with others. 
Accounting information or performance measures such as KPIs are the ways in which 
an individual often compares themselves to others in this setting (Roberts, 1991, 
p.363). Individualizing accountability is linked with hierarchical accountability, as the 
hierarchy imposes discipline on those who are subordinate to a higher authority 
(Roberts, 1991, p.360). Remaining in the hierarchy is contingent on an individual’s 
utility (Roberts, 1991, p.359).  
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“Socializing accountability” on the other hand, is usually exercised informally and in 
a more egalitarian fashion compared to individualizing accountability. Socializing 
accountability takes place when individuals share their experiences and seek to obtain 
meaning from them. For example, discussions in the tea room between colleagues. As 
individuals discuss issues in this setting, the accountability is often subjective in 
nature. In addition, practices which are not prescribed and where people act according 
to convention are examples of socializing accountability (Roberts, 1991, p.362). It can 
be argued that the concept of broad accountability enables researchers to appreciate 
different practices of accountability that deviate from the conventional methods of 
accountability. 
The above discussion strongly suggests that a theory of broad accountability is 
required to sufficiently and comprehensively address the accountability issues which 
boards encounter in the NFP sector. While there are many concepts of accountability, 
broad accountability is arguably one of the most holistic perspectives available. This 
is because of its ability to capture the stakeholder and performance dimensions which 
influence accountability. More specifically, these dimensions include: the multiple 
layers of accountability inherent in relationships with internal and external 
stakeholders, the impact of law, governance and public policy on the organisation, the 
influence of informal practices of accountability, and how the organisation performs 
in satisfying its mission and objectives (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009, p.9). Gibbon 
(2012, p.201) supports this perspective, arguing that “a broader and more complex 
view of accountability” is needed to understand an NFP organisation. 
Adopting a broad accountability perspective requires closer attention to the literature 
with respect to broad accountability in the NFP sector. Two groups of scholars stand 
out in this regard: Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante 
(2007). Both groups of scholars discuss the importance of applying broad 
accountability in the NFP context. They also explore some of the strategic approaches 
to addressing accountability issues unique to the NFP sector. Both highlight the 
importance of conducting future research into broad accountability in the NFP sector. 
The following discussion outlines the key concepts articulated by Ospina, Diaz and 
O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007) and the areas for future 
research which they have identified. 
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Broad accountability: key findings from selected NFP studies 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007) argue that 
accountability perspectives need broadening so that assessments can be made as to 
whether NFP organisations are achieving their missions and being responsive to their 
stakeholder groups (Valentinov, 2011, p.33). While united in their view of utilising a 
theory of broad accountability to study NFP organisations, Ospina, Diaz and 
O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007) each bring unique and 
additional dimensions to broad accountability. Apart from a difference in research 
methods – Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) focused on senior managers whereas 
Morrison and Salipante (2007) examined the Board Chair and CEO, the two groups of 
scholars offer different contributions to broad accountability. It could be argued that 
these two groups of scholars provide theorising at levels three and four - concepts 
theorising and theorising settings, as espoused by Llewellyn (2003). This section will 
primarily focus on Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante’s 
(2007) accountability studies in the NFP sector. There will also be discussions of 
accountability from similar studies in the NFP sector. 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) find that the community was a primary 
stakeholder in their study of four Latino identity-based NFPs in New York City. 
Broad accountability is argued to be one of the most appropriate lenses through which 
to understand an NFP organisation’s accountability relationship with its community. 
The community has an interest that NFP governance is sound and reputable (Parker, 
1996). This is because many people from the community are taxpayers and 
government funding is often the main source of revenue for NFP organisations. In 
circumstances where an organisation is accountable to the community, it is often 
referred to as “social accountability” (Gray, 2000, cited in Shearer, 2002, p.543). 
Fuller and Roffey (1993, p.151) cite Waterford (1991) who argues that accountability 
definitions should be broadened to include the public. Similarly, Shearer (2002, 
p.543) argues that moral responsibility underpins accountability to the community. 
Accountability in this sense means providing account for one’s actions to not only 
oneself but for “…a wider scope of good than their own” (Shearer, 2002, p.546). In 
the present study, this would mean the board being accountable to itself and also to 
the community. Balser and McClusky (2005, p.297) note that Ospina, Diaz and 
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O’Sullivan’s (2002) study “found that nonprofits viewed maintaining community 
relationships as essential for being perceived as accountable and legitimate by 
stakeholders…”  
One mechanism through which community relationships are maintained by NFP 
organisations is by engaging in “two-way communication between community 
members and the organization…” (Balser & McClusky, 2005, p.297). This 
communication could be achieved by the organisation inviting the public to partake in 
information sessions, consultation or fundraising events. According to Ospina, Diaz 
and O’Sullivan (2002, pp.18, 28) other examples include: “regional 
conferences…[an] annual survey of its members…newsletter[s], data sheets, and 
reports, research and feedback through topical forums…[and] focus groups”. Young 
(2002) agrees that NFP organisations need to treat the public as a paramount 
stakeholder because NFP organisations require their trust to survive. “The generic 
challenge of nonprofit accountability” is to balance their mission and other objectives 
successfully so as to maintain public trust (Young, 2002, p.18). The question for the 
current study is whether the community is also deemed a central stakeholder in the 
religious NFP organisation. 
“Strategic accountability” or the closely related concept of negotiable accountability 
(Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, pp.8-10, 29) explains how managers in the NFP 
organisations satisfied their multiple stakeholders including the community. The 
scholars found differences between how the organisation defined their mission and 
how they presented or negotiated it with stakeholder groups. Ospina, Diaz and 
O’Sullivan (2002) found two definitions of mission  – one that is geared toward 
satisfying the community and funders, the other which is focused exclusively on 
mission. Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) conclude that two of the four 
organisations studied negotiated their accountability with the community and funders. 
These two organisations displayed a more strategic and direct broad accountability 
approach to managing and maintaining their stakeholder relationships compared to 
the other two organisations which were focused solely on mission (Ospina, Diaz & 
O’Sullivan, 2002, p.22). Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) characterised the two 
organisations which focused only on their mission as representing an indirect broad 
accountability (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.22). In both types of organisation, 
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the scholars found that strategy underpins how negotiated accountability functions 
were discharged.  
We find that managers develop strategic approaches to address the competing 
pulls exerted in the accountability environment and that the relationship with 
the community is indeed at the core of managers’ strategy to achieve negotiated 
accountability (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.6).  
Negotiated accountability is defined as NFP leaders’ ability to be both accountable 
and responsive to their stakeholders (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.9). 
Morrison and Salipante (2007) also discuss strategy with respect to broad 
accountability, but their strategic focus differs to Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002). 
Rather than investigating how NFP entities communicate their achievement of 
mission to stakeholders, Morrison and Salipante (2007) focus on the forms of 
strategising that take place in an NFP organisation. In their participant observer study 
of the Chair and CEO of an NFP organisation, Morrison and Salipante (2007) use an 
example that illustrates broadened accountability. When discussing NFP board 
succession, the Chair and CEO engage in formal and emergent strategising. Morrison 
and Salipante (2007) assert that the formal aspect of strategy is the rule-based aspect 
of accountability, whereas the emergent strategising aspect is the negotiable aspect. In 
the scenario examined by Morrison and Salipante (2007), it is suggested that formal 
strategising is a form of “window dressing” designed to keep external stakeholders 
satisfied while the Chair and CEO navigate the less certain informal, emergent 
strategising territory (Morrison & Salipante, 2007, p.212; Parker, 2007a, p.1459). 
Morrison and Salipante (2007, pp.196, 208) call this process “blended strategising” 
which satisfies both negotiable and rule-based aspects of accountability in the 
organisation’s pursuit of legitimacy. 
The challenges in measuring NFP board effectiveness have been touched on by 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007). Board 
effectiveness is how well a board performs including to what extent it is accountable 
to itself and others for its actions and decisions. Scholars such as Roberts, McNulty 
and Stiles (2005) have board effectiveness as a key consideration of their study of 40 
company directors. Board effectiveness is highlighted as an area where research into 
accountability is required (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles, 2005). Effective accountability 
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is tied to board performance, which “is crucial to the health of every nonprofit 
organization” (Holland, 2002, p.409). Holland (2002, p.412) argues that while the 
board expects accountability from its executive (senior managers), it usually neglects 
attention to its own accountability to stakeholder groups and to the organisation.  
While there is little dispute about the importance of board effectiveness to 
accountability, there are challenges in measuring board effectiveness (Herman, Renz 
& Heimovics, 1997, p.374; Stone & Ostrower, 2007, p.421). This is especially the 
case in the NFP sector where there are often aspects that are difficult to measure. For 
example, the degree of trust or confidence the community has in an NFP organisation. 
This could be argued to be the goodwill of an NFP organisation, which is often 
challenging to measure in numerical terms because it is usually classified as an 
intangible asset. Carnegie and Wolnizer (1995) discuss similar measurement 
problems with the assets and goodwill of public museums, which are often NFP 
organisations. Boland and Schultze (1996) and Lyotard (1979) (cited in McKernan & 
McPhail, 2012, p.177) identify two components inherent in accountability: a 
calculative and a narrative component. Such a perspective is cognisant of the fact that 
accountability has both objective and subjective elements. Kamuf (2007, p.253) 
supports this argument, encouraging us to “stop calculating and listen at another 
rhythm for…an incalculability and unforeseeability…” It could be said that this 
practice from broad accountability is well suited to the field of accounting, where 
qualitative as well as quantitative elements should be considered. 
The difficulties in measuring board effectiveness are largely due to the lack of 
measures of performance devised or applied in the sector. Moreover, making 
assessments about board effectiveness is often based on subjective assessments – 
“although some studies use financial indicators, such as fundraising success or budget 
deficits” (Stone & Ostrower, 2007, p.433). Organisational effectiveness is often seen 
to be the extent to which an NFP organisation achieves its mission and values. With 
respect to board member effectiveness, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) argue that 
board effectiveness is achieved by the degree to which directors work individually 
and collectively, and engage in behaviours such as questioning, challenging, and 
exploring. By doing these things, board members generate accountability with respect 
to strategy and performance. This NFP study intends to investigate board behaviours 
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in the NFP context. As discussed in the Literature Review chapter and the 
Methodology chapter, this will be done through multi-level analysis – at both the 
board level and the individual director level. 
Limitations of broad accountability 
At this point, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of a framework of broad 
accountability. While there is no doubt that NFP and FP governance issues have 
sparked an interest in increasing accountability, Stiles and Taylor (2001) note that 
simply increasing accountability might not be an adequate solution. In fact, some 
scholars take this argument further, contending that too much accountability can be 
detrimental and in some cases, can encourage delinquent behaviour. They argue that 
invoking more accountability is impractical. Messner (2009) draws upon the work of 
Butler (2005) and argues that despite calls for increasing accountability, 
accountability is to some extent limited in what it can achieve due to the ethical issues 
inherent in demanding a comprehensive account. Joannides (2012, p.247) agrees, 
contending that “accountability holds an unresolved contradiction: the morality of 
decisions implied by individual conduct is undermined, rather than supported, by the 
giving of an account”. For example, when accountants use accounting tools to provide 
reports in accordance with Accounting Standards, they are usually not able to provide 
a moral account, yet accountability also expects this (Joannides, 2012, p.247).  
Roberts (2009, p.957) draws upon Butler’s (2005) work and argues that there is a 
need for an “intelligent” accountability “grounded in an ethic of humility and 
generosity” which recognises that there are limitations to giving an account. Such 
limitations are not only ethical. Sinclair (1995) outlines the challenge of defining and 
practising accountability due to the subjective and contextual nature of the concept. It 
is not surprising therefore the emphasis in the NFP literatures on explaining the 
internal and external factors as background to the accountability being studied. 
In response to the above criticisms of accountability, it is important to consider that 
broad accountability does not invoke more accountability on actors. It means applying 
a broader perspective of accountability such that it is holistic in nature, taking into 
account multiple layers of accountability. Moreover, broad accountability is not a 
critical approach. Broad accountability has been devised to address the shortcomings 
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of narrow conceptions of accountability and governance. Therefore, by applying a 
framework of broad accountability, this study takes many of the positive aspects from 
the critical perspectives of accountability into account (Messner, 2002; Roberts, 2009; 
Sinclair, 1995). This means acknowledging that the practice of accountability is 
comprised of more than simply narrow conceptions that focus on responsibility and 
transparency. Board accountability captures the formal and informal aspects of 
accountability, upwards, downwards and sideways accountability, internal and 
external contextual factors, trust and negotiable accountability, individualizing and 
socializing accountability. However, a limitation of this study is the broad 
accountability framework adopted which will be described in more detail in the 
following section. This is because it covers 11 select broad accountability concepts 
and does not analyse all broad accountability concepts due to constraints in time and 
resources.  
Broad accountability: synthesising concepts and the research agenda 
As discussed above, broad accountability is a framework that has been applied in the 
NFP context. While it has strengths and some limitations, it is appropriate for the 
current study. As this single case study is investigating board roles in the NFP 
context, it can be argued that applying the broad accountability framework takes into 
account not only the internal and external stakeholder and performance perspectives 
of accountability, but also the types of board roles and how they are enacted 
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). Therefore, the broad accountability framework is 
equipped to consider both the unique characteristics of the NFP sector as well as 
board member roles.  
The synthesised accountability framework is outlined in Table 4.1 on the pages that 
follow. It is evident from the table that there are 11 key broad accountability concepts 
employed in this study. The concepts have been drawn from the literature about 
accountability in the NFP sector. The summary focus of each concept is described in 
the far right column and covers a broad range of accountability aspects including 
stakeholders, direction of accountability relationships and types of accountability. 
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Table 4.1 Broad accountability framework for this study 
Broad accountability concepts 
employed 
Source reference Summary focus 
Multiple stakeholders (external 
and internal) 
 
Balser & McClusky (2005); 
Fuller & Roffey (1993); 
Hardy & Ballis (2013); 
Hyndman & McDonnell, (2009); 
Morrison & Salipante (2007); 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan 
(2002); 
Roberts (1991, 2003); 
Young (2002) 
 
This concept considers the 
external and internal stakeholder 
groups that NFP organisations 
often have including: government, 
donors, beneficiaries (consumers), 
staff and volunteers. 
The community as a priority 
stakeholder 
 
Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan 
(2002); 
Parker (2014); 
Rentschler & Potter, (1996); 
Shenkin & Coulson (2007) 
 
A particular stakeholder that is 
often focused on in the broad 
accountability literature is the 
community. 
Upwards, downwards, horizontal 
 
Ebrahim (2003); 
Hoskin (1996); 
Lewis, O’Flynn & Sullivan 
(2014); 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan 
(2002); 
Stone & Ostrower (2007) 
 
The direction in which 
accountability relationships flow 
can be described using the 
terminology upwards, downwards 
or horizontal. 
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Table 4.1 Broad accountability framework for this study continued… 
 
  
Broad accountability concepts 
employed 
Source reference Summary focus 
Formal and informal 
 
Ebrahim (2003); 
Hardy & Ballis (2013); 
Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen (2009); 
Parker (2007a, 2007b, 2008) 
Roberts (1991, 2003); 
Shenkin & Coulson (2007); 
Stone & Ostrower (2007) 
 
Formal accountability is exercised 
through the tabling of documents, 
reports and discussions that occur 
in the board and committee 
meetings. Informal accountability 
encapsulates either verbal reports 
given at the board or discussions 
and dialogue, which takes place 
outside the boardroom including 
pre and post meeting discussions, 
telephone calls, emails, text 
messages and coffee meetings. 
 
Individualizing and socializing 
accountability  
 
Roberts (1991) Individualizing accountability is 
where individuals continually 
compare themselves to others in a 
hierarchical environment. 
Remaining in the hierarchy is 
often contingent on the 
individual’s utility. Success in this 
setting is often measured using 
objective standards such as 
accounting information or 
performance measures like KPIs. 
By contrast, socializing 
accountability is where 
individuals confirm their views 
through interactions with others. 
Such interactions are often 
exercised in informal settings. 
Alternatively, individuals may 
engage in socializing 
accountability practices in ways 
that are not formally prescribed 
such as following convention. 
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Table 4.1 Broad accountability framework for this study continued… 
 
Broad accountability concepts 
employed 
Source reference Summary focus 
Narrative and calculative 
accountability 
 
Boland & Schultze (1996);  
Bruner (1986; 1990) 
Accountability usually comprises 
both narration and calculation 
aspects. Bruner (1986, 1990) 
argues that there are two modes of 
human cognition: paradigmatic 
and narrative modes. Boland and 
Schultze (1996) assert that these 
two modes of human cognition 
create the conditions for 
hierarchical and socializing 
accountability (Roberts, 1991). 
Narration is usually expressed in 
the written word whereas 
calculation is generally expressed 
in numerical terms.  Further, the 
narrative and calculative aspects 
of accountability take place in 
both formal and informal settings.  
 
Negotiable and rule-based 
accountability 
 
Morrison & Salipante (2007) When organisational leaders 
balance and address the competing 
demands of multiple stakeholders, 
negotiable accountability occurs. 
Negotiable accountability is also 
about the communication 
techniques NFP boards use to 
reassure their stakeholders that the 
organisation is achieving its 
mission and values. Rule-based 
accountability is prescribed in 
legislation or regulations and 
carried out according to those 
rules. 
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Table 4.1 Broad accountability framework for this study continued… 
  
Broad accountability concepts 
employed 
Source reference Summary focus 
Trust (linked to negotiable 
accountability) 
 
Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen (2009); 
Holland (2002); 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan 
(2002); 
Sasso (2003) 
 
Fostering the trust of internal and 
external stakeholders is a key part 
of negotiable accountability. 
There are two types of 
relationships with stakeholders in 
this regard: professional (internal 
stakeholders) and political 
(external stakeholders). 
  
Strategic accountability 
 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan (2002) Where NFP leaders navigate 
organisational politics, keeping 
stakeholder groups satisfied while 
also achieving strategic goals.  
 
Blended strategising - formal and 
emergent strategising (to achieve 
negotiable accountability) 
 
Morrison & Salipante (2007) Where organisational leaders 
engage in conventional and non-
conventional ways of strategising. 
For example, they strategise 
formally through a strategic plan 
and informally through 
spontaneous strategic ideas. 
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Table 4.1 Broad accountability framework for this study continued… 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007) outline an 
agenda for future research. Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) explain that 
horizontal (sideways) pulls of accountability deserve further attention. In addition, the 
performance aspects of accountability including to what extent does an NFP 
organisation achieve its mission and objectives is highlighted as an area for more 
research. Finally, Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) pose the question whether 
broad accountability is the key to resolving situations where public trust is 
diminished. This is because broad accountability encourages communication with all 
stakeholders, including the community. This should increase transparency and public 
scrutiny of the NFP organisation’s performance (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, 
p.27). Morrison and Salipante (2007, p.214) ask researchers to consider whether their 
Broad accountability concepts 
employed 
Source reference Summary focus 
Measuring effectiveness of board 
accountability (individual and 
collective levels) 
Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese 
(2014); 
Balser & McClusky (2005); 
Carnegie & West (2005); 
Ebrahim (2003); 
Holland (2002); 
Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan 
(2002); 
Parker (2014); 
Rentschler & Potter (1996); 
Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 
(2005); 
Valentinov, (2011); 
Young (2002) 
This concept requires considering 
to what extent does the NFP 
organisation achieve its mission 
and values. It also involves an 
assessment of board performance 
at a multi-level perspective, 
considering both the individual 
board member level and the 
collective board level. 
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concept of blended strategising occurs in other NFP settings. Applying the broad 
accountability framework from Table 4.1, these areas for future research can be 
addressed. This is because the objectives of the framework, among other things, are to 
examine horizontal accountability relationships, consider performance through the 
concept of measuring effectiveness of board accountability, and to assess the role of 
trust as a specific type of accountability. Therefore, the current study aims to 
contribute to some of the areas for future research identified by Ospina, Diaz and 
O’Sullivan (2002) and Morrison and Salipante (2007). It also aims to uncover other 
aspects of broad accountability that are new to the literature. 
Conclusion 
Broad accountability is suitable for this NFP board study for a number of reasons. 
Principally, accountability is the essence of the board member role. Accountability is 
about the board member making the organisation accountable and the board member 
being held to account. While it is well established that accountability is suited to the 
topic of corporate governance and boards, it is also appropriate for NFP context. The 
literature suggests that the concept of accountability that is most appropriate to apply 
is broad accountability. This is because of its ability to capture the layers of 
accountability inherent in NFP organisations as well as its multiple stakeholders and 
unique context. The challenges inherent in measuring performance can also be tackled 
using broad accountability.  
This study has applied a broad accountability framework in an effort to understand 
board roles and how they are enacted in an NFP setting. There have been calls for 
using a framework of broad accountability since the mid-1990s (Parker, 1996). There 
are examples of scholars applying broad accountability to their studies and the 
argument in favour of such a theoretical approach continues today. O’ Leary (2016, 
p.1) has called for “broader” accountability perspectives when examining NGOs and 
their beneficiaries. Similarly, Coule (2015), Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and 
Morrison and Salipante (2007) mount strong arguments for broad accountability to 
apply in the NFP sector. Therefore, there is little doubt that broad accountability has 
utility in this study, having been discussed and used by accounting scholars for almost 
three decades. 
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CHAPTER 5: ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT AND PROFILE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide the background to the sector in which the NFP organisation 
of this study operates. This includes a brief overview of some of the key challenges 
and characteristics of the NFP sector in Australia which have implications for 
governance in the sector. The chapter will then explain the organisation that has been 
studied. The areas in which the organisation delivers services will be described as 
well as its mission, vision and values. The structure of the organisation, its 
composition, stakeholder groups, and consumer profile are also outlined. The chapter 
then turns to consider some of the partnerships that the organisation has with other 
entities that have a similar mission. The chapter closes by highlighting some areas 
that received considerable attention from the board of the organisation at the time the 
researcher was present. 
The NFP sector in Australia: the challenges 
An NFP organisation can be defined as an entity that does not distribute a profit or 
create a “personal gain or other benefit of…its members, their friends or relatives” 
(ACNC, 2014; Our Community, 2018). If NFPs do make profits, they are usually 
restricted in the way they can treat the profit. For example, surplus revenues are kept 
as retained earnings or reinvested in the organisation in a way that is congruent with 
their purpose (Our Community, 2018). NFP organisations operate in many key areas 
of social progress such as “health, education, and social services (welfare)” (Young, 
2013, p.9). Other common areas of operation include research, culture and recreation 
(QUT Business School, 2014). Some NFPs also have a religious component and 
accounted for 29% of Australian NFP organisations in 2014 (ACNC, 2014; QUT 
Business School, 2014, p.2). Some examples of Australian NFP entities include The 
Fred Hollows Foundation, Lifeline, Orange Sky Laundry and the AICD. International 
NFP entities include Save the Children, Action Against Hunger and the Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society. 
Political uncertainty is a common issue confronting many NFP organisations. Much 
of this stems from the fact that a large proportion of NFP organisations are reliant on 
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government support and funding. A recent study by the AICD (AICD, 2016, p.35) 
reveals that Federal and State Government funding accounts for 40% of income for 
NFPs. Changes in government policy and the areas where funding and resources will 
be provided creates “economic uncertainty and lack of confidence” (Stuart, 2016, 
p.50). In the current political climate, many NFPs in the aged care and disability 
sectors are keenly watching government policy to ensure they understand all 
regulatory requirements and funding implications. According to the AICD, 
improvements can be made in the area of government grants. In particular, funding 
for administrative expenses allocated to NFPs is often “unrealistically low” and 
reporting duties imposed on NFP organisations are often onerous (AICD, 2016, 
pp.29-30). For example, NFP organisations are often required to return unspent funds, 
have to adhere to strict requirements such as regular accreditation processes and 
random audits, and operate under contracts that are short-term in nature (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2010). Additionally, the AICD suggests that NFP 
organisations need to better assess the cost of service provision from the outset and as 
last resort, be prepared to terminate “contracts that will place the organisation at 
financial risk” (AICD, 2016, p.30). 
Two additional challenges facing NFP organisations are new funding models and 
regulatory change. For example, the change from block funding to fee for service 
models is having ramifications for NFPs in terms of the funds available, their 
consumer profile and competition with other providers. “NFPs must now compete 
with for-profit providers for government services and there has been a shift in 
government procurement of services towards commissioning for outcomes” (Stuart, 
2016, p.51). According to the AICD (2016, p.4), changes in the way in which NFP 
organisations are regulated can encourage board members to focus on more short-
term or operational issues to the detriment of higher-level strategic matters. At the 
same time, there are new funding models that call for NFP directors to consider and 
explore alternative sources of funding so they can remain financially and 
operationally sustainable. In some cases, however, this is difficult due to a 
conventional view in many NFP entities that profits and financial performance are 
secondary considerations.  
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Technological change is another factor that is placing pressure on NFP organisations. 
With the advent of technological platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, where 
consumers can report and rate their experiences with organisations, there is increasing 
scrutiny of the quality of services NFPs provide. It also promotes more competition, 
making NFPs fair game in the online environment. Furthermore, the Internet has 
enabled the rise of “vanity charities” – charities that have been established by lay 
people who wish to pursue a particular cause (Wynne, 2018a). It can be argued that 
vanity charities create unhelpful distractions for established NFPs, as donors might be 
attracted to a vanity charity rather than giving money to a reputable NFP organisation. 
Crowdfunding is a technique of fundraising often established on the Internet and used 
by people to raise money for their causes (Wynne, 2018a). Very recently, some 
crowdfunding websites have been revealed to be fraudulent (Wynne, 2018b). This 
only undermines public trust in fundraising activities (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009) 
but it has also prompted more regulation in the online fundraising domain (Wynne, 
2018b). These relatively recent phenomena create additional competition for 
established NFPs, which are already often stretched when it comes to funding. It 
appears the Internet has generated more areas that NFPs have to monitor and has 
created an additional space in which they have to compete. 
Developments in technology have also meant that many NFPs are investing in 
Performance Measurement Systems (PMS) to measure and monitor their 
performance. Performance in this context means analysing areas of the organisation’s 
operations such as aged care. Performance can also refer to individual performance of 
staff members, senior managers and board members. The desire to monitor and 
measure performance appears to be in response to the technological improvements in 
the sector and calls in the sector for increased accountability from stakeholders 
(AICD, 2016, p.20). Information technology systems that provide PMS or Customer 
Relations Management (CRM) systems are usually costly in terms of the time and 
money needed to produce them (AICD, 2016, p.23). An advantage of these 
information technology systems is that they provide NFP leaders (the board and 
senior managers) with more sophisticated information about how the organisation is 
performing. The information produced can also help NFP leaders produce a narrative 
for their stakeholder groups. Recouping the benefits from investment in information 
technology systems such as PMS and CRM may not outweigh its costs in some cases. 
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Stuart (2016, p.50) explains that the size and life cycle stage of the NFP entity are 
factors that need to be considered when contemplating such ventures. The AICD 
(2016, p.22) explains that some NFP entities monitor and review their information 
systems on a yearly basis “to ensure they are getting value for money”. 
Some board members perceive NFP governance to be more complex than ever before 
with the pressure “to achieve both mission success and financial strength…” (AICD, 
2016, p.5). Although the challenge of fulfilling missions that extend beyond profit is 
not unique to the NFP sector, as many FP entities fulfil social and environmental 
accounting objectives, NFP entities that operate in the charity sector tend to also have 
a philanthropic purpose. The philanthropic emphasis is likely to add an additional 
factor to the discharge of directors’ roles and accountabilities in the charities subset of 
the NFP sector. 
The need to be more commercially viable as well as achieving a philanthropic mission 
has become a more recent factor that is demanding attention from NFP leaders. At 
first blush, achieving an altruistic mission as well as generating financial strength 
seem to be at odds. Misconceptions about generating profit in the sector reinforce 
such a view (AICD, 2016, pp.6-9). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that it is 
possible to achieve both NFP missions and financial success. According to the AICD, 
there are NFP directors who have the “motivation and ability to deliver” both the 
mission and financial success (AICD, 2016, p.6). These directors understand the 
importance of making profit for the long-term survival of the organisation. They are 
also of the view that NFP organisations should have an appetite for risk, displacing 
traditional views that NFP organisations should be risk averse. There are other factors 
that also influence the success or failure of NFP organisations to achieve their mission 
and financial success. These include the characteristics of the NFP organisation such 
as its size and the environment in which it operates (AICD, 2016, p.6). 
The ability of NFPs to maximise their limited resources is major feature in the current 
NFP landscape. With a shrinking pool of funds from government and increased 
competition for funding, the ability of NFP leaders to “do more with less” will be 
tested (Stuart, 2016, p.51). Mission Australia is one example of a board that is 
conscious of the need to seek efficiencies in their organisation, harnessing its 
resources to “respond to emerging social need in innovative ways” and finding 
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alternative sources of funding (Stuart, 2016, p.51). Some NFPs are strengthening their 
position by either restructuring their operations or consolidating. For some NFP 
organisations the question of merger arises. The AICD (2016, p.17) found that 70 
percent of the NFP entities they studied had collaborated to promote the rights of 
beneficiaries and 35 percent had discussed merging with other organisations. Primary 
reasons for merger are to better achieve the mission of the organisation, increase 
efficiencies and market share, and reduce costs. Other benefits of partnerships 
between entities in the NFP sector are that it assists some NFPs that are struggling to 
adapt in the dynamic environment and increases the attractiveness of the entity for 
funding. A director of the Australian Conservation Foundation and ChildFund 
Australia, Mary Latham, explains that mergers are especially possible for smaller 
NFP organisations like ChildFund (Stuart, 2016, p.51).  
In addition, there is evidence that the number of and availability of volunteers is 
reducing. For many NFP organisations, having a volunteer base is critical. NFP 
leaders such as Tina Williams, CEO of Volunteering Western Australia, recognise the 
need to change their expectations of volunteers. Williams explains that people are 
more time poor compared to volunteers in years past and it is necessary for NFPs to 
provide more flexible volunteer roles (Wynne, 2018a). These changes in the 
workforce have meant that NFP organisations need to be adaptable and prepared to 
change their perception of volunteers so they remain relevant and successful. 
Unique characteristics of the NFP sector 
There are social, economic and political justifications as to why investigating 
governance in the NFP sector is valuable. From a social perspective, NFP 
organisations deliver a broad suite of services and activities that affect the lives of 
many individuals of different ages, backgrounds and abilities. For example, NFPs 
operate in “health, social services, education, sport and recreation, arts and culture, 
the environment, animal welfare, human rights and religious practices” (ACNC, 
2017).  
Economically, NFP organisations contribute a sizable portion to the Australian 
economy in terms of the employment they create and the revenue they generate. The 
lack of data collected and the nature of the sector with its heterogeneous aspects 
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including variations in size and age of organisations, geographical position, legal 
status (e.g. Incorporated Association or Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG)), 
activities and services makes it a difficult sector to measure (ACNC, 2017). The most 
recent significant studies of the Australian NFP sector were conducted by the 
Australian Productivity Commission in 2010 and the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) in years 2012-2013. The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission 
(ACNC) also conducted some research into the sector in 2014.  
In years 2006-2007, 4.6 million people were working as volunteers in the Australian 
NFP sector. Volunteers declined to 3.8 million in 2010 (Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2010). More recently, estimates of volunteers in Australia have been 
pitched at 5.2 million people (ProBono Australia, 2014). In 2013, over 1 million 
people were employed by the Australian NFP sector (Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2010; QUT Business School, 2014, p.2). This was equivalent to 9.3% of 
Australia’s workforce at that time (QUT Business School, 2014, p.2).  
 
Insights into the remuneration of NFP board members have been provided by the 
AICD (2016), which found that of a sample of 1,160 board members 37% undertake 
their board work on a voluntary basis and 15% have their director fees paid. The 
remaining 48% of board members in the NFP sector have a combination of voluntary 
and paid work, for instance, voluntary with expenses paid (AICD, 2016, p.34). 
 
In 2014, there were over half a million NFP organisations operating in Australia 
(QUT Business School, 2014, p.1). This is supported by research conducted by the 
Australian Productivity Commission (2010), which reports that the number of NFP 
organisations was over 600,000. More recently, it has been reported that the number 
of NFP organisations is doubling every two decades (Cooper, 2016, p.4). The ABS 
found that NFPs contribute approximately $43 billion to Australia’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (ABS, 2010). This increased to about $55 billion in years 2012-2013 
(ABS, 2012-2013). According to QUT Business School, this GDP contribution 
equated to 3.8% of Australian GDP. This is:  
 
more than twice as large as the entire economic contribution of the state of 
Tasmania; and larger than the agricultural, forestry and fishing industries (2.4 
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percent) and the information, media and telecommunications and media 
industries (3 percent) (QUT Business School, 2014, p.1). 
According to ProBono Australia (2014), Australian NFP organisations turned 
over $100 billion Australian dollars a year. 
Sources of funding for Australian NFP organisations have remained steady over the 
years, with Federal and State Governments being the principal sources. In 2012-2013, 
Federal and State Governments contributed over a third of income to NFPs (QUT 
Business School, 2014, p.3). In 2016, they contributed 40% of income sources 
(AICD, 2016, p.35). The QUT Business School (2014, p.3) observed that government 
funding increased over the years “from 30.2 percent of income in 1999-2000 to 33.2 
percent in 2006-2007, and reaching 38 percent in 2012-2013”. While the most recent 
AICD figures from a study in 2016 supports the idea that government funding is at 
least stable, there is widespread discussion in the sector that this funding is reducing 
soon due to tighter government budgets and increasing competition in the sector 
(Stuart, 2016, p.51; Young, 2013, p.10; Cooper, 2016, p.4; Dolnicar & Lazarevski, 
2009). In comparison to the US, Australian NFPs are under greater pressure to seek 
alternative funding sources because only 0.23% of Australian individuals donate to 
NFPs (as a percentage of GDP) compared to 1.44% in the US (Cooper, 2016, p.4). 
 
Another factor that has a significant bearing on Australia’s NFPs is the country’s 
ageing population. Australia’s population is ageing faster on average compared to 
other countries such as the US (Dolnicar & Lazarevski, 2009, p.279). The 
implications of this demographic are that many NFP entities are finding it harder to 
attract and retain younger people (Cooper, 2016, p.4) as well as facing increased 
demands for aged care, housing and health services (Dolnicar & Lazarevski, 2009, 
p.279). These economic factors put NFP boards under greater pressure to seek 
alternative sources of funding, achieve better returns on investment and “do more 
with less” (Stuart, 2016, p.51). In addition, funders are calling for “greater 
transparency and better performance and value measurement frameworks” (Adams & 
Simnett, 2011, p.292). It has been suggested that one of the suitable ways forward for 
Australian NFPs is to partner with corporate entities, which can help shoulder the 
demand, as well as providing skills and efficiencies for NFP organisations (Cooper, 
2016, p.4). 
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In the political realm, NFPs take a significant interest in policy developments and in 
some cases the strategic direction taken by an organisation is shaped by government 
announcements. Some NFP organisations also lobby the government to attain funding 
or subsidies and the right to deliver certain programs. The relationship between 
governments at both state and federal level with NFP organisations is one where the 
government can influence NFPs or be influenced by them.  
 
The social, economic and political reasons for studying the NFP sector are explained 
further in the Literature Review chapter. The remaining paragraphs in this section 
address some of the unique characteristics of the NFP sector. These characteristics are 
described in more detail in the Literature Review chapter. 
 
A unique characteristic of NFP organisations is their vision, mission and values. This 
is because in most cases, NFP missions and values are altruistic and not aligned with 
profit making motives. As government funding becomes more difficult to obtain due 
to the increasing number of actors in the NFP market, having a strictly altruistic 
mission can pose a challenge. The literature has flagged the potential for NFP boards 
to sacrifice the organisation’s mission in preference to more commercial motives. 
This has been called “mission drift” (see O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008, p.821) and is 
an issue that warrants further investigation. For instance, if mission drift occurs, what 
are the implications? If mission drift does not occur, why is that the case? To add 
complexity to the vision, mission and values, some NFP organisations have a faith-
based element. For example, some NFP organisations have been formed by religious 
entities. This component suggests further factors for board members to consider when 
demands to be more financially and operationally sustainable are increasing. 
Governance questions about the ownership of NFP entities and its hybrid nature are 
additional unique characteristics. Entities are classified as “hybrid organisations” 
when they have both NFP and FP characteristics (Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton, 2012, 
p.213). Increasing pressure on NFP entities to be financially sustainable means that 
many are aiming to generate profits. Such a scenario muddies the waters in terms of 
how to treat their profits, who owns the NFP and to which stakeholder groups the 
organisation becomes accountable.  
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Accountability has been argued to be especially complex in NFP organisations, 
largely due to their broad stakeholder base and structure whereby no party has 
alienable rights to ownership of the entity. Accountability has become even more 
crucial in recent times as financial sources become more scarce and NFP 
organisations become increasingly reliant on either government funding or donations. 
One of the most challenging stakeholders has been identified as the community. This 
is because accountability to communities is not only broad in terms of the many 
different types of people involved, but questions also arise about characterising and 
fulfilling accountability in this sense. Commenting in relation to PPPs in the UK, 
Stafford and Stapleton (2016, pp.379-380) discuss phenomena that are similar to the 
NFP sector in Australia: “…the introduction of [government] contracting out [many 
of its services], and adoption of more managerial styles of leadership and performance 
management techniques” are all factors that have ramifications for accountability. 
An additional layer of accountability to the current NFP organisation model is service 
contracts which regulate to some degree how NFP organisations operate. Many 
service contracts are often linked to funding or grants that are provided by the Federal 
and State Governments. This means that many NFP organisations watch policy 
developments with keen interest and submit tenders pitching to the preferences of the 
government of the day. While government contracts generally have positive 
outcomes, the reverse can be true when government programs cease or change. The 
demanding and unpredictable nature of service contracts for NFP organisations can 
create governance challenges for the board. Furthermore, the dynamic environment in 
which NFP organisations operate makes a board agenda challenging. For instance, 
changes to, delays or the withdrawal of funds can put NFP organisations at risk, the 
most significant of which is the risk of insolvent trading (Caneva, 2016, p.3).  
The unpredictable nature of the NFP sector has been made more uncertain with the 
entrance of FP organisations such as Bupa and Woolworths into the service delivery 
market. This raises many questions for NFPs. For example, do NFPs focus on mission 
and values or do they become more aggressive in order to remain financially and 
operationally sustainable? How do NFPs strike the balance between the two 
objectives? There have been increasing calls from leaders in the NFP sector for NFP 
organisations to respond to increasing accountability and competition as well as 
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higher expectations around performance and outcomes (see for example: the “Board 
Report” ProBono Australia, 2016 or the AICD “NFP Governance and Performance 
Study”, 2016). While competition in the UK and US NFP sectors has also increased, 
the UK has an authority that regulates competition in the sector – the Charitable 
Commission of England and Wales (Dolnicar & Lazarevski, 2009, p.280). No 
equivalent centralised authority operates in the US and while Australia has the 
ACNC, it does not appear to have as much clout as its UK counterpart. This view is 
supported by survey results and interviews of NFP leaders in Australia, in a study 
conducted by Chelliah, Boersma and Klettner (2015). As a result, competition in the 
NFP sector is likely to be more intense in Australia and the US. 
Background to the organisation studied 
The organisation that was selected for this Australian NFP study is one of the largest 
in terms of service delivery. At the time the researcher was present, it operated as an 
Incorporated Association, however a decision was made while the researcher was 
present, to make the organisation a CLG. The entity operates in both the aged care 
and community services sectors. Aged care constitutes 60 percent of the service 
delivery component of the organisation and community services comprise 40 percent. 
Aged care can be broken down into the following components: residential aged care 
homes, retirement living, home care services, transitional care services, and support 
for ethnic minority groups. Community services consist of mental health services, 
employment assistance, youth and family services, homelessness services, and 
affordable housing. The organisation operates in rural and regional areas of the state 
as well as in the metropolitan area. It is part of a larger network of faith-based 
organisations that are associated with a religious institution that operates throughout 
Australia.  
The vision, mission and values of the organisation are largely founded on the 
religious teachings that underpin the faith-based institution. During the time the 
researcher was present, the board and senior managers reviewed the vision, mission 
and values and amended them so they were more relevant to community expectations 
and the environment in which it was operating. The mission became simpler and less 
specific about which people the organisation would serve. It explains that it provides 
services to the community and encourages people to reach their potential. It can be 
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argued that this change enables the NFP entity to be more agile and adaptable in a 
dynamic environment. It provides scope to cater for different sectors of the 
community as and when appropriate. The values were also simplified so that it 
contained a total of four different words compared to several sentences with multiple 
meanings. Care and respect featured in the values, as well as words associated with 
honesty and tenacity. 
The organisational structure is overseen by two larger entities. The paramount entity 
is the religious body of the state. This is followed by an advocacy and lobby group 
that represents the interests of the religious body and its affiliated entities such as the 
one in this study. The board represents the organisation, having the ultimate 
responsibility for the organisation. At the time the researcher was present, the board 
had nine independent board members. There were seven committees operating at the 
time the researcher conducted fieldwork. Two of the seven committees were short-
term and established to guide the organisation through the strategic planning process. 
These were the Aged Care & Community Housing Strategies Committee and the 
Strategic Advisory Committee. The other five committees were long-term committees 
and were the Finance & Audit, Governance, Risk, Aged Care & Property, and 
Community Services Committees. The long-term committees were reduced from five 
to three as a result of the implementation of governance changes. The disbanded 
committees were the Aged Care & Property and Community Services Committee. 
The rationale behind the governance decision to dissolve two committees was that the 
board needed to be across aged care, property and community housing. Rather than 
confining these areas to two committees, the board should be discussing the areas at 
the board level. 
Each committee has directors who operate in their areas of expertise. Director 
expertise featured in the following areas: finance and accounting, science, education, 
psychology, social work, and law. Notably, three of the nine board members were 
members of the religious entity from where the NFP organisation originated. Having a 
certain quota of members as part of the board was a constitutional requirement 
specific to the organisation. Each committee has its Terms of Reference, which 
stipulates how they operate. The CEO of the organisation is accountable to the board. 
The CEO is responsible for all senior managers who operate in four primary areas: 
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aged care, community services, business services and organisational development. An 
outline of the organisational structure of the NFP entity is shown in figure 5.1 below.  
Figure 5.1 Organisational structure of case study entity 
 
There were close to 1,000 staff employed at the organisation and over 150 volunteers 
who worked in aged care and community services. The staff comprised the CEO, five 
senior managers, nine board members, 29 service managers, 48 corporate employees, 
250 community service employees and 581 aged care employees. Of the volunteers, 
63 worked in community services and 86 worked in aged care. The board members, 
including the Chair and CEO, all possessed tertiary qualifications of varying 
descriptions. Qualifications ranged from accounting and finance, arts, education, law, 
psychology, science and social work. The board members also often had experience 
working in their respective fields of qualification or in related areas such as the 
religious institution to which the organisation is related. Two diagrams of the board 
composition and structure are below. Figure 5.2 illustrates the board as it stood prior 
to governance changes where senior managers would attend all board meetings with 
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the CEO. Figure 5.3 shows the composition of the board after the governance change 
pertaining to the structure of the board. 
Figure 5.2 Board prior to governance change 
 
 
 
 
BM = Board Member 
SM = Senior Manager 
Purple represents independent board members who have 
a vote. Blue represents the CEO and the senior managers 
who are employees of the organisation and do not have a 
vote. 
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Figure 5.3 Board after governance change 
 
 
 
 
BM = Board Member 
SM = Senior Manager 
Purple represents independent board members who have 
a vote. In this case, blue represents the CEO who is an 
employee of the organisation and does not have a vote. 
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The stakeholder profile of the organisation is large, which has ramifications for its 
accountability and governance. Like most NFP organisations, the Federal and State 
Governments are stakeholders of this organisation due to the funding and service 
contracts they provide. The community is also a stakeholder given the organisation’s 
vision, mission and values to serve the community. Additionally, the community is 
deemed a stakeholder because a significant amount of money the organisation 
receives is from taxpayers. Donors and sponsors of the organisation are stakeholders, 
as are other similar organisations that work in partnership with the organisation. The 
people the organisation serves – the clients – are also an important stakeholder group 
because without clients, there is no need for the services. The staff and volunteers of 
the organisation are additional stakeholders. Many employees and volunteers choose 
to work for the organisation because of its vision, mission and values. Finally, the 
peak religious body and the advocacy and lobby group are stakeholders, as it is in 
their interest that the organisation operates according to the ethos of the religious 
institution. 
The organisation serves older people in the community, young people, people 
experiencing financial hardship, those with mental health challenges and ethnic 
minority groups. Having such a broad suite of clients is not significant only in terms 
of the organisation’s impact on those individuals, but there are governance 
implications with respect to accountability and compliance. For example, aged care is 
an area of service delivery that requires strict compliance with national accreditation 
standards. Similarly, the services the organisation provides to vulnerable people is 
often subject to regulation and review.  
The organisation also partners with dozens of leading organisations to deliver 
assistance to those in need in addition to its primary service offering. For instance, a 
project with Rotary International was designed to salvage disused assets from the 
organisation to send to people in developing countries. Partnerships with 
organisations who share a common mission enable NFPs to extend their reach beyond 
their current service offerings. This means that more innovative ways of helping 
people can be explored – often in ways that more conventional means do not permit. 
This extends the impact of the organisation in the community. During the time the 
researcher was present, the NFP organisation partnered with over 20 organisations to 
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deliver services or develop policy. Services were delivered to reduce homelessness, 
provide emergency relief, and to help young people and the elderly. Policy 
development was in the area of homelessness and involved the organisation 
partnering with several strategic action groups throughout the state. 
Strategic issues and the financial and operational sustainability of the organisation in 
the medium to long-term were one of the main focuses when the researcher was 
present. This focus was partly instigated by policy developments such as changes to 
aged care funding and programs – especially with the advent of consumer directed 
care, and the NDIS. Strategic issues also arose due to decisions by the board and 
senior management to assist the organisation as it was making the transition to being a 
more efficient and adaptable organisation. Examples of these strategic changes 
included: implementing new accounting and information systems, upgrading the 
organisation’s branding and market profile, changing to a CLG, and investing in its 
aged care and community services.  
There were also two external reviews of the organisation during the time the 
researcher was conducting fieldwork. These were an Organisational Review and a 
Governance Review. The board adopted many of the recommendations from both 
reviews. For example, changes were made to the governance structures where the 
number of committees were reduced or consolidated, the structure of board meetings 
was changed so that senior managers no longer attended all board meetings, and 
board members were remunerated for their board services. The Organisational 
Review had ramifications for the strategic planning process particularly with regard to 
service delivery. The effects of the two reviews will be explored further in the 
findings chapters (chapters six, seven and eight). The findings and Discussion and 
Conclusion chapter will refer to the case study organisation as “Burgundy”. 
Conclusion 
There is a strong case for investigating how governance and boards operate in the 
NFP sector. This is particularly so given the dynamic and uncertain territory many 
NFPs in Australia are encountering. These factors as well as the unique characteristics 
of NFP entities have governance implications. In addition, there are social, economic 
and political justifications for undertaking research in the sector. The literature also 
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highlights that little is known about how boards of directors work in the NFP context. 
This single NFP case study contributes to the small number of qualitative studies in 
the sector. It uses observation, interview and document analysis methods and a lens of 
accountability to investigate how board members enact their three roles in one of the 
largest NFP organisations – hereafter called “Burgundy” – in one state of Australia. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF BOARD MEMBERS 
 
Introduction 
The strategic role of board members was the dominant role exercised in Burgundy. 
This chapter addresses RQ 1, which asks how does board members’ conception and 
approach to their strategic role reflect the unique NFP environment? There were many 
contextual factors both internally and externally that encouraged board members to be 
strategic. In this case study, there were external pressures, largely through legislative 
change, that were impacting on the organisation’s ability to source funding. Other 
legislative amendments such as the move to a user-pays system in aged care changed 
the relationship between Burgundy and its clients. In response, the board and senior 
managers redefined clients as consumers. Viewing the client as a consumer had 
ramifications for the future of aged care service delivery for Burgundy. Legislative 
change regarding funding and the change to a user-pays system also had implications 
for the negotiable accountability of Burgundy to its stakeholders. 
The strong emphasis on the board member strategic role can be argued to form part of 
the board’s motive to demonstrate to external and internal stakeholders that it was 
accountable because it achieved its mission. As Sasso (2003, p.1487) argues, “The 
standard of accountability in the non-profit sector can be succinctly defined as 
compliance with the institutional mission”. As will be described in this chapter, the 
board was very conscious of its mission and its stakeholders, but it also knew the 
importance of being able to assess its performance. The challenges identified (Sasso, 
2003) in this regard are first, how to define mission and second, how should the 
performance of achieving mission be evaluated? The finding in this chapter about 
performance measurement confirms the arguments from Carnegie and Wolnizer 
(1995) and Parker (1996) who suggest that NFP performance measurement should be 
informed by mission first and consider “measures of performance and accountability” 
second. The current case study reveals and explores the additional challenge of the 
board having to balance the mission with the need to be sustainable in the medium to 
long-term. 
The board wished to monitor and measure the performance of their services. The 
board made it clear that their use of KPIs, Key Result Areas (KRAs) and 
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benchmarking was primarily for internal use at that point in time. The new methods of 
measuring the performance of Burgundy in its areas of service delivery revealed 
narrative and calculative accountability in action. Narrative accountability is the 
explanatory or qualitative aspects of accounting whereas calculative accountability is 
the quantitative or measurable aspects of accounting. Kamuf (2007) argues that while 
accounting is typically geared toward the calculative aspects, narrative accountability 
is also required to give a more comprehensive picture of accounting (Shaoul, Stafford 
& Stapleton, 2012, p.213). This comprehensive outlook is argued to be pivotal for the 
dynamic and complex NFP context (Gibbon, 2012, p.202).  
Another factor that conditioned board members to be strategic was the impact of a 
new Board Chair who encouraged a strategic approach. This chapter will examine two 
strategic initiatives encouraged by the Board Chair. First, the welcome item for every 
board meeting and the implications this had for accountability. Second, a governance 
change to the structure of the board will be analysed in terms of how it enabled a 
more strategic approach as well as increasing accountability.  
This findings chapter explores the key external and internal factors that created the 
conditions conducive to the board’s emphasis on strategy and accountability. In 
particular, the chapter shows that environmental changes impacted on the board in 
such a way that they became more involved in strategic topics and the strategic 
processes of strategy formulation and development. These findings are not an 
idealised view of the board’s role in strategy from the literature or from the case 
study. The findings reflect what the researcher observed in the case study. The 
researcher witnessed the board shift up a gear in term of its strategic emphasis across 
strategy formulation, strategy development and strategic monitoring. 
This chapter will firstly analyse the topic of legislative change with respect to funding 
NFP activities. It analyses how funding changes meant that the directors had to be 
more strategic in the ways that they source funds or gain access to resources. The 
following section examines the effect of the introduction of a user-pays system for 
services through legislative and market change and how this conditioned board 
members’ roles in strategy. The next section turns to investigating the internal factors 
that encouraged a strategic approach. Examples from board and committee meetings 
and strategic planning days are provided and the strategic approach taken by the board 
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members is assessed. This assessment reveals the board’s principal focus on 
balancing the mission of the organisation with its financial and operational 
sustainability, which is followed by insights into the board’s transition to measuring 
its service effectiveness. The final section of the chapter describes the impact of the 
new Board Chair and the strategic initiatives they introduced including a welcome 
segment at the beginning of every board meeting and a structural governance change 
to how the board operated.4 
Strategic responses to external changes in funding 
In the present case, funding changes meant Burgundy had to strike a balance between 
being sustainable and achieving its mission. It was decided that the most suitable way 
to position the organisation to obtain funding would be to change to a CLG. A key 
justification that underpinned the board’s decision to become a CLG was that the 
Federal Government was showing a preference for providing funding to CLG entities 
rather than Incorporated Associations. Investing in aged care and fostering strong 
relationships with stakeholders for the future were also said to be primary factors that 
encouraged the change. The change to the user-pays system meant that Burgundy had 
to re-assess its aged care services and consider new and different ways of doing things 
in that space so that they were attractive to consumers. Moreover, many board 
members and senior managers discussed the need to invest in premium services in 
aged care so that the revenues generated could be re-invested in the services that did 
not generate profit, but were an essential part of the organisation’s mission.  
In response to changes in government funding flowing from new legislation, 
Burgundy’s board and senior managers identified three strategic options: pursuing 
strategic alliances, becoming a CLG and seeking alternative sources of funding. The 
                                                
4 Please note that references to board members and senior managers throughout the findings chapters 
(chapters 6 to 8) will be made using the Phonetic Alphabet to protect their identities. While some 
aspects of the Phonetic Alphabet use names that are associated with gender such as “Juliet” or “Mike”, 
this does not mean that the board member or senior manager is necessarily of the corresponding 
gender. The names from the Phonetic Alphabet have been allocated to board members and senior 
managers randomly starting from letter A for “Alpha” through to letter N for “November”. Other 
references to people such as experts who have provided advice to the board have been allocated names 
from O for “Oscar” onwards.  
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board and senior managers decided to achieve a combination of the three options. 
Strategic alliances and partnerships were discussed for future services in aged care 
and community services. Critical to strategic alliances was the condition that the 
partnering organisation must share similar values to Burgundy. The majority of board 
members also agreed to update the status of the organisation from an Incorporated 
Association to a CLG so that the Federal Government would recognise Burgundy as a 
major player in the NFP sector. Alternative sources of funding were also discussed 
and this was to be achieved through “cross-subsidisation” where the revenues 
generated from one part of the organisation would be re-invested in another aspect of 
the organisation. 
A key strategic reason underpinning the change to a CLG was that it would help 
secure funding from the Federal Government as Burgundy would be operating within 
the framework of Commonwealth legislation regulating companies. This reveals the 
board being responsive to rule-based accountability demands in the sector. As the 
legal advisor to Burgundy commented at a board meeting, the rationale behind the 
government’s preference to deal with CLGs is that they will then be treated on the 
“same level playing field”. The CEO, Delta, commented at a Governance Committee 
meeting that changing to a CLG would make Burgundy appear more serious, “more 
financially viable” and enable the organisation to “engage fully with the NDIS”. 
Other board members agreed. Echo said, 
“Becoming a CLG is an opportunity to show the community we’re a 
serious NFP…I think we need to seize the opportunity – it’s a very 
exciting time to change… There are advantages being a CLG over our 
current arrangement. If we are a CLG, we look more serious, stable and 
reliable as an organisation”. 
Echo’s comments highlight that the board was conscious of its image and how it 
would be perceived by its stakeholders. Another board member, Foxtrot, made a 
comment that supports this notion. Foxtrot explained that there were three key reasons 
why Burgundy should become a CLG:  
“First, purpose. We need to position ourselves in the best way possible to 
be ready for the changes (in aged care and community housing). It also 
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allows us to more easily form partnerships and alliances, strategically 
position ourselves with the parent body and gives us an increased status 
working with the Commonwealth framework of legislation regulating 
companies. Second, timing. It is better to decide on the process now 
rather than waste everyone’s time on the issue. Third, capacity. 
Becoming a CLG means we can work across the state and secure federal 
funding. Being a CLG would also be beneficial from a Human Resources 
and budget point of view”. 
While the vast majority of board members including the Chair and CEO were in 
favour of Burgundy becoming a CLG, two board members were against the proposal. 
One of the two opponents was particularly vocal on the issue and voiced their strong 
view on many occasions that they did not see any drivers that justified the decision to 
change from the current Incorporated Association model. This board member, Bravo, 
was not only vocal at board meetings, making their position clear verbally, but also 
wrote a formal paper to the board outlining the case for no change in legal status, 
saying:  
“…as the board’s only legal representative it is very important that I put 
my advice and recommendations on record”.  
The Chair, Alpha, acknowledged the position of the opposing board member, ensured 
it was recorded in the Board minutes and circulated hardcopies of their paper to the 
board. It is evident that there was the exercise of formal accountability here – where 
the board member’s views were formally voiced in a paper tabled to the board and 
formally recorded in the minutes. The decision by the majority of the board to change 
to a CLG reveals negotiable accountability in action. The board wished to negotiate 
its organisational desire to grow and adapt along with the Federal Government’s 
preference to fund CLGs. It could be argued that such an approach balances both 
unitary and pluralist logics (Coule, 2015). Unitary logics are narrow conceptions of 
accountability, in this case, rule-based accountability with the Commonwealth 
corporations legislation. Pluralist logics are those that favour more stakeholder 
oriented views of governance, in this case, the board considered their organisational 
perspective (internal stakeholders) and the perspective of the Federal Government, 
their external stakeholder. 
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Strategic responses to legislative and market change 
Another change that was often discussed at board meetings, strategic planning days 
and committee meetings was the change to the market in aged care, especially the 
consumer driven, user-pays approach. An analysis of competitors in aged care had 
board members discussing that other aged care providers already had a “continuum of 
care” where central phone numbers would provide consumers with access to all 
services from the organisation. This meant it was more likely that the consumer 
would stay with the organisation as all their needs were met by a single provider. This 
analysis of competitors in aged care prompted board members to ask questions such 
as why are for-profit competitors picking up the market in the West? These analyses 
also confirmed to board members what the consultants in aged care were explaining – 
that Burgundy can lose market share very quickly if the organisation is not agile and 
able to change in an appropriate way to service consumers. 
Board members recognised the implications of the change to “consumer directed 
care” and engaged in discussions about how to best address the change. Suggestions 
such as making a current aged care facility “pet friendly” was an example of 
designing a facility with a difference – so it had a competitive advantage over current 
aged care providers. Board members also explored future projects in aged care that 
would address the consumer directed care model and provide a continuum of care for 
consumers. For instance, the Senior Manager for Financial Services Mike informed 
the board that Burgundy had been approached by a major land developer to build a 
multi-storey aged care complex. While the board members exercised their control 
roles with respect to the proposal, responding positively but cautiously, they also 
recognised the potential value of the project as potentially enhancing the public 
profile of the organisation. Additionally, board members could appreciate such an 
opportunity would enable Burgundy to transform their current aged care arrangements 
to meet present and future demand from consumers. For example, the bundling of 
aged care services with ‘hub’ style accommodation (a one-stop-shop) where 
pharmaceutical services and basic medical care could also be on site for residents. 
The strategic value of the proposal was recognised by directors such that the board 
requested a memorandum of understanding be signed between the organisation and 
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the land developer to secure the offer while the necessary checks such as feasibility 
studies and financing investigations were undertaken. 
The changes in the aged care space prompted board members to think further afield 
than simply delivering aged care in a way that fulfilled the mission and values of the 
organisation. For instance, board members agreed that it was best for the medium to 
long-term survival of the organisation to provide for both disadvantaged people and 
the sector of the market that was more affluent. This approach was seen to strike a 
balance between Burgundy achieving the mission of the organisation while also 
generating a revenue stream, which would be re-invested in the activities of the 
organisation. In the aged care space, directors talked about aged care facilities in the 
context of the hotel chain “Ibis” (three-star accommodation) and “Stamford” 
accommodation (four-and-a-half-star accommodation). Such an approach meant that 
Burgundy could service both low and higher fee-paying consumers and profits would 
be re-invested to help those who were most disadvantaged. As a Foxtrot commented 
at a strategic planning day: 
“if we want profit, we need to provide premium services and cross-
subsidise”. 
It was evident that all board members and senior managers formed the view that 
simply servicing low fee-paying consumers was no longer sustainable. It was this 
reasoning that the board members used to justify providing for an additional market 
outside the realm of its traditional mission. Negotiable accountability became relevant 
here, as the board struck a compromise between providing services for its traditional 
stakeholders – the disadvantaged people of the community as well as those who are 
more financially comfortable. Here it is evident that Burgundy was negotiating its 
accountability to the original base of external stakeholders (consumers who were 
disadvantaged) while also recognising that new strategies will also need to be adopted 
to remain viable, i.e. servicing a more affluent segment of society. 
The issue of negotiable accountability became relevant as Burgundy tried to reconcile 
the organisation’s mission with being sustainable into the medium to long-term. The 
board came to the conclusion that this required a careful, considered approach. Two 
separate strategic planning days were dedicated to the board and senior managers 
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analysing Burgundy’s vision, mission and values as well as its plans for the future. 
While most items on the agenda for the strategic planning days were roundtable 
discussions, there were occasions where the board and senior managers were split into 
small groups by an independent facilitator. For example, one group exercise involved 
groups discussing how they would improve the values of the organisation to take into 
account the strategic change which it was undergoing. One common theme identified 
by the independent facilitator was: 
“…the challenge is to say that you are an organisation to help the 
disadvantaged but in a way you also want to attract people with money”. 
Similarly, in an interview, the Board Chair Alpha explained: 
“I think those challenges in terms of both retaining resources and 
earning money to deliver on our values commitment, is one of the biggest 
challenges we have”. 
Careful re-wording of Burgundy’s mission so that it was broader and enabled the 
organisation to service more consumers than the disadvantaged was agreed to be the 
appropriate approach at the strategic planning days. So while the wording was 
amended slightly to enable more flexibility in those the organisation served, the spirit 
and intent of the mission remained the same. All board members and senior managers 
decided that the wording needed updating to bring it in line with present day language 
and understanding. As board member Bravo explained in an interview: 
“To some extent the wording has changed. I think the core of what we do 
and what we stand for is the same. I guess just to bring it into current 
trendy lingo more than to change the meaning of it. For example we 
weren’t back in the day involved in mental health but that has…we have 
captured that within our values without really needing to change too 
much.” 
Part of the updating values exercise involved discussions between the board members 
and senior managers about addressing the tension between moral purpose and being 
more commercial. Foxtrot suggested adding the word “integrity” to the values. That 
way, they explained it suggested a balancing of the tension between the organisation 
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fulfilling its mission, being accountable and achieving financial and operational 
success. The board and senior managers agreed and the word integrity was added to 
the values statement. Ultimately, this example illustrates that board members were 
actively engaged in negotiating accountability in terms of its mission between internal 
(e.g. staff and board members) and external stakeholders (e.g. consumers and 
funders). This confirms the view of Sasso (2003, p.1485) that “the success of the not-
for-profit corporation is defined by the efficacy with which it fulfils its mission”. 
Internal strategic focus: balancing mission and sustainability 
In the foregoing paragraphs, it is evident that legislative changes prompted the 
organisation to assess itself internally, consider its mission and assess the long-term 
viability of its operations. This was done through board and committee meetings, 
strategic planning days and by engaging external consultants to report on the services 
delivered by the organisation. The board and senior managers spent considerable time 
analysing existing services and conducting feasibility studies about potential new and 
different services that would meet future demand.   
An examination of the agendas from board meetings revealed the board’s strong focus 
on strategic topics. Aged care and community housing strategy, CLG, strategic and 
corporate plans, strategic KPIs and risk appetite were frequently featured in board 
agendas. A review of the board meeting agendas over the period during which the 
researcher was present showed that on average, strategic topics formed between one 
third and one half of the topics discussed by the board.  
Strategic planning days, board and committee meetings highlighted the challenge of 
the board and senior managers of Burgundy to effectively balance the mission of the 
organisation with the increasing emphasis on being a sustainable organisation in the 
medium to long-term. For example, discussions were often had about meeting the 
needs of disadvantaged people in line with Burgundy’s mission, but board members 
and senior managers also recognised that there was a need to service higher fee 
paying consumers to enable revenue to be generated to sustain the organisation, 
especially given funding sources were becoming harder to access. The issue of 
negotiable accountability became relevant as Burgundy tried to reconcile the 
organisation’s mission with being sustainable into the medium to long-term. At a Risk 
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Committee meeting, striking the balance between maintaining a viable organisation 
and keeping stakeholders satisfied was expressed in the design of a risk appetite 
document to guide the board and committees with its decision-making. The 
committee report stated: 
“We therefore seek to balance our risk position between:  
1. Investing in activities and/or projects with inherent risk that may drive 
substantial growth in the demand for aged care and housing, and  
2. The need to remain a stable and sustainable organisation with the 
capacity to continue to work for our many stakeholders long into the 
future”. 
An informal interview with Delta, the CEO, at a strategic planning day sheds light on 
how the board and senior managers balance mission and remaining sustainable. In 
Delta’s view, defining boundaries and exercising discretion was the best approach. 
The CEO said that when assessing projects, it is vital to consider first, whether the 
mission of the organisation would be fulfilled and second, whether the proposal 
satisfies the efficiency and effectiveness requirements as required in the service 
contract. Delta explained that satisfying both requirements was not always achieved 
in which case the proposal would be rejected by the organisation. S(he) provided the 
example where the government offered funding for a site. The site was government 
land that they wished to donate to an organisation that was willing to accept the tender 
for providing residential aged care facilities at the site. Burgundy undertook a 
feasibility study of the proposal, which revealed that the wellbeing of internal 
stakeholders (staff) would be threatened if the project was accepted. In other words, 
staff would need to work long hours with minimal breaks to achieve the government’s 
efficiency and effectiveness requirements. Delta explained that Burgundy did not 
accept the government’s funding for this project because they did not want staff to be 
exploited, as it would contravene the values of the organisation. 
In Delta’s example, it is evident that there were the conflicting interests of two 
stakeholders – the government and staff. The government invited Burgundy to 
provide service at a particular site, but Burgundy’s own investigations revealed their 
staff would not be treated fairly. As a result, Burgundy declined the offer of funding 
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from the government. This highlights negotiable accountability in practice. In this 
case, the mission of the organisation set the boundary of what would be an acceptable 
proposal. As the feasibility study revealed the staff of Burgundy (internal 
stakeholders) would be exploited, Burgundy rejected the proposal. The government’s 
proposal failed the informing lens that Burgundy uses to assess whether undertaking a 
project would be both morally acceptable and helpful for the longer-term viability of 
the organisation. 
Internal strategic focus: analysing service effectiveness 
A key aspect of strategic discussions on the board and its committees was a desire to 
analyse the effectiveness of Burgundy’s responses to the external and internal changes 
it was encountering. Service contracts provided by funders such as the government 
demand the monitoring and measurement of performance (Stafford & Stapleton, 
2016). Additionally, with more “managerial forms of accountability” penetrating 
hybrid organisations, there has been more of a focus on applying performance 
measurement techniques to the areas in which the organisation operates (Stafford & 
Stapleton, 2016, p.380). Analysis of the effectiveness of Burgundy’s services in aged 
care and community services was the primary means by which this was done. It was 
suggested at meetings that performance measuring was for primarily for internal use.  
Performance measurement was undertaken in a variety of ways. One example was 
where aspects of Burgundy’s aged care and community services were benchmarked 
against those of other similar NFP providers. For instance, the occupancy levels in 
aged care was one area of focus, as some board members took a strong interest in 
ensuring the organisation maintained a high occupancy rate. This was the first time 
Burgundy participated in a yearly benchmarking study with a leading national 
organisation in NFP benchmarking.  
Benchmarking analyses revealed to board members and senior managers in an 
unprecedented and quantifiable way how Burgundy was performing compared to 
similar organisations in the sector. Such information was said by board members to be 
valuable in their assessments of the services they provide. For instance, the use of 
agency staff in residential aged care was an area in which board member Charlie, who 
had expertise in aged care, focused during board meetings. Charlie compared 
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Burgundy’s usage of agency staff with that of similar organisations providing aged 
care. Charlie noted that Burgundy had some way to go in improving agency usage in 
order to reach the lower benchmark figure. He explained that high agency levels are 
not good for Burgundy as agency staff cost the organisation money that otherwise 
would not be spent if Burgundy’s own staff were rostered instead. This insight 
prompted discussion at a board meeting between board members and the Senior 
Manager of Aged Care, November. In response, an initiative was outlined to address 
the agency issue including a timeframe with the aim of meeting the agency 
benchmark by mid-year the following year. The board member Echo who was the 
Chair of the Finance and Audit Committee asked for the target to be re-worded so that 
the board could measure it. It became evident that the agency benchmark instigated 
accountability not only at the board level but also the committee level – given the 
financial ramifications of high levels of agency use. 
Another means by which Burgundy wanted to enhance its understanding of its 
operations was through investments in Information Technology Systems (ITS). 
Burgundy harnessed improvements in their own internal ITS to better understand the 
organisation’s client base and consumer profiles. When the researcher first 
commenced fieldwork in Burgundy, there was a fragmented, out-dated accounting 
ITS which produced hundreds of budgets and reports. While there were no complaints 
from the board about the quality of the financial reports, they did form the view that 
the system could be more efficient. This would have the advantage of making the 
workload more manageable for the Senior Manager Finance and less costly for the 
organisation. The board also discussed that the added benefit of an updated 
accounting ITS was that more sophisticated financial reports could be produced. As a 
result, a decision was made by the board to invest in a major upgrade to the 
accounting ITS. In addition, the board agreed to finance a new consumer database so 
consumer profiles could be more efficiently stored and retrieved. It was evident in 
board and committee meeting discussions that the rationale behind the new consumer 
database was so the board could measure and monitor consumer demand to analyse 
their services in a more sophisticated and accountable fashion. As board member 
Juliet commented at a strategic planning day, 
“With respect to operational strategy 2.1.3: use impact and outcome 
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measurement and reporting - we need a framework to measure and 
monitor because this speaks to accountability too”.  
The Senior Manager Organisational Development, Lima, reassured Juliet and the 
other board members that:  
“We have built up a lot of tools in our new customer service ITS which 
provides us with a lot of very rich data…It also means that we’re more 
efficient so that consumers don’t have to tell their story 1,000 times”.  
Such techniques involved the use of narrative and calculative accountability. The 
researcher was present long enough to see the new accounting and customer service 
ITS operate and how the data from those systems was being used. For example, the 
researcher compared annual reports published on Burgundy’s website prior to the ITS 
upgrades and after the upgrades. It was evident that the new ITS could produce more 
sophisticated and accurate data insights. Since the operation of the new ITS, accurate 
figures of the number of people the organisation serves, the areas in which services 
were provided and demographic profiles of consumers could be provided. 
At a board meeting, board members discussed Burgundy’s corporate plan and 
strategic KPIs, which involved the exercise of broad accountability concepts. 
Narrative and calculative accountability again featured. As the Board Chair Alpha 
commented, 
“Now, the board has been saying ever since I’ve been around, we want a 
clearer focus on KPIs, and what I’m pushing for is a strategic plan for 
the next five years, that will have high-level KPIs that can be measured 
in both outcome and, what’s the term? In both qualitative and 
quantitative terms”. 
Some time later, the board received a draft corporate plan from senior management 
that featured a matrix with KRAs that will be achieved by certain KPIs. One board 
member asked how often the KPIs and KRAs would be reviewed. The CEO replied 
every six months. Another board member inquired with respect to who will oversee 
the process. The Chair replied, the CEO. It was apparent that board members were 
asking such questions to ensure appropriate processes were in place to monitor and 
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review the corporate plan and strategic KPIs. The Chair formalised the process by 
asking for the corporate plan to be added to the record of minutes and the board 
agenda for six months’ time. Board members spent time reviewing and making some 
revisions to the corporate plan document so that the board would receive strategic 
reports from senior managers about the plan and not operational reports. This change 
in reporting structures aimed to increase the accountability of senior managers to the 
board in a formal, upwards accountability fashion so that management reporting to the 
board was improved. Such changes appeared to be intended to increase the efficiency 
of the board so that they did not waste time with routine operational matters and could 
focus on the higher level activities. Moreover, it encouraged the strong strategic focus 
that the Board Chair was advocating. 
Internal strategic focus: the new Board Chair and strategic initiatives 
A new Board Chair commenced at the time the researcher started fieldwork in 
Burgundy. Many board members and senior managers in the interviews made 
reference to the Chair as being far more strategic than the previous Board Chair. 
Board member Juliet said: 
“…it’s just a different way of running the board. And I can understand, 
like the previous Chair of the Board had actually been the CEO of the 
organisation prior, so I suppose there was always a danger with 
them…of not being able to step away from the management role into the 
board role, whereas the current Board Chair hasn’t been the CEO, so 
s(he) does see it as quite a separate thing”. 
Board member Foxtrot contended that the time was ripe for change when the new 
Board Chair commenced: 
“…there was a move towards greater appreciation and commitment to 
the Board as a governing body. So when the new Chair came in, this 
person saw that pretty quickly. That came through their meetings with 
board members, s(he) had a back understanding of all of that, had the 
experience. So s(he) cut to the chase pretty quick and made it really 
clear”. 
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Another board member, Golf contrasted the approach of the previous Board Chair 
with the new Chair: 
“…until very recent times…the previous chair, has been uncomfortable 
about the concept of growth, uncomfortable to consider and therefore, to 
consider/explore the concept of growing. This is sort of linked a bit to the 
modest, safe, do what you can mentality, but I think that in this world that 
you just get left behind very quickly”. 
Two examples of the Board Chair’s more strategic approach will be provided and 
analysed. First, the welcome item at the start of every board meeting will be explored, 
including its accountability ramifications. Second, the change in board structure 
where senior managers no longer attended board meetings unless they were invited or 
delivering a presentation to the board will also be examined. Insights into board 
members’ and senior managers’ perspectives about the Board Chair’s strategic 
approach will also be provided, as it sometimes had ramifications for accountability at 
both the individual and collective levels.  
An example of the strategic focus encouraged by the Chair was the welcome item at 
the start of every board meeting. The first formal item on the agenda for every board 
meeting was the item “Welcome by [board member’s name]”. Board members took 
turns to provide a welcome presentation to the board. The subject of the welcome was 
one of the organisation’s values, which was allocated to the board member before the 
meeting so they could prepare their presentation. The welcome item gave board 
members, including the Chair, the opportunity to provide their perspective on a 
particular value from the organisation’s mission. Welcome items generally lasted for 
an average of between five and ten minutes.  
Often thought-provoking and personal, board members would share their perspective 
of what a value meant to them, how the value might be perceived by the community 
and what it meant for the organisation. For example, board member Juliet referenced 
a newspaper article from journalist Andrew Bolt, saying that although often not 
agreeing with his views, they found themselves in agreement with his recent column 
about people’s innate worth. Juliet also linked their reflection to the welcome 
presentation from another board member at the previous board meeting where that 
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director had discussed a value relating to innovation. It is evident that such an 
exercise not only prompted the individual board member to reflect meaningfully on a 
certain value of the organisation, but it also sensitised the other board members to the 
values of the organisation.  
The welcome technique appeared to strengthen the board’s understanding and 
appreciation of Burgundy’s values and mission. It can be argued that socializing 
accountability was therefore exercised at both the individual level and the collective 
level with the welcome item for each board meeting. Socializing forms of 
accountability tend to occur in instances where an individual adopts a less 
conventional form of accountability. While exercising accountability, the individual 
acknowledges the effect their accountability has on others (Roberts, 1991). In the 
present study, it can be argued the welcome segment is an unconventional form of 
accountability where a chosen individual board member expresses their perspective 
about a particular aspect of the organisation’s mission and values. By sharing their 
personal account of the mission and values with the rest of the board, accountability is 
discharged at the individual board member level but it also involves thought and often 
dialog with the board as a collective whole. 
Another significant strategic change implemented by the Board Chair, following the 
advice of an external governance expert, was to remove the senior managers from the 
board meetings. The reasons for this were three-fold. First, it would enable the board 
and senior managers to concentrate on their own areas as the board has a different role 
to the senior managers, although it is somewhat related. Second, the new format 
facilitated discussion about issues that might otherwise be sensitive to the senior 
managers. For instance, reviewing the performance of a particular senior manager. 
Third, it enabled a more manageable, smaller group that would foster more 
participation from board members. It appeared that this was an attempt to increase the 
formal accountability of the board in a downward accountability fashion and the 
senior managers in an upward accountability sense. 
The researcher was present before and after the change was introduced. Board 
members’ and senior managers’ attitudes to this change were elicited during the 
interviews. Most board members were in favour of the change as it allowed more free 
and frank discussion but some had reservations about the impact on the flow of 
 171 
information between the board and the senior managers. This was because the 
structure of the board had gone from a forum where all senior managers were present 
and exposed to the context of board requests, to a forum where only the CEO would 
be present and would convey board requests to senior managers. One board member 
Golf said: 
“I would like more assurance that the CE was able to give a really good 
sense of the feeling of the responses to the board agendas, etc. to the 
senior managers which would imply directly, I think, that they have 
regular meetings including just after the board meeting. And I’m still 
really left unclear…” 
A similar view was voiced by board member India: 
“I’m not sure how much the CEO would be feeding that back, and that’s 
the other issue, is that not having senior managers there relies entirely 
on the CEO to feed back what happens at the board meeting, and I 
assume they can read the minutes”. 
While some board members expressed doubts about whether it was appropriate for 
the CEO being entirely responsible for conveying the context of board requests, one 
board member, Bravo, was against the change. Bravo argued that the change reduced 
the sense of camaraderie between board members and senior managers: 
“It’s not a change that I’m in favour of…I’ve always been an advocate of 
strong relationships between senior managers, CEO and board members. 
And I think that it’s actually damaged the relationship making that 
change. I think we now have only the CEO reporting snapshots of the 
board meetings…” 
With the CEO becoming the sole party responsible for conveying requests from the 
board to the senior managers, some expressed views that it had ramifications for the 
flow of information between the board and senior management. For some senior 
managers, this governance change also had the effect of making report writing for the 
board difficult. A senior manager, Kilo, explained: 
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“I think from my perspective the report writing issue is one of them 
because the board will ask for a report and then the CEO will task me 
with writing a report but the requirements of the board in relation to the 
content of that are not really clear which makes it very hard to respond”. 
Board members were also cognisant of the challenges the new governance format 
presented. This became evident at times in board meetings where papers tabled at 
board meetings from senior managers in some cases did not meet the board’s 
expectations. In the cases when this did occur, it was generally because the paper was 
operational in nature and did not have enough of a higher level strategic focus as far 
as the board was concerned. The submission of one board paper in particular caused 
considerable concern for board members and the senior manager involved. The paper 
was to be about the future of community services and the board expected the content 
to be forward-looking and proposing an agenda for how the services might be in 5-10 
years’ time. Unfortunately, the senior manager responsible did not view her task in 
that way and instead provided a general report on the operations of community 
services. In the first instance, the board did not approve the report and returned it to 
the senior manager for amendments so it met their expectations. It was re-submitted 
to the board again but many board members still felt it was not what they required to 
make a decision. Exasperated, board member Echo said: 
“It’s unfortunate that the Senior Manager says it is not their job to be 
strategic. The Board needs something which is not general. It needs to be 
articulated so we have a target. For example, use the data to find gaps in 
service delivery. Identify the areas of need and then quantify them into a 
future direction!” 
Other board members agreed, voicing similar views. The Board members tried to 
work out a way to deal with correcting the issue. It was suggested by Bravo (in a 
similar way to Foxtrot) that feedback could be provided to the Senior Manager about 
what the Board thinks of the current document and what it needs (what it was 
lacking). Echo said s(he) doubts whether that course of action would produce what 
the board was seeking. However, the other board members decided to follow Bravo 
and Foxtrot’s suggestion – note the paper and request further information. This 
example illustrates negotiable and strategic accountability in action. The example of 
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the board providing guidance and engaging in negotiable accountability with the 
senior manager shows the board working with senior managers to adjust to the 
change. It also shows the collective decision of the board to tactfully address a 
difference of opinion between the senior manager and the board. Individual board 
members expressed discontent with the paper. As a collective whole, the board 
decided on a course of action that would tactfully address the misunderstanding so the 
senior manager would not be embarrassed or feel inadequate. 
Expressing their opinion in an interview, senior manager Mike explained the value of 
having an ally on the board or a committee who can assist with providing context: 
“…that’s where my conversations and regular contact with the Chair of 
the Finance and Audit Committee is important as well, because that 
probably helps me get an understanding of what the board is thinking – 
the board perspective”. 
Mike’s comment about the value of having an ally in a board member was expressed 
in a similar way by board members who recognised that it was helpful to foster 
communication with senior managers. Often, such conversations took place in an 
informal, socializing accountability sense – outside the boardroom. For instance, 
Juliet said: 
“Occasionally I’ll follow up things that I don’t understand outside the 
board meeting; I might get on to Mike or somebody for something 
financial or whatever…” 
Board director India made a similar comment during her interview: 
“Echo and Mike are both really great with answering any questions that 
you have, so that’s useful too, having people who you can ask questions 
of and because sometimes there’s things you don’t need to hold up the 
board meeting with, it’s just little nuances that you don’t quite 
understand”. 
It can be argued that the broad accountability concepts of formal and informal 
accountability also became relevant with the change in board structure. In a formal 
 174 
sense, the CEO and board had to work on achieving a strong, effective way of 
communicating. In addition, papers tabled to the board from senior managers had to 
be pitched at a higher level. The board as a collective showed a preparedness to help 
outline the expectations of board paper content during the adjustment period. Other 
techniques of communication were informal and showed socializing accountability in 
action. Board members and senior managers would communicate informally outside 
of the boardroom if they required further context than what the CEO conveyed. The 
informal communications that took place were sometimes mentioned during the 
course of board meetings or committee meetings; otherwise, interviewees explained 
this behaviour during interviews. 
There was much evidence that the new Board Chair certainly encouraged the board’s 
focus on strategy and accountability. With the advent of the welcome item at the start 
of every board meeting and its focus on the values of the organisation, there was 
socializing accountability exercised at both the individual board member and 
collective board levels. Such accountability appeared to put board members in the 
correct strategic mindset prior to the board meeting so they could operate at the higher 
level. In addition, the governance change where the senior managers would no longer 
attend board meetings could be said to make the roles more clear between the two 
parties. It would also facilitate more free and frank discussion between board 
members and it enabled a more manageable, smaller group that would foster more 
participation from board members. While formal accountability is inherent in these 
reasons for the governance change, it was the ramifications from the change that 
revealed some additional accountability insights. For example, there was evidence 
that the two-way flow of information between the board and senior managers was 
somewhat compromised. In some cases, this meant that senior manager reports that 
were written for the board did not match what the board was seeking. Negotiable and 
strategic accountability was exercised in these cases to strategically manage the 
relations between the senior managers and the board. Informal accountability also 
featured while the board members and senior managers were adjusting to the 
governance change. For instance, if a senior manager required extra context or 
clarification, they might contact a board member with whom they had a good rapport.  
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Conclusion 
This findings chapter has explored the strategic role of the board members of 
Burgundy. The contextual factors that encouraged a strategic focus were discussed, 
including the impact of legislative change in funding and the user-pays system in aged 
care. These external factors created a tension between a need for Burgundy to remain 
financially and operationally sustainable, but the board also recognised the paramount 
importance of fulfilling the mission of the organisation. Many discussions were had at 
board and committee meetings and strategic planning days about striking a balance 
between the viability of the organisation and achieving its mission. The broad 
accountability concept of negotiable accountability enables us to see what Ospina, 
Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002, p.9) point out - negotiable accountability consists of 
being accountable to internal and external stakeholders. It often consists of 
negotiating between two types of parties: “professional relationships” and “political 
relationships”. The former relationship is where negotiations took place within the 
organisation (between board members and senior managers) about striking the 
balance between being commercial and fulfilling the mission. The latter relationship 
is where Burgundy presented a particular image to its external stakeholders. In this 
case stakeholders were mainly consumers and the image was one of organisational 
legitimacy – i.e. that the mission of the organisation would be fulfilled. 
Narrative, calculative and formal accountability featured in the organisation’s efforts 
to measure the effectiveness of its services. With the external pressures to change to a 
more serious NFP outfit, the organisation could see it needed updated means of 
measuring its services. By participating for the first time in a national NFP 
benchmarking study and investing in major ITS upgrades, the board had some more 
tangible data to work with that could assist in analysing the effectiveness of its 
responses to change. The board also requested a draft corporate plan with KPIs and 
KRAs from senior managers. This also meant that senior managers were held to 
account in a more rigorous way than before the benchmarking and ITS upgrades were 
implemented. Therefore, formal and upward avenues of accountability were also 
strengthened. 
The new Board Chair also signalled a new era for the board and senior managers. 
Comments from board members and senior managers revealed the Chair’s leadership 
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was more strategic than the previous Chair. With the new Chair’s focus on welcome 
segments at the beginning of each board meeting, board members were sensitised to 
the vision, mission and values of the organisation. This showed socializing 
accountability in action at both the individual and the collective levels. A change in 
the governance structure of the board also heralded an emphasis on making the 
strategic roles of the board and senior managers clear while also increasing formal 
accountability. The ramifications of the governance change showed additional broad 
accountability concepts operating in response. For instance, negotiable accountability 
took place in the early adjustment period when some senior managers were trying to 
work out what the board expected in board papers. As another example, the board 
exercised negotiable and strategic accountability to finesse the conflict between a 
senior manager’s view and the board’s view. Other implications from the governance 
change to some extent could be argued to affect the two-way flow of information 
between the board and senior managers. Some senior managers and board members 
harnessed the technique of using an ally to provide them with additional context in an 
informal, socializing setting – outside the boardroom. This revealed the exercise of 
informal accountability to address a deficiency in information as a result of the 
governance change. 
In summary, this findings chapter has explained why there was a significant emphasis 
on the strategic role in the case study organisation, Burgundy. Many examples have 
been provided that illustrate how the board members exercised their strategic role and 
the accountabilities inherent in the enactment of the role. This chapter illustrates the 
value of a framework of broad accountability in understanding and analysing the 
strategic role of directors and the ramifications for accountability. 
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CHAPTER 7: BOARD MEMBER ROLES – LIMITING 
OPERATIONAL DRIFT 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses all three RQs as it explores the strategy, control and resource 
dependence roles and how they were enacted in the NFP context. The challenge for 
board members to distinguish between their roles and senior managers’ roles has been 
recognised in the board literature. When a board member strays into the senior 
manager role performing tasks in the senior manager realm, it is often referred to as 
“operational drift” (Cornforth & Edwards, 2001, p.357). The essence of the 
transgression is that board members, either unconsciously or consciously, spend board 
time on the detailed and routine aspects of business rather than focusing on the higher 
level “uncertainties or dilemmas” facing the organisation and assessing how the 
organisation is performing (Cornforth & Edwards, 2001, p.357). 
While the literature shows board members are often cognisant of operational drift, 
little has been written about how board members limit the slippage into senior 
manager territory. While it is useful to know that most board members are aware of 
the practice and they are capable of acknowledging it (Parker, 2007a; 2008), we do 
not know how board members prevent it from occurring. This study is able to 
contribute to the board process studies literature by explaining how board members in 
Burgundy respect the line between their roles and senior manager roles. 
The following section provides further explanation and background about operational 
drift. It also highlights the key issues to be addressed. The subsequent section explains 
why the primary focus of this findings chapter is on operational drift in strategising. It 
then considers the techniques board members use to prevent operational drift 
including the broad accountability concepts that are inherent in the exercise of the 
techniques. Table 7.1 sets out the techniques board members use to manage 
operational drift as well as the broad accountabilities that result from such techniques. 
The paragraphs after table 7.1 explain the techniques and accountabilities in more 
detail using the heading names from the table. The chapter then explores how board 
members manage operational drift in the control role and how the resource 
dependence role may assist board members in preventing operational drift. 
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Background to operational drift 
The board literature notes the potential for board members to stray into senior 
manager roles in all three aspects of strategy, control and resource dependence. This 
is because board members and senior managers both discharge roles in the three 
areas. The distinction between the board member and senior manager is the level at 
which they operate. Senior managers exercise strategy, control and resource 
dependence roles at an operational, detailed level compared to board members who 
operate at a higher level where there is less detail but more broad thinking required.   
The data from the present study mainly shows how board members limit operational 
drift in strategising. There are two reasons for the strategic focus. First, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, there was a significant focus on the strategic role in board 
meetings, strategic planning days and committee meetings. It is not surprising 
therefore that most of the data illustrates instances where board members are 
respecting the boundaries between their strategic role and senior managers’ strategic 
role. Second, the nature of the NFP organisation lent itself to the tendency to require a 
board that was proactive with respect to strategy. This was because there was a 
general consensus among the organisational leaders that there was a need for the 
board and its senior managers to become more strategic to continue to operate a 
successful organisation. 
While a rationale for a primary focus on the strategic role has been outlined, it is 
important to consider the other areas in which operational drift can occur. Considering 
the resource dependence role, Stiles and Taylor (2001) highlight the overlap between 
board members’ and senior managers’ roles in “boundary spanning” – where 
networks and alliances are formed between the organisation and external parties.  
The control role is another area where board members can exercise roles that are in 
the senior manager domain. For example, this might occur where a board member 
focuses on the detailed aspects of legislation relevant to a higher level discussion 
about regulation. Whether it is the strategy, control or resource dependence roles, the 
key take-home message is that the detailed aspects of these roles is in the realm of 
senior managers. The higher level aspects of the three roles are reserved for the board 
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members. Sasso (2003) notes that neither board members nor senior managers can do 
without the other:  
The breadth of knowledge and specialized skills needed in the boardroom to 
make informed strategic business decisions on an ongoing basis demands a 
careful blending of their unique competencies and perspectives…(Sasso, 2003, 
p.1513). 
The findings from this study contribute significantly to the existing literature as these 
findings shed light on the practices board members use to limit operational drift. On 
the occasions that operational drift occurred in the case study organisation, the 
researcher observed it happening without reference to s198A of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). When operational drift occurred, it happened when directors would try to 
make decisions with respect to routine, daily operations of the organisation. In some 
cases, the Board Chair would identify operational drift and in other instances, the 
board members recognised it. The identification of operational drift was a multiple, 
interactive individual and group decision process. 
The techniques board members use to prevent drifting into senior manager roles are 
common across the exercise of all three key board member roles. Certain aspects of 
broad accountability help explain how board members reduce operational drift. These 
include trust (negotiable accountability), accountability enacted at both individual and 
collective levels, and formal and informal accountability.  
Observational and interview data reveals that board members consider the following 
factors as key in preventing operational drift: the two-way flow of information 
between the senior managers and the board, individual awareness of operational drift 
and accountability, a strong rapport between board members and senior managers 
(trust), experience, being clear on board member roles and scope (to operate at the 
higher level), being clear on senior manager roles and scope (to operate at the detailed 
level) and having appropriate systems in place to make the distinction clear. These 
findings confirm those of Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) and Cornforth and 
Edwards (2001) and also add new, additional insights. 
A principal finding from the present investigation is the techniques board members 
harness to respect the line between their roles and the duties of senior managers. 
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Concepts of broad accountability are helpful in explaining the ways in which board 
members stay on the correct side of the line between their roles and those of senior 
managers. This section will explore the techniques board members use to respect the 
line including trust (negotiable accountability), accountability enacted at both 
individual and collective levels, and formal and informal accountability. The insights 
from these findings are novel. While the board literature notes the challenge for board 
members to observe the line, the literature does not explore in any great depth the 
techniques directors exercise to observe the line. 
Operational drift in strategising 
A common theme from interviews was that strategy was the most challenging role 
where the line between board member and senior manager roles was hardest to 
distinguish. This appeared to be the case due to two factors. First, both the board and 
senior managers were heavily involved in strategy. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, this was largely due to the external and internal changes Burgundy was 
encountering and the life cycle stage at which the organisation was at the time. 
Second, the board wished to change the emphasis of Burgundy from that which 
focused on the operational or general management issues to a more strategic, forward 
looking organisation. Each of these two factors will be investigated in more detail 
below. 
The first factor, the strategic focus, was challenging in terms of distinguishing 
between board member and senior manager roles because both the board and the 
senior managers were, to a large extent, involved in the organisation’s strategising. 
For example, drafting strategic plans and corporate plans was a shared task between 
the board and senior managers. As explained in the previous chapter, the stage at 
which the organisation was at made it essential for the board to understand their role 
in strategy. Recall that the board was driving the transition from the organisation’s 
previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model. Board member Bravo 
commented: 
“I think it’s important for the organisation and for the relationship 
between senior managers and board members to know where that line is 
and the board and the board members to be operating at that higher 
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strategic level”.   
The second factor that added to the challenge for board members to distinguish their 
strategic role from those of senior managers was a conscious decision on the part of 
the board to develop a strategic approach different to the historical operational and 
management focus of the board. As discussed in the prior chapter, the need for a more 
strategic emphasis was identified by an independent governance expert and 
encouraged by the new Board Chair. There were also external factors including 
legislative changes in funding arrangements and the introduction of a user-pays 
system in aged care that contributed to the board adopting a more strategic 
orientation. The governance expert argued Burgundy would be more efficient if board 
roles were distinguished from those of senior management. Board member Charlie 
explained: 
“…in response to the latest major consultation we’re saying we want to 
change the ethos of the organisation, we want to move it from a laid back 
dad’s army effort into a highly professional outfit that’s going to mix it 
with the for-profits”. 
The outcome of the governance review was that not only the board, but also of some 
the senior managers needed to be more strategic in their dialogue, written reports and 
activities. In an interview, board member Golf commended the senior managers for 
being excellent operationally but recognised that some senior managers were not 
comfortable with strategising. The Board Chair, Alpha, expressed a very similar view 
in their interview and informally to the researcher after a board meeting. The CEO, 
Delta, explained why some senior managers struggled to distinguish between being 
operational and working at the strategic level: 
“Senior managers may need to deal with the operational level and then 
again at the strategic level, and I think some are more comfortable in the 
operational level rather than the strategic level”. 
Board member Golf attributed the lack of strategic focus by both the senior managers 
and board members to the history of the organisation, “which is very modest, to just 
do good works and not expect a reward”. According to Golf, another contributing 
factor was some reluctance of both board members and senior managers to tackle 
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strategy, either due to an inability to strategise (as suggested by Delta above) or a lack 
of confidence. The leadership from the previous Board Chair was also cited as a 
factor that encouraged the operational approach.  
Senior manager Mike shed more light on the previous Board Chair’s modus operandi 
and how that had impacted on the strategic approach of the current CEO. Mike 
suggested that the previous Board Chair had been dominant with respect to strategy 
and the current CEO was not able to take a leadership role in strategy. With the new 
Board Chair Alpha, the CEO became more involved in strategy because the new 
Board Chair was prepared to share the strategic role with the CEO. Mike observed, 
“…there are a lot of organisations out there where the CEO will be the 
leader around strategy, so they’ll be the ones that drive the strategy and 
the direction and the ideas, and I think in that case…the board needs to 
be probably a bit more of the—maybe of the conservative nature of the 
oversight nature, whereas if you’ve got a CEO who’s probably less 
inclined that way then I think the board has a role to be more 
strategic…I think we’re probably more the latter”. 
Mike suggested that the context in which the organisation was operating could also 
impact on the dynamics between the CEO’s leadership style and that taken by the 
board. CEO Delta provided a similar view, contending that the context in which board 
members and senior managers operate can condition the strategic role: 
“I think the strategy is to look broadly across the organisation, broadly 
assess the environment in which we work, which sounds fairly easy, but 
in fact in our business it is quite difficult because the environment in 
which we work is constantly changing”. 
Board member India drew upon their experience as a board member in a statutory 
authority and compared it to that of Burgundy. India explained that in the statutory 
authority, strategy was driven by the senior managers and the board played a more 
passive, approval or disapproval role. In Burgundy, India explained that it was almost 
the opposite. The board in Burgundy was actively involved in developing and driving 
strategy with the senior managers. Hence, there was the particular challenge for the 
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board members to observe their strategic roles in Burgundy to ensure they did not 
encroach on roles belonging to senior managers. 
 
Board member India attributed the differences in board involvement in strategy 
largely to the structure of the organisation and its mandate. For instance, in the 
statutory authority, there were more formal roles and personnel who had the 
capability to strategise. India explained that the mandate of the statutory authority was 
also more specific compared to Burgundy. On the other hand, in Burgundy, an 
absence of formal strategic structures and a much broader mandate made it more 
challenging for the board and senior managers to strategise. It was therefore more 
critical that the board members in Burgundy identified and respected the line between 
their roles and those of senior managers. 
 
India’s comparison of Burgundy’s board with the board of the statutory authority 
highlighted that the locus of strategy either largely rests with the board or the senior 
managers depending on the structure of the organisation and its mandate. India’s 
perspective was similar to that provided by an external strategic consultant who was 
engaged by the board to assist with strategic planning days. This consultant will be 
referred to as Papa. In an informal interview between the researcher and Papa, Papa 
explained that there is usually a principal difference between a corporate board and an 
NFP board. They said in their experience, a corporate board would not be so involved 
in strategy as an NFP board. This is because corporate firms have the funds and 
resources to employ a staff member to deal with the high level strategic issues. On the 
other hand, in the NFP sector, this is generally not the case as funding and human 
resources are more scarce. Consequently, the NFP board is more involved in high 
level strategy. For example, analysing the vision and values of the organisation and 
working out what the organisation should aim to achieve. 
 
As the examples from India and Papa illustrate, the dichotomy between the strategic 
role the NFP board and its senior managers can be far less clear in an NFP 
organisation compared to that of a statutory authority or corporate board. This is 
especially so when there are additional contextual factors such as those in the case of 
Burgundy that meant both the board and the senior managers needed to exercise a 
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strategic role. Board member India illustrated the fine line between board member and 
senior manager roles in Burgundy, 
 
“…the senior managers give us the information that helps us to make a 
strategic decision, that they can’t just rely on the board to think 
strategically, because we’re not close enough to the information. We can 
interrogate that and we can push that thinking, and think beyond that, 
but we need a starting point from them”. 
Senior manager November expressed a similar sentiment to India in their interview. 
November argued that senior managers were generally in a better position to think 
strategically because they are closely involved with the organisation on a daily basis. 
November also contended that there was a role for board members in strategy too. 
November distinguished between the strategic roles of senior managers and board 
members by commenting that senior managers provide the ideas or information with 
respect to strategy and the board members operate at a higher level. Board members 
exercise a higher level strategic role by either deciding to act on the advice or 
information from senior managers or they might decide to do something else. 
November explained in their interview, 
 
“While senior managers can make a recommendation or provide advice 
and information, it's really up to them [the board] to make that final 
direction. I think it's really important than when the board decides on 
strategic direction that senior management is actively involved in that, 
because we have a sense of what is and isn't possible”. 
The interviews shed light on why there was a challenge to distinguish between the 
board member strategic role and the senior manager strategic role in Burgundy. 
Observations of board meetings, committee meetings and strategic planning days 
reinforced this challenge, as it was evident that there was a strong emphasis on 
strategy from both board members and senior managers.  
 
Despite the significant emphasis on strategy from both the board and senior managers, 
observations revealed the occasions on which operational drift occurred were few. For 
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example, only during a handful of board and committee meetings did senior managers 
spend time on aspects that were deemed too detailed by the board. In every case, 
either the Board Chair or a board member would step in and in a respectful manner, 
point out that such conversations were operational and alerted the senior manager for 
the need to lift their analysis to the higher strategic level. A similar leadership 
approach to prevent operational drift was taken by the board members with	respect to 
formal reports tabled to the board by some senior managers. For instance, a customer 
service charter drafted by some senior managers and staff was returned to the senior 
managers because it was not pitched at the strategic level the board required. Also 
across board meetings observed, very rarely did the researcher observe board 
members venturing into operational discussions. On the rare occasion that a board 
member did, the Chair Alpha would take an active role in preventing time being spent 
on the issue and Alpha would request that such conversations take place outside of the 
board meeting.  
 
Observations of board and committee meetings and strategic planning days showed 
accountability was exercised at the individual board member level or the collective 
board level when managing operational drift. Individually, for example, the Chair 
would take an active role to prevent operational drift. Other board members exercised 
a similar role if the Chair did not acknowledge it. Alternatively, accountability at the 
collective level was exercised where more than one board member agreed that a 
discussion was becoming too managerial or a board paper needed to be pitched at a 
higher level for the board. 
 
Preventing operational drift through broad accountability 
Board members and senior managers held common views about how they respect the 
line between their roles and the roles of senior managers. The techniques discussed by 
board members were often not mutually exclusive. For example, trust between board 
members and senior managers was usually linked to the technique of gathering 
information. Table 7.1 below is divided into three groups of the techniques and 
associated accountabilities that board members use to reduce operational drift. Each 
of the three techniques and accountabilities are explained in more detail after the table 
using section headings that correspond with the techniques.  
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Table 7.1 Techniques and accountabilities to reduce operational drift 
Board member and senior 
manager perspectives that 
support the techniques and 
accountabilities (from 
interviews) 
 
Techniques/themes used 
to prevent operational 
drift (from observations 
and interviews) 
 
Associated broad 
accountability concepts 
Board members 
Juliet, Echo, Bravo, Charlie, 
Golf, India, Foxtrot 
 
Senior managers  
Mike, November, Lima 
 
 
Trust. 
Developing good 
relationships with senior 
managers through informal 
and formal accountability 
relationships. Trust in the 
abilities of each to 
communicate effectively 
and provide appropriate 
information. 
Information.  
Provision of the 
appropriate amount of 
information and accurate 
information. Understanding 
the two-way flow of 
information between the 
board and senior managers 
through the CEO. Upwards 
and downwards flow of 
information. A two-way 
obligation on both board 
members and senior 
managers with respect to 
the information provided 
and received. 
 
Negotiable 
accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upwards and 
downwards, formal and 
informal accountability. 
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Table 7.1 Techniques and accountabilities to reduce operational drift continued… 
Board member and senior 
manager perspectives that 
support the techniques and 
accountabilities (from 
interviews) 
 
Techniques/themes used 
to prevent operational 
drift (from observations 
and interviews) 
 
Associated broad 
accountability concepts 
Board members 
Foxtrot, Alpha, Juliet, Echo, 
Golf, Bravo 
 
Senior managers  
Mike, November, Delta, Kilo 
 
 
 
 
Being clear on board 
member and senior 
manager roles and scope.  
The board role is setting the 
broad, strategic direction. 
The board operates at the 
higher level. The senior 
manager role is 
implementing the strategic 
direction set by the board. 
The senior managers 
operate at the detailed, 
routine, day-to-day level. 
 
Knowledge and experience 
from the resource 
dependence role. 
Knowledge gained through 
training courses and 
research. Experience in both 
formal board settings and 
informal settings with board 
members and senior 
managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individualizing and 
socializing 
accountability, formal 
and informal 
accountability. 
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Table 7.1 Techniques and accountabilities to reduce operational drift continued… 
Limiting operational drift: how trust and information assist 
One of the most commonly occurring themes discussed in the interviews was the 
concept of trust between board members and senior managers. The broad 
accountability literature cites trust as an aspect of negotiable accountability 
(Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009; Sasso, 2003; Holland, 2002; Ospina, Diaz & 
O’Sullivan, 2002) however; the ways in which trust operates are not expressed in 
much more detail. While mentioned briefly in the broad accountability literature, this 
study gives the aspect of trust more attention and provides examples of trust in action. 
This responds to the comments from Sasso (2003, p.1489) that call for more 
theoretical and empirical research into trust in NFP governance. Sasso (2003) argues 
trust is critical in effective NFP boards and one way of achieving greater trust might 
be by increasing the number of inside directors that is, senior managers, on the board. 
Sasso (2003) acknowledges however that simply increasing inside directors on the 
NFP board is not sufficient. She explains that there also needs to be strong “internal 
working norms” that facilitate positive and constructive dialogue between the board 
and senior managers, which generates trust (Sasso, 2003, p.1541). 
 
Board member and senior 
manager perspectives that 
support the techniques and 
accountabilities (from 
interviews) 
 
Techniques/themes used 
to prevent operational 
drift (from observations 
and interviews) 
 
Associated broad 
accountability concepts 
Board members 
Juliet, India, Echo, Alpha 
Individual and collective 
accountability.  
Asking appropriate 
questions such as, “is this 
something I or we should be 
talking about?” 
 
Being cognisant of the 
mission of the organisation 
and asking questions such 
as “who are we serving?” 
 
Individualizing and 
socializing accountability. 
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The significance of providing and receiving the appropriate amount of information 
was also a technique that was commonly suggested in interviews to combat 
operational drift. There was a consensus between board members and senior 
managers that communication of information was a mutual responsibility and the 
negotiable accountability aspect of trust was often linked to information. For instance, 
many interviewees said trust was important in relation to information in terms of 
being able to trust that sufficient information was provided and that the information 
was accurate. Board member India said, 
“…a board is only as good as the information it’s given, and it’s very 
easy to deceive a board, that’s my own personal view, because, as I said, 
coming from the other side and being someone who’s written papers for 
a board, the board is trusting…” 
Information has also been cited in the board literature as a crucial element. Sasso 
(2003) argues,  
How effective the not-for-profit is…is ultimately driven by what information is 
presented in the boardroom and how the directors use that information to 
strategically position the institution within its operating environment on an 
ongoing basis (Sasso, 2003, p.1486).  
It became especially evident in interviews with board members and senior managers 
that having a trusting rapport between the two parties was essential to respecting each 
other’s roles. This trust related to the notion that each party could competently and 
reliably discharge their roles, that the information communicated was sufficient and 
accurate, and appropriate questions were asked when necessary.  
According to board member Echo, trust in the senior managers reduced the workload 
of board members so that they could focus on their roles, which operate at a higher 
level than senior managers. Echo also shared how board members exercise their role 
at a higher level by explaining that the board focuses on outcomes, not on the way 
that things get done by the senior managers: 
“The biggest issue to me is trust in the management ability. If you don’t 
have trust in the management to do their job, you’re then in a situation 
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where you’re overseeing almost everything they do, whereas if you trust 
what they’re doing, well, all the rest of it actually disappears, because 
you can say, what’s the outcomes? If the outcomes are what you are 
looking for, well, it doesn’t really matter how they do it”. 
Trust is relevant to the level of confidence the board members have in the senior 
managers to discharge their role competently. As Echo said, it does not really matter 
how the senior managers discharge their role, the board members are more interested 
in the outcomes. If it becomes apparent to the board that there are problems with how 
a senior manager reached an outcome, then the board members will look into it 
further. Senior manager November made a similar comment in their interview: 
“So I think that we're accountable to the board on not so much how we 
do it - I think it's more the outcome so that we get the outcomes that we 
should be getting…if we don't meet the vision and values of the 
organisation with the services that we provide, then it's the role of the 
board to be saying, 'You've not met that. Now we need to know what 
you're doing and how you're doing it…” 
To senior manager Mike, trust between senior managers and board members was 
essential because it enabled board members to make an assessment as to whether the 
organisation is being managed in an appropriate fashion: 
 
“…there’s that sort of trust element that needs to happen between senior 
management and directors to ensure that they’re obviously comfortable 
that the management is managing the business appropriately”. 
When trust is present between board members and senior managers, board member 
Juliet highlighted that it gives board members the confidence that they do not have to 
worry about the more detailed aspects of the organisation: 
“And I guess developing good relationships with management too, so 
they can almost say, “Well, that’s my job. I’ll make sure that happens. 
Don’t you worry about that”. 
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As explored in the preceding paragraphs, trust enabled the board members and senior 
managers to respect their roles because it instilled confidence in both parties that the 
requisite roles were being exercised by the appropriate people. Senior manager 
November explained that a prerequisite to board members effectively exercising their 
roles is that they rely on information provided by the senior management team and 
then they ask the appropriate questions.  
“And of course, to do that [exercise their roles], they need to, I believe, 
rely heavily on the senior management team in giving them that 
information to assist them do that”.   
Board member Echo highlights the importance of board members asking the right 
questions from information that has been provided to them: 
“The thing is to know what questions to ask. If you don’t know what 
questions to ask, that’s the old story, it’s not what you know, it’s what 
you don’t know”. 
It is incumbent on board members have to ask appropriate questions, including 
obtaining further information if necessary to inform their decision. There is also an 
obligation on senior managers to provide the appropriate amount of information as 
well as information that is accurate. Senior manager Mike argued while senior 
managers are responsible to a fair extent for the provision of information to the board, 
the responsibility also rests with the board to request the appropriate and relevant 
information from senior managers: 
“I think an important part of the board’s job is to get the information 
they need to make sure that the organisation’s in a good position…it’s 
really important that there’s some control aspect going the other way in 
terms of making them [the board] accountable or responsible for what 
they want and why and being really clear about what they want”. 
The ways in which board members requested further information occurred formally at 
a board meeting or informally outside of the boardroom. This highlights the exercise 
of formal and informal accountability. While board members are responsible for 
seeking more information, the structural governance change to the board explained in 
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the previous chapter had an effect on information from the senior manager 
perspective. Many comments were made by senior managers in interviews that they 
felt the connection with the board had been diminished as they were removed from 
board meetings and relied solely on the CEO to provide information to them from 
board meetings. Most senior managers not only expressed frustration with the change 
but also explained how they managed the new structural arrangement. It became 
evident that they adopted coping techniques. These coping techniques were about 
fostering good relationships with board members so that if context or clarification was 
required, they could contact the board member to check. For instance, senior manager 
Mike commented, 
“…if you can have an ally, you know, you then – it makes it easier to go 
to a board meeting or a subcommittee meeting with a proposal or 
whatever, or to make sure you’re on the right track”.  
Having a trusted colleague on the board where senior managers could clarify things 
appeared to work in a similar way for board members. Board member India displayed 
a similar sentiment to senior manager Mike about having trust in senior managers and 
board members to help with issues that directors might not understand or in which 
they might not have much experience: 
“…so [the Chair of the Finance and Audit Committee] and [Senior 
Manager Finance] are both really great with answering any questions 
that you have because sometimes there’s things you don’t need to hold up 
the board meeting with it, it’s just little nuances that you don’t quite 
understand as opposed to issues that you have”. 
It became evident that senior managers and board members valued positive working 
relationships as it enabled questions to be asked or clarification sought when required. 
This worked in both directions: from senior managers to board members and board 
members to senior managers. 
Both comments from Mike and India show informal accountability being exercised by 
a senior manager and board member respectively. Informal accountability in this 
instance is asking questions from trusted colleagues in an informal setting. Informal 
settings include telephone conversations or coffee meetings. Usually informal 
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meetings were had so either a senior manager or board member can gain more context 
to help with communication or decision-making. This can be argued to be socializing 
accountability in action.  
On some occasions, it became apparent during meetings that informal meetings had 
been had between board members and senior managers. For example, during 
discussion of an item about work, health and safety (WH&S), the relevant senior 
manager declared that they and the CEO had discussions with a board member on a 
number of occasions about WH&S reports. They said the discussions were conducted 
over the telephone and email. Another example of informal accountability being 
exercised was acknowledged during a committee meeting where the Chair of the 
Aged Care and Property Committee said that they had had “informal conversations” 
with another board member about the Risk Appetite Framework. Such informal 
accountability practices not only help board members or senior managers clarify or 
ask more questions, it also has the additional benefit of saving board time for other 
agenda items by not holding up the meeting with questions about a specific item. 
Some board members and senior managers provided the view that by engaging in 
informal activities outside the boardroom, trust and camaraderie between both parties 
would be increased. This supports the notion of socializing accountability in action. 
For instance, senior manager November explained that when she took the new Board 
Chair on a site tour, she found the time spent to be valuable as it generated a rapport 
between her and the Chair: 
“When Alpha took on as the chair of the board, I actually spent a day 
with Alpha and took Alpha around to some of our sites, and we sat down 
and had a chat, and then we took off and visited sites. That was really, 
really good.  You know, I felt that helped build a relationship with Alpha. 
And you know, I feel reasonably comfortable chatting with Alpha”. 
Board member Bravo viewed relationships with senior managers to be valuable in 
fostering trust. Bravo argued that building a rapport between senior managers and 
board members could also occur formally, in the boardroom. Bravo provided the 
example prior to the governance change where the structure of the board was such 
 194 
that senior managers also attended. Bravo said that she preferred the previous 
structure as it:  
“…fostered the camaraderie and the joint roles that we each have”. 
With the governance change and the structure of the board changing, it was evident 
that board members and senior managers adapted by engaging in more informal 
activity outside of the boardroom. For example, Mike and India’s comments above 
about exercising informal and socializing accountability by contacting their trusted 
colleagues to ask further questions or request more information. 
 
Board member Golf argued that good relationships between board members was vital. 
Golf gave the example of a suggestion from the Board Chair who mentioned that the 
board members could occasionally go out for dinner after board meetings had 
concluded. Golf was very supportive of the idea because: 
 
“I think you just need to know each other and be able to laugh with each 
other and converse, and it’s really to keep building the relationships. We 
don’t have to be best friends, in fact we shouldn't be best friends…” 
The data shows that information to the board from the senior managers and 
information requested from the board is a two-way role and it is most effective when 
there is trust between both parties. For example, trust eliminates suspicion from board 
members that they are not receiving adequate or accurate information. Trust also 
encourages dialogue with senior managers, usually in the form of questions, if board 
members need to clarify an aspect of information that has been provided.  
Trust is an aspect of negotiable accountability. With regard to trust and information, it 
is evident that there is accountability that is being negotiated between the board 
members and the senior managers. According to Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002, 
p.9), this type of relationship can be characterised as professional. This is because the 
rapport between senior managers and board members is the board negotiating 
accountability with its internal stakeholder – its senior staff. The two-way 
responsibility between board members and senior managers could also be expressed 
as upwards and downwards accountability. The upwards accountability is exercised 
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by the senior managers reporting upwards to the board through the CEO. The 
downwards accountability is exercised by the board members who are responsible for 
communicating any questions or requesting any further information to help them 
make a decision. Finally, accountability of board members and senior managers is 
exercised both formally (individualizing) and informally (socializing) when it comes 
to trust and information. In formal settings, questions are asked at board and 
committee meetings. In informal settings, questions are usually asked either at a 
coffee or lunch meeting or on the telephone. In summary, there are several aspects of 
broad accountability that operate to facilitate trust and information between board 
members and senior managers. 
Limiting operational drift: knowledge and experience aids understanding roles 
and scope  
Understanding the roles and scope of board member and senior manager roles was 
another common technique raised in interviews to observe the line between board and 
senior manager roles. Many board members and senior managers showed they 
understood the distinction between the two roles. In interviews, it was often said that 
board members exercise a higher level role compared to senior managers. This higher 
level thinking requires board members to look at present and past information, to 
assess outcomes and to plan for the future. Senior managers on the other hand, are 
responsible for exercising a role that covers the day-to-day operations of the 
organisation. Board members explained in interviews that they gained this 
understanding through knowledge and experience.  
The findings from this study confirm those of Cornforth (2001) with respect to 
managing operational drift. Cornforth (2001, p.217) argues that board effectiveness in 
NFP organisations is achieved by having clearly defined board roles and senior 
manager roles and ensuring that board members have “the time, skills and experience 
to do the job”. The current study highlights the importance of board members 
acquiring knowledge and experience. Board members explained in interviews that 
knowledge and experience was often gained through exposure to board work, 
governance training and research about how the board members and senior managers 
work together. The present investigation also found that many board members had a 
strong view that it is important to be clear on board members’ and senior managers’ 
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roles and scope, as this could limit operational drift. This study underscores the 
importance of having board members who possess the knowledge and experience 
about roles in governance, as it enables them to challenge how meetings are being run 
(Cornforth, 2001, p.355). 
It became evident both in interviews and observations that board members had to 
draw upon the aspects of the resource dependence role of the board member to 
manage operational drift. Recall that the resource dependence role of board members 
requires them to possess appropriate skills, knowledge, networks and experience. The 
aspects of resource dependence that were harnessed to prevent operational drift were 
knowledge and experience. Knowledge appeared to be acquired through training. For 
instance, there were opportunities available to directors to up-skill through the AICD 
courses to equip board members with knowledge about how their roles function. The 
CEO sometimes mentioned upcoming AICD courses to directors in board meetings. 
On some occasions, the CEO would provide handouts to board members outlining the 
AICD training opportunities available. Furthermore, it was discovered through 
interviews with some board members that there were in-house training courses 
available from the parent body that oversees Burgundy. Board members remarked 
that such training programs were valuable. Board member Juliet gave examples of the 
courses available including:  
“…training sessions you can do on the role of a board or board 
membership, financial accountability and the ethos of the [parent 
body]”. 
Board members explained that knowledge could also be gathered by undertaking 
research, asking questions and being exposed to board and committee meetings.  
Many board members shared the view held by board member Bravo about knowledge 
and training. Bravo explained that it is largely an individual responsibility to pursue 
knowledge and training. If however, more than one board member neglects this 
responsibility, it also has a negative effect on the board as a collective whole. Bravo 
outlined the opportunities available for board members to learn new things: 
“…there are opportunities, I think, to train and up-skill board members 
in some of those more complex areas. Having said that, it’s important to 
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inform yourself as well and to ask questions and to speak with people 
who can assist if you’re struggling with a particular area. We have had 
board members that have done AICD courses and that sort of thing, and 
of course [Burgundy’s parent body] runs some training programs”. 
Bravo’s comment above also highlights the individualizing aspect of accountability 
inherent in knowledge and training. Bravo suggested that it is incumbent on the board 
member themselves to know their limitations and assess their weaknesses, and if 
necessary, ask more questions or seek assistance from those who can help. 
Experience was also said to be a crucial element in assisting board members to 
observe the line between their roles and those of senior managers. Experience could 
be gained through exposure to the current board or experience in other board settings, 
as many of the board members had been or were also members of boards for other 
organisations. The youngest board member India, explained how experience over the 
years on Burgundy’s board has helped them distinguish between the operational and 
the higher level aspects: 
“I’ve worked this out more over the years, is which things that I can just 
email and ask, and which things I’d rather raise at the meetings, it might 
be a broader issue for other people. That takes a bit of working out, 
really, which things are just operational, and what does this mean?” 
India’s comment also reveals how board members work out whether a question is 
worth raising formally at the meeting or informally through avenues such as emailing 
the relevant senior manager. This illustrates the exercise of formal and informal 
accountability in preventing operational drift. It appeared that the exercise of this role 
required judgment, as it might not always be appropriate to ask questions in the 
formal context of a board meeting. As India suggested, raising a question in an 
informal setting might be more appropriate if it was an area where the board member 
felt they were not comfortable and perhaps required more detail to understand it 
compared to other board members. 
Most of the interviews with board members and senior managers revealed that 
experience could also be attained through working in the sector. This could be in 
another capacity as a senior manager or a consultant. Experience could also be 
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attained through business. It became evident that experienced board members were 
not only confined to experience in board activities. If they came from a managerial 
role for example, this would help them appreciate the operational aspects and they 
were likely to be more attuned to distinguishing between operational roles and higher 
level roles. Board member Echo shared their view that instead of seeking board 
members with specific skills such as an Accountant or a Lawyer, in their view, it is 
more suitable to have board members who: 
“…actually know, have got some really good industry knowledge, I think, 
people who have been good business people, people who really know the 
skills of running a business, because that’s what we’re talking about…As 
long as we’ve got people who really understand how to run a business, 
you can always go out and get someone to advise you on the specific 
skills that you really need”. 
The above quotation from Echo also illustrates the board member being required to 
operate at a level higher than the detailed management level of senior managers. In 
the interview with Echo, they explained that in their view, there is a common 
misconception that board members need specific skills. On the other hand, Echo 
suggested that the specific skills could be a limitation as it might encourage the board 
member to become managerial in their approach rather than considering the broader 
issues. This example shows that board members again can limit operational drift by 
drawing upon their experience in ways that broadens a board members’ ability to be 
able to think at a higher level. 
Limiting operational drift: using aspects from the resource dependence role 
While some aspects of the resource dependence role have been shown to prevent 
operational drift, it is important to recognise that there are aspects of the role where 
operational drift can occur. As Stiles and Taylor (2001) point out, the boundary 
spanning aspect of the role, which has also been referred to as the networks and 
resources aspects, can encourage operational drift due to closeness of the roles in both 
the board and management realms. While the researcher observed both board 
members and senior managers exercising boundary spanning – where they would 
suggest strategic partnerships and alliances with other organisations – there were no 
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notable instances where this generated a conflict between senior managers’ roles and 
board member roles. As there was little evidence of operational drift in the resource 
dependence realm, perhaps future studies can examine this aspect more closely. 
The following example outlines how board members exercised their resource 
dependence role, by confining their role to the higher level aspects of strategic 
alliances and partnership analysis. For example, at a board meeting, a strategic KPI 
reporting document from senior managers was tabled which outlined 82 strategic 
alliances and partnerships Burgundy had with similar organisations. Some brief detail 
about the outcomes of the alliances and partnerships was also provided. The board 
examined the document and requested further information about how the outcomes 
had been met. The board members also suggested that one aspect of the document be 
presented to the board in detail. A decision was made that the CEO would present on 
the topic of the consumer directed care model for aged care at a board meeting in two 
months’ time.  
After two months elapsed, the CEO provided a paper to the board that they wrote with 
another senior manager and the Chairs of the Risk Committee and Aged Care and 
Property Committee. Some of the principal aspects of the paper covered key 
performance areas and risk appetite descriptors for the consumer directed model of 
aged care. The CEO also provided a verbal report to the board detailing the strategic 
KPI reporting for the new model of consumer directed aged care. As the analysis of 
strategic alliances and partnerships was then at the outcomes level that the board 
expected, the item for discussion was noted and accepted by the board. 
The interviews and observations revealed that board members value knowledge and 
experience as two techniques from the resource dependence role that they can draw 
upon to limit operational drift. Inherent in knowledge and experience is an 
individualizing accountability aspect where it is incumbent on the board member 
themselves to assess their weaknesses or areas where they feel they are lacking. 
Documents tabled at the board meeting such as the yearly review of board member 
skills helped board members make this assessment. Another concept of broad 
accountability was revealed in the resource dependence aspect of experience. This 
concept was socializing accountability. It occurred when a board member would 
determine whether they ask further questions in a formal setting at a meeting or 
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request more information informally outside of the boardroom. Such a process could 
be characterised as socializing accountability as board members would engage in 
face-to-face discussions or dialog through telephone conversations about topics the 
board member deemed important to pursue.  
While other aspects of the resource dependence role such as resources and networks 
can be said to create the conditions conducive to operational behaviour, the board 
members in Burgundy showed a strong understanding of their roles and scope and 
rarely appeared to encounter difficulties in observing the line. The board members 
had also showed an ability to work together in a similar realm with senior managers 
such as strategy. This ability to work closely with senior managers in both the 
resource dependence and strategic roles was facilitated by the use of techniques 
previously outlined in table 7.1 above. This includes exercising techniques that foster 
trust between directors and senior managers, assessing information and determining 
how to acquire more if necessary, acquiring knowledge through training and 
experience, and exercising accountability individually and collectively. 
Limiting operational drift individually and collectively 
Having an awareness of the roles expected from a board member and a sense of 
individual accountability was a technique used by directors to make the distinction 
between the higher level and the operational aspects of board work. A common 
question posed by board members during board and committee meetings and strategic 
planning days was “who are we serving?” According to Sasso (2003, p.1508) such 
questions are important in facilitating trust: “…if it is not clear what purpose(s) the 
board is serving, there is no basis for trust…”  
The board began to ask questions such as “who are we serving?” with increasing 
frequency after a report from external consultants was tabled to the board which 
encouraged the board members to frequently consider their mission and who they 
were serving. The question “who are we serving?” was often asked in two contexts. 
One of these contexts was when the board engaged in analysis of their current 
services. The other context was when board members assessed the capacity of the 
organisation to provide services in the future. It appeared that active and vocal 
questioning enabled the board to focus on its mission and values, allowing this to 
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inform decision-making as to whether current services were appropriate or whether 
service delivery in other areas was required. 
The question about the people the organisation was serving was also raised when the 
finances of the organisation were reviewed for current services. It appeared that the 
use of this questioning technique appeared to keep the board members focused on the 
mission of the organisation so that analyses were not as simplistic as making a 
quantitative assessment that a service was underperforming. For example, when 
analysing financial reports of aged care services during a Finance and Audit 
Committee meeting, the Board Chair and the Chair of the Finance and Audit 
Committee acknowledged that one aspect of their home care packages was not 
generating any profit. The Chair said the way to view the figures for the service was 
to consider whom that home care package was serving. In other words, was the home 
care package servicing a part of the market that was congruent with Burgundy’s 
mission? If so, that would prevent the committee from making a recommendation to 
the board to discontinue its services. The Chair of the Finance and Audit Committee 
agreed and commented that in some cases a profit might not be made for activities. 
The example of board members questioning who Burgundy was serving has 
illustrated the use of individual and collective awareness and accountability. This 
technique of thinking aloud had an individual effect but it also had a collective 
accountability effect where it would prompt other board members to analyse the 
situation using a similar lens. These two effects can be argued to be individualizing 
and socializing accountability in action. 
Some board members said that they found asking themselves questions about the 
relevance of board discussions was an effective way of preventing the drift into 
management roles. Like the question “who are we serving?”, this was a form of 
individualizing accountability in action. Board member Juliet described in an 
interview how s(he) respected the line between their role and that of senior managers: 
“I think that’s something that you’ve always got to be asking yourself, 
“Is this something we should actually be even talking about?” or just 
expressing a view to management that we’re interested in that and we’d 
like to see a report on it or something, but not getting too involved in 
that. There’s a bit of a fuzzy line, I suppose, between what people 
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consider strategic and what people consider, no, that’s what 
management are there for, not us. So just at least being aware of that and 
making sure that we don’t cross over the line too much”. 
In summary, accountability was exercised both at the individual level and the 
collective level when it came to managing operational drift. Observations of meetings 
showed that accountability occurred where board members would think aloud by 
posing questions or they would ask themselves the question. In the cases where board 
members would think aloud at meetings, this showed accountability being exercised 
at the individual level and also the collective level. It appeared when board members 
asked questions vocally, it also had a collective effect on the other board members, 
prompting them to consider the question if they had not already done so. Such a 
practice has both a individualizing and socializing accountability effect. Alternatively, 
if a board member asked themselves questions, it could be said this was a form of 
individualizing accountability. If enough board members asked the appropriate 
questions of themselves, this could be argued to have a collective accountability effect 
too. 
Operational drift in control and the resource dependence role 
To this point, the current chapter has addressed how board members manage 
operational drift when exercising their strategic and resource dependence roles. This 
section will explore how board members observe their roles and those of senior 
managers when exercising the control role.  
 
There is a common set of techniques board members use to stay on their side of the 
line with respect to exercising their three principal roles. As explained earlier in this 
chapter, the techniques include: trust and information, understanding the roles and 
scope of board members and senior managers through knowledge and experience, and 
individual and collective accountability. When board members exercised their control 
roles, they also used these techniques. Control in the context of the present study can 
be classified as financial control, risk management and control monitoring (Parker, 
2007a). 
 
 203 
There was strong engagement in control monitoring in the present investigation. This 
was especially evident in the areas of financial control where board members would 
generally ask questions of financial reports and budgets in board meetings and 
committee meetings. An example of such a question was from a board member who 
asked: 
“How come so much was budgeted for a branding specialist and we’ve 
only used a portion of it?”  
The response from the CEO was that senior manager Lima took on the role instead, 
saving money for Burgundy. An example of another question was:  
 
“Why is the revaluation so lumpy?”  
The senior manager responsible, Mike responded,  
 
“We do it every four years. It’s standard procedure. We can do it more 
regularly, say every year or two years but there is a cost involved”.  
Risk management and operational control were other areas of control exercised by 
board members during board meetings and committee meetings. The following 
example shows board members working collectively to prevent a decision being made 
on a proposal to redevelop an existing aged care site.  
The proposal was submitted to the board by senior manager Mike and consisted of a 
written report to the board detailing the proposed redevelopment plan, timetable, 
budget, financial evaluations, and potential demand. The board also heard a verbal 
report from Mike. More than half of the board members (six out of nine) expressed 
concern about the project in terms of risk and finances. Board member India was 
unsure about the projected demand for the redeveloped site. India commented,  
“There are operating losses for every aged care site projected by the 
consultants on p.xx of their report. This is staggering. How can this be?”  
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Some board members explained this was due to the capital and operational 
improvements that had been made to aged care. Another board member Golf 
exclaimed,  
“Eight million dollars for redeveloping the site is a lot of money”.  
Senior manager Mike responded by saying, 
“The proposal is consistent with the consultants’ report to redevelop and 
to expand the organisation’s market share”.  
Golf asked whether the Board would receive a Business Case. Mike replied,  
“If required, sure”.  
Mike continued:  
“The redevelopment of [the site] will be like [another recent 
redevelopment for an aged care site] therefore the documentation will be 
similar”.  
Board member Echo agreed with Golf’s concerns and said that in their opinion  
“The decision is premature”.  
Echo was Chair of the Finance and Audit Committee. Echo contented:  
“It is advisable that there is a task force to consider this proposal”.  
Foxtrot supported the position of their fellow board members, stating:  
“The benefits and risks of moving straight away [on this decision] need 
to be better assessed. It is clear we have to move on this but perhaps we 
have a strategy to dictate how we move forward?” 
Board member Charlie agreed and expressed their view that the proposal should be 
considered at the Strategic Planning Day in a month’s time.  
What this example illustrates is that by exercising financial control, risk management 
and operational control, most board members collectively worked to postpone a 
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decision on the proposal until they could receive more information and consider the 
plan in more detail. It was evident that the cost and scale of the project warranted the 
board receiving a greater level of detail and more time to analyse the proposal before 
it would approve the redevelopment plans.  
The above example shows board members exercising the questioning technique and 
seeking more appropriate information from senior managers. The type of broad 
accountability present in this scenario is upward accountability, where the board 
members are questioning senior managers and seeking more appropriate information 
from them. It could also be argued that trust is present in the questioning and seeking 
of more information because the manner of such questions and information requests 
were conducted in a respectful manner. Therefore, negotiable accountability existed 
in this scenario between the two parties – board members and senior managers. 
Interviews with board members highlighted the ways that knowledge and experience 
helps them distinguish between the operational and the higher level aspects of control. 
For example, board member Foxtrot described that board members work at the higher 
level of management control systems to ensure and monitor that the organisation is 
compliant with legislation, contracts, accounting standards and accreditation. 
 
“Well, you don’t get involved in the management of it but you might, so 
as we do, have an annual report around the organisation’s strategic risk 
framework. Or you might have a report around the health and safety 
committee, so that you have a mechanism for ensuring that those controls 
are in HR [Human Resources] practices or work, health and safety”. 
The senior managers also demonstrated that they appreciated the difference between 
the higher level aspects of control and the operational aspects. It can be argued that it 
was also essential for senior managers to understand the distinction between their 
roles and board roles. A shared or mutual understanding between the senior managers 
and board members of their roles appeared to increase the efficiency of the work from 
both parties. Senior manager Mike provided an example to underscore the difference 
in how senior managers exercise control compared to the board members: 
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“If I’m looking at property or IT [Information Technology] then I’m 
looking at what are our security levels like and customer service levels 
and risk and all that sort of stuff, so I’m making sure that from a day to 
day perspective that we’ve got all those things in place. Whereas the 
board just needs to make sure that something is actually in place. So I 
think there’s a lot of similarities but I think the board needs to look at the 
overall framework and make sure the framework is right, and therefore 
they’re getting regular reports on that framework and the success of 
that…” 
Senior manager November explained that while there are similarities between the 
board member and senior manager roles with respect to control, they could be 
distinguished by the level of control that is exercised. November remarked that from a 
board member perspective, this is done by looking at the outcomes of controls in 
areas such as risk management, WH&S, and quality. Observations confirmed that the 
Risk Committee and the board were the main forums were the board members made 
assessments about the outcomes of controls. Interviews of senior managers revealed 
that the operational aspects of controls are exercised at various levels in the 
organisation from the staff and middle managers’ level up to the senior managers. 
With respect to operational control matters, November commented, 
 
“…the board can't know all these things. They have to rely on senior 
management. Senior management has to rely on managers, you know, 
like, it's - you know, we're all reliant on each other”. 
The aspect of reliance in November’s comment above reveals the theme of trust 
between management and the board. Trust in this context means board members and 
senior managers trust each other to competently carry out their designated roles. In 
addition, if trust is present between board members and senior managers, it operates 
to facilitate the effective two-way exchange of appropriate information. Broad 
accountability aspects of negotiable accountability and upwards and downwards 
accountability feature in this example. Trust is derived from negotiable accountability 
and is present in the exercise of board and senior manager roles in control. Upwards 
and downwards accountability occurs in the two-way exchange of information 
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between the senior managers up to the board and the board downwards to the senior 
managers.  
It was often argued by board members that it was somewhat easier to distinguish 
board member roles in control from those of senior managers. This was due to the 
more clearly defined rules and regulations in the control realm. The perspective from 
board member Golf illustrated the common feeling among the board members:  
“I think this is more an area where having defined directions and 
accountabilities, we should be a much lighter touch”. 
The Board Chair, Alpha, provided a similar perspective about board member roles in 
control. In their view, Alpha saw the board member control role as “very clear”. 
Alpha explained that board member roles in control revolve around monitoring 
financial and service operations, managing risks and evaluating outcomes. 
Observations of meetings enabled the researcher to provide examples in the areas 
listed by Alpha. An example of financial monitoring is where board members keep 
track of expenditure and investments. An example of monitoring service operations is 
evaluating the organisation’s performance in service delivery. Risk management 
usually occurred in the board’s evaluation of proposals to undertake new projects. 
Evaluating outcomes was central to assessing the results of annual audits, the 
outcomes of accreditation processes, and WH&S reports.  
In their comment about the control role of board members, Board Chair Alpha 
highlighted an aspect of the control role that belongs to senior managers: 
“I suppose are the reports that come to the board around our 
accreditation processes, so that every time a service is accredited there 
should be in place a continuous improvement loop, in terms of learning 
from that. Now, that’s a management task, and really all the board wants 
to know in terms of control is around managing the risks, so I think the 
risk framework which we have is a very good checklist in terms of a lot of 
those controls and making sure that those controls, whether they’re 
financial or service-operation oriented, are managed properly”. 
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The risk framework document referred to by Alpha was a high level document that 
originated from the Risk Committee and was designed by the Chair of the Risk 
Committee and the relevant senior manager with input from the Risk Committee. The 
researcher witnessed the draft risk management checklist being circulated among the 
other committees and the board to obtain their view of the document and seek further 
input. After some changes and refinements, the risk framework document was 
finalised by the Risk Committee and approved by the board. The risk framework was 
a tool used by board members to keep thinking about risk at the higher level. This tool 
served many purposes but the relevant one in this context is that it prevented 
operational drift with respect to risk discussions and decisions.  
 
The examples so far have shown how board members use the techniques of trust, 
information and understanding roles and scope to limit operational drift. This section 
will now explore the technique of individual and collective accountability and 
consider how this was exercised in the board member control role. 
 
The interview with board member India revealed the use of the technique of 
individual accountability when exercising control. In comments about the governance 
change to the board meetings, India shared personal hopes and trepidation about the 
change. To eliminate the unease being experiencing with respect to the change, India 
decided to exercise a degree of control by undertaking research and making his/her 
own assessments outside of the boardroom. India explained that (s)he contacted the 
senior managers who could no longer attend the board meetings, 
 
“…just to talk to them about, to get their views on what they think the 
opportunities are coming up, what are the risks for the organisation. I 
met individually with each of them and I found that really useful, that 
was something I just wanted to do for myself, but I think that picks up 
some of that control. So, I suppose for me, how I exercise that control is 
to try and have a fairly good understanding of the organisation”. 
India’s perspective reveals that the discretion that board members have with regard to 
following up on a particular issue is a form of control. Revisiting the section in this 
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be recalled that judgment was exercised by board members when deciding whether to 
follow up on an issue formally or informally. The exercise of judgment or discretion 
can be argued to be an aspect of the control role just as the exercise of knowledge and 
experience can be argued to come from the resource dependence role. The 
significance of this finding is that certain aspects of board member roles can assist in 
preventing operational drift. Previous analysis has explained how knowledge and 
experience from resource dependence limit operational drift. Similarly, the exercise of 
judgment or discretion in determining whether to follow up on an issue and in what 
way is an aspect of the board member control role being exercised to respect the line 
between working at a lower or higher level. 
 
Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter address the three RQs for this study. The strategic role, 
control role and resource dependence role are all covered in this analysis of how 
board members prevent operational drift when exercising their three roles. The 
chapter opened by explaining why the strategic role was one of the most challenging 
roles for board members to prevent operational drift from occurring. Observations 
from meetings and interviews with board members and senior managers revealed that 
in the recent past Burgundy had a propensity to focus on lower level operational 
aspects but there was a strong desire for change. This desire was encouraged by a 
review of the organisation by a governance expert and supported by the new Board 
Chair as well as most board members and senior managers. The focus on lifting to a 
more strategic emphasis at both the board and organisational levels meant that both 
the board and senior managers had to discharge strategic roles to a large extent. 
Therefore, it was vital that board members and senior managers took particular care 
not to drift into each other’s respective roles with respect to strategy. 
The ways in which board members prevented transgressing into senior manager roles 
in strategy, control and resource dependence was found to consist of using various 
techniques. These were: trust, information and accountability, being clear on board 
members’ and senior managers’ roles and scope through knowledge and experience, 
and exercising individual and collective awareness and accountability. Data analysis 
has found that inherent in the exercise of these techniques were a number of broad 
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accountabilities including trust (negotiable accountability), upwards and downwards 
accountability, individualizing and socializing accountability, and formal and 
informal accountability practices.  
In addition to identifying the techniques which board members used to prevent 
operational drift, this chapter finds that aspects of the resource dependence and 
control roles can assist in preventing operational drift. This is a novel contribution. 
More specifically, the knowledge and experience aspects of the resource dependence 
role provide board members with the tools to identify if operational drift is occurring 
and how to prevent it. In addition, the action of following up and the exercise of 
judgment and discretion as to how the follow up will be exercised is an aspect of the 
board member control role that works to deal with operational drift in an appropriate 
manner. For instance, if a specific board member feels they need more detail for their 
own peace of mind, they can exercise discretion to follow the issue up with the 
appropriate people informally without using time at a board or committee meeting.  
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CHAPTER 8: THE CONTROL ROLE OF BOARD MEMBERS 
 
Introduction 
This study reveals board members frequently enacting formal and negotiable 
accountability when exercising their control role. This chapter addresses RQ 2 which 
asks what is the board member control role and how is it enacted in the NFP context? 
The areas of control exercised by board members were financial control, risk 
management and operational control (Parker, 2008). This chapter argues that the 
enactment of control often involved the exercise of formal and negotiable 
accountability. Formal and negotiable accountability were usually enacted so that 
board members could demonstrate to stakeholders that the organisation was 
financially and operationally sustainable as well as achieving its mission and values. 
By communicating this narrative with supporting evidence, Burgundy was able to 
project an image of the board and organisation being reputable, thereby instilling 
confidence in its stakeholders. Trust is suggested to generate confidence, which in 
turn, facilitates effective relationships (Sasso, 2003). Relationships in this context are 
professional or political (Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002, p.9). Professional 
relationships were those the board had with internal stakeholders such as managers 
and staff. Political relationships included those the board had with external 
stakeholders such as the government. 
Additionally, it became evident that the combination of formal and negotiable 
accountability practices served another purpose – it helped the board limit mission 
drift. By increasing the formality of the organisation as well as being conscious of 
how the organisation’s mission and values were achieved, the effect was that control 
and strategic discussions were often brought back to the core values of the 
organisation. This practice prevented the board members slipping into a purely 
commercial mode to the detriment of its NFP mission and values. The researcher 
witnessed a strong focus on both control and strategy being exercised by board 
members as well as the discharge of formal and negotiable accountability practices. 
There were a number of external and internal drivers that underpinned Burgundy’s 
desire to project an image of a responsible entity with a good reputation. Internally, 
there was a strong sense that Burgundy needed to update its NFP model from an out-
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dated form of operations to a more contemporary NFP model. References to this 
phenomenon will also be framed as the “old NFP model” and the “new NFP model”.  
Conversations at board and committee levels, strategic planning days, interviews and 
meeting documents all revealed the board’s desire to lead a change from the 
organisation’s previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model. The need to be 
more strategic was encouraged by external factors such as government policy change, 
increases in the demand for services and the trend for NFPs to formalise their 
governance and accountability processes in response to increasing community 
expectations from NFPs. Internal factors that encouraged the strategically refocused 
model included the effect of a governance review, recommendations about the future 
of the organisation’s services and the new Board Chair.  
The combination of negotiable accountability and formal accountability exercised by 
board members produced a practice that the researcher calls “blended control”. In 
other words, control was blended with strategy and its exercise incorporated formal 
and negotiable accountability practices. Blended control is a new finding that adds to 
and goes beyond the findings of Morrison and Salipante (2007) with respect to 
blended strategising. Blended control is discussed further in this chapter with 
examples from meetings and interviews in support. 
The chapter commences by analysing observations of board members and associated 
documentation that reveals Burgundy’s transition from a former NFP model to a more 
contemporary strategic model. The section that follows considers how the external 
environment encouraged the change to the strategically refocused model. The 
subsequent section describes the internal factors that also drove the change to the 
strategically refocused model, while the following section provides the example of 
board member remuneration to illustrate the change from the previous NFP model to 
the strategically refocused model. The next section then reports the finding that 
formal and negotiable accountability occurred when board members exercised their 
control role. It analyses the reasons why there was a focus on formal and negotiable 
accountability including the need to generate trust and confidence among Burgundy’s 
stakeholders, as well as preventing mission drift. The subsequent section describes the 
phenomenon of blended control that was observed to take place in the present study. 
It provides the example of how the board wished to increase its legitimacy through 
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improved communication and monitoring of its accreditation and compliance 
standards. A more detailed example of the practice of blended control is evident in the 
example of Burgundy’s branding and organisational profile change in the next 
section. Another section considers the challenges that arose from the transition to the 
strategically refocused model and how this was managed through change 
management. The chapter closes with a section about board members who 
“champion” particular control topics (Parker, 2007a, p.1468) and the exercise of 
individual and collective accountability that was observed to occur as a result of the 
championing practice. 
Old to new: from the previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model 
Conversations at board and committee meetings revealed a shift from a former style 
NFP organisation that was operationally focused to a more contemporary, strategic 
and accountable NFP entity. This will also be referred to as the transition from the 
“old NFP model” to the new “NFP model”. Formal accountability was exercised by 
the board’s focus on ensuring relevant rules and standards were met. For example, all 
board members had to complete compulsory WH&S training. Negotiable 
accountability featured when the board would use various mediums to communicate 
with external and internal stakeholders during the transition to a more contemporary 
NFP entity.  
Document analysis and observations revealed that the board would communicate with 
its stakeholders through different mediums. Communication to external parties was 
mainly through public publications such as a quarterly magazine produced by the 
organisation or annual reports. Communication to internal parties was often through 
memoranda or meetings. Burgundy’s communication with their stakeholder groups 
was a way of reassuring stakeholders that their funds were being applied in 
accordance with the organisation’s mission. The present investigation confirms 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan’s (2002) similar findings with respect to the 
considerable value NFP organisations place on communication with stakeholder 
groups.  
A comment from the CEO, Delta, illustrates the common perspective shared by senior 
managers and the board that they are accountable to their stakeholder groups, largely 
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for the funds they receive and how they are applied. Delta explained in an interview 
that they believe giving the community access to the CEO through an “open door 
policy” helps foster trust and confidence in the community with respect to the 
organisation’s services. Delta remarked, 
“The community includes taxpayers, and a lot of the money that we run 
our services with is taxpayer money”.  
An important part of the narrative to stakeholder groups was the reassurance that the 
NFP entity is accountable not only for the resources stakeholders provide but it is also 
accountable for its mission and values. Burgundy’s focus on communicating its 
mission and values seemed especially warranted during the transition it made from its 
previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model. During an interview with 
board member Foxtrot, they argued that NFPs and FPs are similar in their practices of 
governance and management, but differ with respect to their stakeholder groups, the 
priority given to them and the mission and values of the entity. Foxtrot’s perspective 
is representative of the view of most board members in the present study. Foxtrot 
argues what makes an NFP distinctive is: 
“it’s not there to make money for its shareholders…[it’s] who it’s there 
to serve. And that comes back to the expression of that through its 
mission and constitution. And that comes back to its accountability to 
itself”. 
As outlined in the Literature Review chapter, a primary difference between NFP 
organisations and FP entities is their mission and values. Unlike FP entities, NFP 
missions and values are often philanthropic and not geared toward making a profit. 
Therefore, an NFP board has an additional challenge of ensuring it is accountable for 
discharging its mission and values as well as being operationally and financially 
sustainable.  
 
The challenge to balance Burgundy’s mission with the need to be more commercial 
was evident in board and committee meetings. For example, at a Risk Committee 
meeting, a draft risk appetite document was being reviewed. While reviewing the risk 
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appetite document, the CEO argued that there needed to be an important addition to 
the document. This addition was: 
“…a checklist for the board…that shows that we are: first, true to our 
values, second, [financially and operationally] sustainable, and three, 
innovative”. 
 The CEO continued by explaining that “these three factors should be part of the 
board’s lens” and while achieving all three is not always possible, all three should 
always be considered. All members of the Risk Committee agreed and it was decided 
that the Chair of the Risk Committee and the relevant senior manager should add the 
checklist into the risk appetite document. It was further decided that after the CEO 
had reviewed the change, it will be sent to the board for approval. This example 
illustrates the essence of the strategically refocused model. It meant the board needed 
to fulfil its values, ensure operational and financial sustainability and innovation.  
Internal and external documents produced by the board and committees showed the 
directors’ focus on being accountable in more formal ways. Documents often 
contained references to the mission and values of the organisation. Internal documents 
revealed a formal emphasis with the development of tools such as the risk appetite 
document to guide the board with high level risk assessments and decisions. The risk 
appetite document was accompanied by assessments of the values of the organisation. 
Externally, the board worked hard to discharge accountability in a formal sense 
through its annual reports. There was an emphasis on improving the reporting so that 
they contained formal accounts of control topics such as quality and accreditation. 
The report on its control activities also addressed how Burgundy fulfilled its value-
based objectives over the course of its reporting period. From the strategic 
perspective, the board also worked to enhance its formal reporting of activities such 
as growth and redevelopment. Strategic initiatives were also reported in the context of 
its mission and values. 
 
External factors that encouraged the strategically refocused model 
The external context in which Burgundy was operating included one of policy change, 
increases in the demand for services, pressure to strengthen accountability and 
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improve governance processes. There were also increasing media reports of NFP 
organisation malpractice and irregularities: for example, the recent allegations of 
financial misconduct in the RSL in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia 
and the subsequent investigations by the ACNC (Dayman, 2017). Such media 
scrutiny whipped up community sentiment for increasing the accountability of NFPs. 
In an interview, board member Echo commented: 
“I think there is a real [sense], within the community generally, I think 
there’s probably too much emphasis on the personal liability of directors 
generally...”   
Despite the view from Echo that there was pressure on directors to be accountable, 
there was recognition from them and the other board members that changes in 
Burgundy were required, given other factors such as policy change and demand for 
services. Other board members described the need to change from the former NFP 
model to a contemporary model in interviews. Board members explained the previous 
NFP was generally perceived as a more relaxed and informal board of dedicated 
volunteers who may or may not have the necessary skills to function as a board. The 
former NFP model was not necessarily accountable and board members tended to 
focus on the operational aspects of the organisation to the detriment of higher level 
and strategic issues. According to Cornforth and Edwards (1999), the way that board 
meetings were run and agendas designed could create conditions conducive to an 
operational approach by directors.  
Board and committee discussions revealed a consensus among board members that 
the strategically refocused NFP model would be better equipped to address the 
changes in the sector and enhance its accountability. The same theme arose in 
interviews. For instance, in an interview with the Board Chair, Alpha explained, 
“We are trying to get the organisation to move into what is a current-day 
not-for-profit mode, from what was the old contracting out of 
government, which started thirty years ago. So, accountability demands 
have increased hugely in that period of time, in terms of standards of 
services, in terms of financial accountabilities in terms of, now there’s 
this whole new evaluation model impact statement stuff”. 
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Internal factors that encouraged the strategically refocused model 
An internal factor that conditioned the change from the organisation’s previous NFP 
model to a strategically refocused model was the presentations and reports to the 
board by external consultants. The consultants were tasked with providing advice and 
guidance to the board with regard to the future of aged care and community services. 
The presentations and formal reports to the board galvanized the board’s sentiment 
for improving the efficiency and accountability of the organisation. For example, 
comments were made by board members that “synergies” needed to be found in the 
organisation and that the “siloing” of operations needed to cease. 
The content of the consultants’ presentations and reports outlined the potential impact 
of policy changes, increases in the demand for services, as well as pressure to 
strengthen accountability and improve governance processes. The consultants hired 
by the board recognised the environment in which Burgundy was operating: 
“The combined impact of these changes, along with the emergence of an 
increasingly articulate and aware consumer group, will require 
organisations to have a clear plan for operating in an increasingly 
market driven sector”. 
During some presentations, the consultants posed questions to board members 
challenging them to think, explain or discuss certain aspects of the organisation. For 
instance, the consultants asked board members whether growth fulfils Burgundy’s 
mission and values. One of the consultants said to the board:  
“You seemed very ambivalent about answering this question last 
workshop”.  
The Board Chair responded:  
“It is a serious question. It needs a lot of consideration before we answer 
it”.  
The consultants suggested some areas where they believed Burgundy had capacity to 
grow. The consultants guided the board members and recommended the answer to the 
question is considering the areas where growth was possible while also asking:  
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“What are we getting out of this? What are we achieving? And this 
means consulting Burgundy’s set of values”. 
The above comment from one of the consultants to the board illustrates that the 
answer to the strategic question of growth lies in Burgundy’s values. This example 
shows the interplay between the board’s control role in weighing the risks of growth 
with the board’s strategic role in assessing benefits of growth. 
Governance changes instigated by a governance review also encouraged the 
movement to the new NFP. Shortly before the researcher commenced fieldwork in 
Burgundy, the board had agreed to a governance review by an external governance 
specialist. This became evident in discussions at board meetings while the researcher 
was conducting fieldwork. The governance review took place while the researcher 
was present and the recommendations of the report were released when the researcher 
was in the field. The board agreed to adopt many of the recommendations from the 
governance specialist including the change previously discussed where senior 
managers would no longer attend board meetings unless they were giving a formal 
presentation. Another governance change included making board meetings more 
regular so they were monthly instead of bi-monthly. This was done as the governance 
expert was of the view that the board needed more time to address the complex issues 
and change it was encountering. The recommendation for a leaner committee 
structure was also adopted by disbanding two of the five committees. Comments 
made by board members to the researcher in interviews captured the sense of change 
from the previous NFP to the strategically refocused NFP. For example, board 
member Golf commented that the board was: 
“…trying to raise the level of governance in the organisation at a time 
when I’m seeing the organisation’s in a time of great change in moving 
from a good, very well operating service delivery organisation to one 
that needs to be in a much more strategic space”. 
There was evidence to support the narrative that the strategically refocused Burgundy 
was a contemporary board that was aware of its responsibilities. An examination of 
the board agendas revealed a clear strategic and control focus. Strategic topics often 
comprised between a third to half of the agenda items and control topics consisted of 
 219 
about a third of board agendas. Agendas with a clear focus are argued to assist in 
limiting operational discussions by board members (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). 
The strategically refocused board aimed to recruit board members who were able to 
strike a balance between being strategically and operationally focused. This objective 
was evident in discussions of the Governance Committee and the board about the 
recruitment of two new board members to replace two existing members who were 
due to retire. Part of this process involved the Governance Committee and the board 
assessing the board member skills matrix document to identify the areas where skills 
would need replacing once the two members retired. Amendments were made by the 
Governance Committee to the attributes list in the matrix to guide the board with the 
future identification of suitable members for the board. Additionally, the board invited 
the governance specialist to review the skills matrix and refine it further. Such 
processes were designed to formally assist the board in their decision-making process 
when it came to the selection and recruitment of new board members. 
The strategically refocused model in practice: an example of directors’ 
remuneration  
The decision by the board and its Governance Committee to remunerate its board 
members in line with governance developments in the sector was an example of an 
internal change designed to move Burgundy into the present day NFP mode. This 
decision was influenced by research undertaken with respect to remuneration models 
in similar NFP organisations, the AICD (2016) NFP Governance and Performance 
Study and recommendations from Burgundy’s own governance review. It appeared 
that the decision to change from an Incorporated Association to a CLG also supported 
the need to remunerate the board members from Burgundy. This is because with the 
change to a company structure, there was an increase in directors’ liabilities under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Therefore, trends in the NFP sector as well as an 
increase in rule-based accountability encouraged the movement to remunerating board 
members.  
Requests were made by some board members to formally record the decision to 
remunerate Burgundy’s board members. The rationale behind recording the decision 
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was that it was the first time in Burgundy’s history that board members would receive 
remuneration. Board member Bravo suggested: 
 “We should spell out how we wish to remunerate directors in a similar 
way to how [a similar NFP organisation] has done it”.  
In supporting Bravo’s input to formally record the decision, board member Golf said 
that in their view, the importance of the decision warranted a record of the decision 
and the context in which it was made. The other board members agreed and the CEO 
was charged with the task of writing the formal statement. This example illustrates the 
move to the strategically refocused model as well as formal accountability to record 
and justify the decision. 
Balancing control and strategy: the role of broad accountability 
A key finding from the present investigation is that when board members exercised 
their control role, they frequently enacted formal and negotiable accountability to 
project an image of legitimacy to the organisation’s stakeholders (Hardy & Ballis, 
2013; Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009). Projection of the image of legitimacy was 
often communicated to stakeholders using formal means of accountability. For 
instance, external stakeholders could access annual financial reports that contained 
accompanying narratives explaining the key projects that the board undertook. The 
narratives included references to the organisation’s mission. Internally, key projects 
were communicated through memoranda, presentations and workshops to the staff. 
These forms of communication also contained references to the mission and values of 
the organisation. Some examples will be explored later in this section. 
Examination of Burgundy’s annual reports revealed a balance between a control focus 
(e.g. financial reports and compliance) and a strategic emphasis on its values. In the 
board’s annual report, financial and operational accounts were usually nested in terms 
of the mission and values of the organisation. The formal aspect of accountability in 
this context was the written and numerical publication of data for stakeholders. This 
constituted the narrative and calculative aspects of accountability as it contained non-
financial and financial information (Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton, 2012). The 
narrative aspects of the annual reports that referred to Burgundy’s values were an 
additional dimension to the calculative aspects that were designed to meet the 
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expectations of stakeholders. The marriage of the narrative and calculative aspects of 
accountability could be said to constitute negotiable accountability. This is because, 
taken together, the financial and non-financial aspects of the report were able to 
reassure stakeholders that Burgundy was achieving its philanthropic objectives as 
well as being a going concern. This in turn was designed to generate trust and 
confidence among its stakeholders. For example, narratives of Burgundy’s 
investments in growth were explained in the annual report and justified as part of the 
organisation’s mission to deliver high quality services to the people it serves.  
The exercise of negotiable accountability by board members is common to the 
principal literatures about the communication of an image of legitimacy to 
stakeholders. Morrison and Salipante (2007) find organisational leaders exercise 
negotiable accountability to reassure stakeholders that good governance is taking 
place and the mission and values are being fulfilled. Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan 
(2002) find communications with the community are central to negotiable 
accountability practices in their multiple NFP case study. Coule (2015) argues that 
NFP organisations that involve their stakeholder groups in decision-making are able 
to negotiate their accountability with them. Holland (2002) argues how an NFP 
organisation is perceived by external stakeholders is largely dependent on the degree 
of trust they have in the entity. Similarly, Sasso (2003) argues trust between internal 
stakeholders (i.e. the board and senior managers) facilitates board effectiveness. The 
present case study confirms negotiable accountability being exercised by the board to 
its internal and external stakeholder groups. It affirms findings from the above 
literatures that fostering trust and confidence is part of the process of communication. 
The present investigation also corroborates the emphasis on mission and values in the 
communication.  
The present research goes beyond the findings of previous board literature, as it finds 
that formal and negotiable accountability were often performed together. These broad 
accountability concepts facilitate the communication of the achievement of 
philanthropic objectives as well as financial and operational sustainability. 
Terminology from Burgundy’s annual report and its external publication – its 
magazine – illustrates the organisation’s simultaneous focus on sustainability and 
discharging its values. Investigation of these documents shows the use of terminology 
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such as “sustainability”, “operational compliance”, “upgrades”, “redevelopment” and 
“expansion” which support the narrative of financial and operational sustainability. 
References to Burgundy’s mission and values were communicated through language 
such as “high quality care”, “to help people in need”, and “increasing our impact”. An 
example that illustrates the discharge of both sustainability and values is contained in 
the annual report using words to the effect of [paraphrased to protect the identity of 
Burgundy]:    
We remain committed to responding to the needs of individuals, their loved ones and 
the community. This is achieved by investing in the areas we serve. 	
Another example of the dual discharge of sustainability and mission is in a statement 
about Burgundy’s decision to invest in information technology systems to monitor the 
work it is achieving in the sector. There is a comment in the annual report along the 
lines of [paraphrased]: 
Our new information technology systems will enable us to assess and measure the 
impact we are having in the work that we do. 
	
The board’s emphasis on legitimacy was not only to generate trust and confidence 
among its stakeholders, but also to manage the potential for mission drift. As outlined 
in the Literature Review chapter, mission drift was a potential issue for an NFP 
organisation such as Burgundy that was coming to terms with the need to adapt to a 
more commercial market while also maintaining its focus on mission and values. By 
enacting a combination of control and strategy, and exercising formal and negotiable 
accountability, it appeared the board had clear a purpose that prevented the drift away 
from its mission. This is a key finding from the present investigation that goes beyond 
the current literature. 
There were two principal methods that the board used to prevent drifting away from 
its mission. One of these methods was where the CEO and Board Chair often 
provided verbal cues or reminders to board members about Burgundy’s values. This 
demonstrated a form of control being exercised by the organisational leaders. Such 
actions were especially apparent when discussions were focused on strategy or 
control. The second method used by the board was the welcome item at the start of 
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every board meeting. Recall findings chapter six about strategy and that the welcome 
focused on a chosen value of Burgundy. Board members had to present their 
interpretation of the value to the board. The effect of this was both individual and 
collective, as the individual had to report their reflections to the board and the board 
as a collective considered the value in response. The two methods used by the board 
to limit mission drift acted as sensitising devices or tools to remind board members of 
the primary purpose of Burgundy. 
Blended control: balancing formal and negotiable accountability 
A primary contribution this study can make to the literature is the concept of “blended 
control”. When enacted by board members, blended control was the bridge between 
the control role and the strategic role. For example, strategic risk management 
contained elements of control and strategy. Other examples of blended control 
characteristics included control activities such as compliance and financial control 
that also took into account strategic aspects such as the operational and financial 
sustainability of the organisation. Blended control occurred in instances where the 
control and strategic roles of board members were interrelated and not executed 
separately. The researcher also found that when blended control was enacted, 
accountability was also inherent in the practice. Blended control often featured formal 
and negotiable accountability. The control component was often associated with the 
formal accountability and the strategic component was usually related to negotiable 
accountability.  
The phenomenon of blended control is inspired by three key literatures about the 
strategic role of directors. The seminal work by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) 
identifies formal and emergent strategising in directors’ and managers’ behaviour. 
Morrison and Salipante (2007) build on Mintzberg and Waters (1985) work and find 
that deliberate and emergent strategising occurred in their study of interactions 
between a CEO and Board Chair. Hendry and Kiel (2004) argue that strategy can be 
comprised of strategic control and financial control. These findings suggest that 
strategy can occur in tandem with control aspects. The work by Morrison and 
Salipante (2007) will be outlined further, as it not only confirms the link between 
strategy and control, but also identifies the crucial role accountability performs in the 
process. 
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Morrison and Salipante (2007) found that organisational leaders in an NFP engaged in 
both formal and emergent strategising which also incorporated aspects of broad 
accountability. The formal strategising practices were usually enacted to reassure 
stakeholders that well-established forms of strategising were being followed such as a 
strategic plan. At the same time however, strategic discussions between organisational 
leaders revealed emergent strategy. This occurred when unexpected outcomes from 
strategic and corporate plans were analysed and then integrated into the formal 
strategic planning process. Broad accountability was found to facilitate this deliberate 
and emergent strategising process. Rule-based and negotiable accountability were the 
two broad accountability concepts the scholars found in their identification of 
“blended strategising”. The finding of blended control from the present investigation 
is similar in the sense that it is comprised of more than one aspect of control. It 
contains two aspects of the board member role – control and strategy and two forms 
of broad accountability. 
In summary, blended control contains elements of formal and negotiable 
accountability as well as control and strategic aspects. A comment from board 
member Foxtrot during an interview revealed a perspective that was shared by many 
board members: 
“Accountability isn’t just about compliance with controls, the 
accountability’s tied to fundamentally the success of the organisation in 
achieving its purposes, its mission and its delivery of strategy”. 
This comment encapsulates the essence of blended control. Control is exercised to 
achieve accountability in a formal sense following well-established practices such as 
accreditation and compliance standards, but strategic aspects also underpin the 
enactment of control because of the board’s focus on the organisation’s mission. 
Negotiable accountability is related to the strategic component of blended control 
where the board communicates the narrative to stakeholder groups that the mission 
and values are being fulfilled (Coule, 2015). Communication to stakeholders was 
enacted externally through mediums such as annual reports and Burgundy’s magazine 
or exercised internally through memoranda or presentations to staff.  
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Blended control in practice: the example of accreditation and compliance 
standards 
An example where the board wished to make its operations more transparent was the 
accreditation and compliance standards it fulfils. During a board meeting, the CEO 
Delta provided a verbal report to the board about the accreditation processes the 
organisation is required by law to satisfy in order to provide its services. Delta 
explained that the accreditation processes are rigorous and contain a number of 
important compliance measures, all of which Burgundy satisfies. The CEO also 
reported that a KPI for 100 percent accreditation had been formally implemented in 
the strategic plan of the organisation. Board member Golf asked: “how do people 
know that Burgundy has full accreditation?” Delta explained that the certificates of 
accreditation are present at the sites where services are delivered. After Golf’s 
question, other board members began asking questions. They argued that the 
achievements of the organisation needed to be marketed in a more effective way. 
Board member Echo commented, “people in the industry know what accreditation 
means, but others might not know”. Echo was making the distinction between internal 
stakeholders such as staff and senior managers who would know what accreditation 
means and external stakeholders such as potential clients and their families who might 
not know. The board and CEO agreed a statement should be written and published so 
external stakeholders were aware of the high standards of quality and compliance 
Burgundy achieves. This was subsequently made public in Burgundy’s annual report 
and on their website. 
The above example highlights the practice of blended control. This is particularly 
evident in the compliance KPI for 100 percent accreditation that was discussed by the 
CEO and the board. The compliance KPI illustrates a topic that cuts across both 
strategy and control. It contains elements of strategy as it is a KPI from the strategic 
plan but it also is comprised of elements of control, as it pertains to the issue of the 
organisation’s compliance with accreditation standards for service delivery. The 
following paragraph will assess the elements of broad accountability inherent in the 
enactment of blended control in this example.  
Formal accountability is present in the example because a formal means of measuring 
accreditation had been implemented in Burgundy’s strategic plan through the KPI. 
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Formal accountability also occurred where the board agreed that a written statement 
about the accreditation, quality and compliance procedures that the organisation 
fulfils should be contained in the annual report. The public statement about 
accreditation also shows negotiable accountability in action as the board wished to 
communicate to its external stakeholders what accreditation was and the high 
standards of compliance and quality that the organisation achieved. Furthermore, the 
public statement reassures stakeholders that Burgundy was both operationally 
sustainable and meeting its philanthropic objectives. 
Blended control in practice: the example of branding and organisational profile 
change 
While the previous section explored an example of blended control being enacted in 
relation to accreditation and compliance, this section will consider a more detailed 
example. The change to Burgundy’s branding and organisational profile illustrates 
blended control as board members endeavored to achieve both formal and negotiable 
accountability for key stakeholder groups. The principal stakeholders affected by this 
decision were the staff from Burgundy and similar organisations in the sector.  
 
As previously outlined, internal professional relationships and external political 
relationships were apparent in board conversations about control. For instance, the 
board’s unanimous decision to update the branding and organisational profile of the 
organisation was one that had to be handled carefully. The board was conscious that 
the change to their name would help them gain a competitive advantage in the market, 
but other organisations that operate in the sector might disagree with the use of the 
name because of its significant impact. In meetings, the board members and senior 
managers showed they were cognisant of the potential effect of the change. 
Discussions were had around the perceptions of staff and similar organisations 
operating in the same service delivery space.  
There were frequent conversations at board and committee levels, as well as strategic 
planning days, about how to handle the branding change. Risk management came into 
play as board members navigated internal professional relationships. They decided 
that keeping the staff closely involved in the branding process by seeking their input 
and keeping them regularly updated would be an effective, accountable means of 
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managing the transition. This means of negotiable accountability is argued to be an 
effective way of handling sensitive topics (Coule, 2015). It became apparent that 
involving staff in the branding process was designed to mitigate any negative feelings 
or mistrust. This was because they had a forum where they could ask questions, 
contribute or be heard. 
Board members used strategic risk management techniques with respect to navigating 
its political relationships with external stakeholders. In particular, two similar NFP 
entities that provided services in the sector raised concerns about the proposed 
branding change for Burgundy. They had reservations about the proposed change of 
name for Burgundy, arguing that if the branding change went ahead, Burgundy would 
gain an unfair advantage in the sector. These concerns had been raised both formally 
in writing to the board and at informal meetings between the leaders of the entities 
and the Board Chair and CEO of Burgundy. The board treated these reservations 
seriously and spent time devising strategies to handle the branding change to 
minimise discontent among fellow NFP organisations in the sector. 
After many board meetings and much research, the board members agreed that 
alternative branding names were not suitable. There was a consensus among the board 
that they could adequately justify why they decided to use a particular name to update 
their brand. While aware that it was likely to create some discontent among some 
external stakeholders, the board members engaged in cost-benefit analysis and 
concluded that the benefits of proceeding with the branding change outweighed the 
costs. In order to keep discontent at a minimum, Burgundy worked “quietly” with 
organisations that did not oppose the name change to secure their place in the market. 
For example, a similar NFP organisation had the ownership rights to the name and 
web address that Burgundy required to launch its updated brand and website. 
Burgundy contacted this organisation to arrange the transfer of ownership for the web 
address. The other organisation cooperated with the request and transferred the 
ownership rights to Burgundy.  
The board’s cost-benefit analysis and quiet approach in securing its new name 
illustrates strategic accountability in action. While ultimately the two fellow NFP 
entities would find out about Burgundy’s name change, the board had engaged in 
thorough research and the exploration of alternatives to feel confident in its decision. 
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To formalise its decision, a board member suggested a record of the reasons for the 
decision be recorded in the board meeting minutes “so that if anybody in the future 
wishes to re-visit the decision, they can understand why the decision was made”. The 
steps taken by the board to carefully manage the transition to a new name and brand 
profile illustrates strategic, negotiable and formal accountability in action. 
Accountability to internal stakeholders through change management 
While the reasons underpinning the transition from Burgundy’s previous NFP model 
to a strategically refocused model have been discussed, there were also challenges 
that arose from the change. In particular, the board and senior managers were 
cognisant of the need to present the change in a way that would be accepted by its 
internal stakeholders. The phrase that was often used at the board level to describe 
handling this change was “change management”. This meant managing the change 
from the previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model in a sensitive and 
careful way. For instance, the board was aware that a strategically refocused model 
might not sit well with staff who had worked at the organisation for a considerable 
period of time and were accustomed to the processes under the previous NFP model. 
The consultants making recommendations for the future of aged care and community 
services remarked at a board meeting:  
“The people in the organisation who deliver – the frontline staff need to 
notice a change of process…The personnel need to recognise that culture 
requires engagement”.  
The comment above illustrates the need for negotiable accountability during the 
process of organisational change. The consultants encouraged the board and senior 
managers to work closely with staff during the transition. The CEO also made it clear 
that they were aware that the organisational change was likely to unsettle staff who 
were accustomed to the old NFP model. The CEO explained to the board that 
organisational change needed to be implemented with care. This created much 
discussion as the board tried to work out ways that the change could be managed to 
keep parties satisfied both within the organisation and external to the organisation.  	
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A discussion that board members had at a strategic planning day was exploring the 
possibility for a “change strategist” to be employed by Burgundy. Board members 
said a change strategist could identify the “skills mix in people, systems and 
structures required to drive the change”. The conversation about employing a change 
strategist showed the board thinking of ways to control and accomplish change 
management. At a subsequent board meeting, a decision was made to employ a senior 
manager to assist with managing the change. It was agreed that this approach was 
likely to bridge the gap between the board’s desire to be more strategic while also 
respecting manager and staff perspectives. The strategic planning day facilitator 
explained communication of the change to internal stakeholders is very important. 
The facilitator said: 
“It’s a gradual process. It’s about the development of the organisation – 
not a contraction of services. Opportunities for change are not a need for 
change. Saying it that way implies a deficit. It all about how it’s put to 
the staff and managers”. 
An additional strategy to manage the change was having workshops for the staff to 
talk about organisational change and how they would continue to fulfil the values of 
the organisation. It became evident that the organisation could adapt to the new 
demands in its environment as long as the values and mission would remain “front 
and centre” of what Burgundy does. This example illustrates the perspective that 
involving stakeholders in decision-making is a way of achieving negotiable 
accountability (Coule, 2015). 
Championing control topics and enacting blended control 
As most board members were conscious of the need to be more accountable during 
the transition from the previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model, many 
of them were “champions” (Parker, 2007a, p.1468) of particular topics. This occurs 
when a board member adopts and drives a certain topic or issue of interest to them, 
demonstrating “ownership and leadership” of that issue (Parker, 2007a, p.1468). A 
board member who exercises the role of champion is often vocal at meetings or they 
take an active informal role in conversations outside of board meetings. They are 
usually heavily involved in drafting papers for board and committee meetings. For 
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instance, some board members liked to advocate the need to increase accountability 
on a particular topic and to communicate this with staff and external parties. Other 
board members highlighted the value of utilising new information systems to produce 
meaningful data for the benefit of internal planning and control. This desire to 
increase internal and external accountability was enacted at the individual board 
member level and the collective board level. 
One board member, Golf, had a particular focus on accountability and this was 
generally enacted when control issues were discussed at the board. The following 
example shows how Golf generated negotiable accountability from an operational 
control issue. At a board meeting, a senior manager reported the results from the staff 
survey for the year. After the senior manager’s presentation, Golf explained that there 
is value, in their view, in communicating with the staff. Golf argued that it would be a 
“nice touch” if the board could send a statement back to the staff thanking them for 
participating and encouraging them to participate in future surveys. Golf commented 
that there should also be an explanation to staff about how the information is valuable 
to the board. The motivation underpinning Golf’s motivation to communicate with 
staff was that they believed there was a need for more communication between the 
board and staff. Increasing communication with the staff in their view meant less of a 
disconnect between the organisational leaders and the personnel. The board was 
persuaded by Golf’s argument. A decision was made that a statement should be 
drafted and when approved by the board, circulated to the staff. The Chair, having 
identified Golf as the champion of this topic, suggested that Golf liaise with the CEO 
and the senior manager to draft the statement. Once the statement was drafted and 
approved by the board, it was sent to the staff along with the results from the survey. 
This example illustrates the exercise of formal and negotiable accountability at both 
the individual and collective board levels. 
Financial and operational control was also exercised by Golf. This also showed their 
focus on formal accountability. Golf made a comment at a board meeting about the 
value of investing in multiple new ITS. The new information systems were in the 
areas of accounting, finance and customer service. Golf remarked that after the 
challenging time the previous year with some contracts not being renewed and staff 
leaving the organisation, the new ITS - while “large scale and confronting for some, 
 231 
will create a greater sense of accountability”. The Board Chair supported this 
comment, explaining that how staff spend their time will be more visible through the 
software. These comments reveal the change from a less formal system of staff 
monitoring to a more formal, measurable sense of accountability through Burgundy’s 
new software systems. Having the ability to measure and monitor financial and 
operational performance gave the board more confidence in the accountability of the 
organisation. The new ITS had the added benefit of producing more timely reports to 
the board and committees such as the Finance and Audit Committee. Such an 
approach complemented the board’s desire for formal planning and control systems.  
Monitoring staff productivity was valuable as the board could assess where 
improvements needed to be made or corrective action taken in their value chain to 
maximise the efficiency and quality of the services they provide. While this is mainly 
an example of formal accountability being exercised, it also shows a degree of 
negotiable accountability, as the ITS enabled the board to understand why certain 
targets in contracts might be challenging to meet. This understanding would give the 
board the opportunity to negotiate with its contract providers in the event certain 
aspects of service delivery might be challenging to meet. This form of negotiable 
accountability between the organisation and its contract providers could potentially 
open avenues for alternative measures or strategies.  
Another board member, Charlie, championed financial control issues with respect to 
aged care. Charlie was the board’s expert in aged care and demonstrated a keen 
interest in aged care issues by taking an active, vocal approach at board meetings. For 
instance, when the board reviewed a report on service delivery from the Finance and 
Audit Committee, Charlie assessed the financial results and made comments such as:  
 
“[site 1] is still dragging its feet. We are still not at full occupancy. 
There are 10 beds remaining”.  
Charlie’s comments and leadership on the issue alerted other board members to the 
issue and they too often asked questions. The CEO reassured the board that the 
financial result was likely to improve because there was a merger with another site 
still to take place. While Charlie accepted this, Charlie continued to monitor the aged 
care financial results at future board meetings. This scenario shows an individual 
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board member taking the lead on accountability for aged care, which also prompted 
other board members to ask questions or make comments. Therefore, similar to a 
previous example, the exercise of individual accountability on a certain topic 
prompted a collective response. 
 
Charlie demonstrated concern not only for the occupancy rates in aged care but also 
for the levels of agency staff usage. Charlie explained to the board that agency staff 
were expensive and added to the organisation’s expenses in an area where the 
organisation’s own staff could work and reduce costs. This comment sensitised other 
board members to the issue and some took the lead at future board meetings to follow 
the issue. For instance, board member Juliet commented at the next board meeting 
that resources should be invested in “training our own staff instead”. 
 
Charlie also championed monitoring a major project in aged care where one of the 
key sites of Burgundy underwent a major redevelopment. The essence of the control 
role enacted in this scenario was financial control and risk management. Charlie often 
asked questions at board meetings inquiring about the progress of the aged care 
project. While Charlie appeared satisfied receiving verbal responses at board 
meetings, Charlie suggested that the board would benefit if there was more formal 
and regular reporting from senior managers about the progress of the redevelopment. 
Charlie’s request was supported by other board members who agreed that a frequent 
high level progress report on the aged care project would be beneficial so that 
financial targets could be monitored and risks could be identified and managed, if 
necessary. The formalisation of this process was evident in the board papers in future 
board meetings, with a specific standing item created for an update about the major 
development. From this point onwards, the CEO provided a brief, high level progress 
report to the board about the major redevelopment project. The enactment of formal 
accountability at both the individual and collective board levels is evident in this 
example. 
 
Board member Hotel was interested in risk management issues and worked largely 
through informal avenues outside of the board and committee meetings. Hotel would 
telephone or email the senior manager responsible and the CEO for a more detailed 
and regular report to the board about significant WH&S issues that affected the 
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organisation. The informal meetings and conversations Hotel had with senior 
managers became apparent at board meetings. This was often because Hotel would 
mention their informal meetings with senior managers on the topic. In other cases, the 
CEO acknowledged Hotel’s work to create a regular report on WH&S issues for the 
board. At one board meeting, Hotel explained the reasons why they were pursuing the 
issue:  
 
“…such a serious issue is often not adequately reported on at board 
meetings. We only ever get a one page report with about a sentence or 
two”.  
The motivation for Hotel championing the WH&S issue was because they were 
dissatisfied with the irregular and brief reporting to the board about the issue. Other 
board members agreed with Hotel and a decision was made that a more formal and 
detailed WH&S report should be provided to the board. The board members and CEO 
negotiated a timeframe for the more regular formal reporting practice and it was 
agreed that once every three months was prudent in addition to the current reporting 
practices. This example reveals the effect of Hotel’s request for the formalisation of 
WH&S reporting practices. The pattern of an individual championing a particular 
control issue and being supported by other board members is again apparent in this 
example.  
 
While championing of certain issues generates a form of accountability exercised at 
the individual level, the board members demonstrated that they understood they were 
also collectively accountable for decisions made as well. As illustrated in the 
examples above, although a board member might champion an issue, whether it was 
successful depended on the level of support they received from fellow board members 
and the Chair and CEO. In an interview, board member Juliet remarked, 
“I think it’s the responsibility of everyone on the board…even if you’ve 
got someone who’s specified as the strategic planning monitor or 
champion…I think we’re all responsible for…monitoring, making sure 
that there’s processes that monitor the various initiatives from the 
strategic planning to see that they are moving along, ask questions if 
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they’re not, follow up with the appropriate people if I want more detailed 
information”. 
This finding about individual board members championing particular issues and 
whether such an issue is successful at the collective level complements the findings of 
Parker (2007a). With respect to the collective level, Parker (2007a, p.1476) remarks 
that it is a contextual, dynamic and political process. The impact of contextual factors 
and the interplay of political processes was evident in the researcher’s observations of 
board and committee meetings. This finding addresses Parker’s (2007a) comment that 
more participant observer studies need to be undertaken to confirm or challenge his 
findings. The present study goes beyond Parker’s (2007a) findings by discovering that 
board members often enacted blended control when topics were championed. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has mapped the external and internal context in which Burgundy was 
operating and shown how it encouraged the exercise of formal and negotiable 
accountability. A key challenge for the board was the need to change from the 
organisation’s previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model without 
compromising its mission and values. One way in which the board of Burgundy was 
able to strike the balance between changing but also remaining true to its moral 
purpose was by increasing its formal accountability practices and communicating this 
to its stakeholders. At the same time, it also retained a strategic focus. What this 
chapter has identified is that blended control was comprised of control and strategy as 
well as the enactment of formal and negotiable accountability. 
In most cases, formal and negotiable accountability aspects worked together 
producing a form of blended control, which showed the organisation was serious 
about achieving its moral purpose as well as adapting to the demands in the sector.  
The primary purpose behind blended control was to illustrate to Burgundy’s 
stakeholders that organisational and board legitimacy existed. In other words, the 
organisation was fulfilling its values while also remaining financially and 
operationally sustainable.  
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The other benefit of blended control was that it appeared to curb the potential for 
mission drift to occur. The board demonstrated a disciplined approach to balancing 
operational and financial sustainability as well as its values. This was evident through 
observations as well as document analysis. This control and strategic balance had the 
effect of limiting a drift away from Burgundy’s mission. Other examples are provided 
throughout the chapter where blended control operated to manage change. The 
examples of Burgundy’s updated branding and organisational profile, and change 
management, illustrate how board members enacted blended control to assist in the 
transition from the previous NFP to the strategically refocused model. 
This chapter has also explored the instances were board members champion certain 
topics about control and enact blended control. Board members might champion a 
particular issue associated with financial control, operational control or risk 
management. The present investigation confirms the findings of Parker (2007a) that 
the championing of topics by board members does occur. Where the present study 
goes beyond the findings of Parker (2007a) is the finding that often in the process of 
championing, formal or negotiable accountability was exercised. Moreover, it was 
discovered that the success of a topic that was championed was contingent on the 
collective board support it received. In the present investigation, often one individual 
would champion a control topic in the first instance. If other board members agreed, 
they often exercised accountability also. This illustrates the enactment of broad 
accountability at the individual director level and the collective board level. 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
This chapter maps the key findings from the longitudinal case study in Burgundy. The 
three RQs from the study will be revisited and the corresponding findings from the 
investigation will be set out. The chapter will then turn to explain the theoretical 
contributions that the study makes. The findings will be discussed in relation to the 
relevant literature, outlining what is new and significant. Theoretical contributions 
will be discussed in two sections. The first section will illustrate the theoretical 
findings with respect to the framework of broad accountability. The second section 
will cover the theoretical findings that pertain to board studies. Limitations of the 
study will be outlined and explained. Recommendations for areas of future research 
are then identified and discussed. The chapter will conclude by summarising the 
objectives of the study, recapping briefly how it was conducted and the primary 
findings and contributions it makes.  
Summary of the key findings 
Findings chapters six, seven and eight each contribute distinct findings in relation to 
the three RQs. Each will be outlined and discussed in this section. The three findings 
are: 
• Broad accountability concepts were present in the exercise of the board member 
strategic role. There was a significant focus on strategy by the board in response 
to a number of external and internal factors. The board was cognisant of the fact 
that it needed to balance the need to be financially and operationally sustainable as 
well as achieving its mission and values. Many of the strategic decisions it made 
were with this balance in mind. 
 
• Operational drift rarely occurred in the exercise of the three board roles. The 
techniques board members used to limit operational drift were usually common 
across all board roles. Inherent in the exercise of such techniques were aspects of 
broad accountability. Contrary to a widely held view in the literature that board 
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roles create conditions conducive to operational drift, aspects of the control and 
resource dependence roles were found to prevent operational drift. 
 
• External and internal factors influenced to a considerable extent how board 
members exercised their control role. Unpinning these factors was a general 
consensus and consciousness among the board that there was a need to change 
from the organisation’s previous NFP model to a strategically refocused model. 
The challenge for the board was to balance the need to be financially and 
operationally sustainable with the need to fulfill the mission and values of the 
organisation. The communication of this to internal and external stakeholders 
revealed the exercise of blended control as well as practices to limit mission drift. 
 
The first findings chapter (chapter six) focuses on the strategic role of board members 
and answers RQ 1. It finds that board members exercised a significant and active 
strategic role in this case study. This supports the arguments of scholars such as 
Lauenstein (1982), Zahra and Pearce (1989), Demb and Neubauer (1992), Hyndman 
and McDonnell (2005) and Crow, Lockhart and Lewis (2014). These scholars argue 
the board should be actively involved in strategy. The present investigation goes 
beyond the scholars’ arguments because it finds it is the effect of contextual factors at 
the time of analysis that will largely influence the extent to which a board is involved 
in strategy. The strong emphasis on strategy in the case study of Burgundy was in 
response to several principal contextual factors including the impact of legislative 
change with respect to funding and the change to a user-pays system. Responses to 
these external influences encouraged the board to exercise a highly strategic approach 
to its activities including updating the legal status of the organisation from an 
Incorporated Association to a CLG model.  
A key challenge for board directors in this context was balancing the mission of 
Burgundy with the need to project an image of a financially and operationally 
sustainable organisation. The board worked hard to support its narrative with 
measures of success such as the results from benchmarking studies, outcomes from its 
new IT systems and measuring outcomes against the attainment of KPIs. Broad 
accountability concepts played an important role in this strategically focused board 
work. One area where narrative, calculative and formal accountability (Kamuf, 2007; 
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Roberts, 1991) was exercised was the board’s evaluation of its service delivery. 
Among the internal contextual factors that fostered a strategic approach, most notable 
was the new Board Chair and their preference for a strategic approach to board work. 
Broad accountability featured in the techniques used by the board and senior 
managers to adjust to the new Board Chair. Formal and informal accountability as 
well as negotiable accountability were exercised (Roberts, 1991; Ospina, Diaz & 
O’Sullivan 2002). The major theoretical finding from this chapter is that as this NFP 
organisation was experiencing significant changes externally and internally, it 
required a strategic approach by board members to be adaptable while also remaining 
true to its values. 
The second findings chapter (chapter seven) explores the practice of operational drift. 
It addresses RQs 1, 2 and 3, as the inquiry is relevant to all board roles of strategy, 
control and resource dependence. Revisiting RQs 1-3, it can be seen that central to 
each question is the nature of the board roles of strategy, control and resource 
dependence and how the role is enacted in the NFP context. The chapter argues that 
operational drift can occur with respect to the exercise of all board roles, but the 
primary focus of the chapter is on the strategic aspect of the board member role as this 
formed a significant part of board work while the researcher was present.  
A key finding from chapter seven is the techniques board members used and the 
associated broad accountability concepts directors enacted to limit operational drift. 
The chapter argues that the techniques board members use to keep their roles in check 
are applicable not only to the exercise of the strategic role but also to the other roles 
of control and resource dependence. Some examples are given in these other two 
realms of board member roles. The chapter also explains that certain aspects of the 
resource dependence and control role can help prevent operational drift. Notably, the 
knowledge and experience aspects of the resource dependence role limit operational 
drift. Similarly, the practice of further inquiry and follow up are aspects of the board 
member control role that tended to limit operational drift. The main theoretical 
finding from this chapter is the contribution it makes in terms of explaining how 
board members prevent operational drift, as the literature is yet to address this aspect 
adequately (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999; Parker, 2007a). 
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Exploring how the control role of board members was exercised in the NFP 
environment was the primary focus of the final findings chapter (chapter eight). It 
answers RQ 2 from the study’s RQs. It finds that external and internal factors 
influenced how board members enacted their control role and its associated 
accountabilities. A considerable number of external factors appeared to sensitise 
board members to the need to be more transparent and accountable. Policy and 
legislative changes, an increasingly competitive market for services and demands to 
strengthen accountability and governance are some examples. Internal factors 
including the new Board Chair, a governance review and presentations by external 
consultants about the future of aged care and community services encouraged board 
members to transition from the organisation’s previous NFP model to a strategically 
refocused model (Parker, 2008). In essence, this transition was signalling farewell to a 
more informal and operationally based approach to governance and heralding a new 
era of an NFP organisation that is financially and operationally sustainable while also 
maintaining its focus on the organisation’s philanthropic values.  
Achieving a balance between being sustainable and fulfilling the altruistic values of 
the NFP entity was made possible through the exercise of blended control practices. A 
major theoretical finding of this chapter is the concept of blended control and its role 
in the control function of the board. This concept makes a contribution to 
understandings of the control role of the board. Morrison and Salipante (2007) found 
blended strategising practices took place in an NFP entity. Similar practices with 
respect to the exercise of control by board members have been found in this case 
study. It was found that during control processes such as financial control, board 
members enacted formal and negotiable accountability to convey the image of a 
legitimate NFP organisation to its stakeholders (Hardy & Ballis, 2013; Jayasinghe & 
Soobaroyen, 2009). In addition, blended control practices were found to be helpful for 
the board in limiting mission drift (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Tuckman & Chang, 
2006; Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski, 2008). Finally, Parker’s (2007a, p.1476) 
discovery of board members championing particular control topics was confirmed and 
added to, as it was discovered that the success of a topic that was championed by an 
individual was contingent on the collective support it received from the board. 
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Theoretical contributions for broad accountability 
This study has made theoretical contributions to the literature at three primary levels. 
Bearing in mind the different levels of theorising discussed by Llewellyn (2003), this 
study has engaged in theorising at levels two to four inclusive. These levels are:  
• level two: differentiation theories  
• level three: concepts theorising  
• level four: theorising of settings.  
 
Contribution to differentiation theories 
Starting with the first theoretical contribution at level two, differentiation theories 
feature within the framework of broad accountability that the researcher used for the 
study: for example, the concept of formal and informal accountability. The data 
collected often reflected the practice of two related but different concepts of broad 
accountability. For instance, the finding that both formal and informal accountability 
feature in board member behaviour is an example of differentiation theories that 
feature in the findings of this thesis. While the concepts of formal and informal are 
opposites of each other, they are related in the sense that they are both types of 
accountability. Such a synergy between different concepts is also argued to exist by 
Lindkvist and Llewellyn (2003). Similarly, the finding that there is narrative and 
calculative accountability exercised and individualizing and socializing accountability 
enacted in this case study illustrates other examples of differentiation theories. The 
identification of these differentiation theories and explanations of how they apply in 
the present investigation contributes to understandings of the broad accountability 
concepts in these areas. 
Contributions to concepts theorising 
The second theoretical contributions are at level three – concepts theorising. This is 
applied in the present investigation by the creation of a broad accountability 
framework and its application to the data collected. This study has produced further 
insights into conceptual understandings of broad accountability concepts. For 
example, a primary finding was with respect to the theme of trust from negotiable 
accountability and how trust was vital for an NFP entity concerned with 
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demonstrating that it is achieving its philanthropic mission and values while also 
being financially and operationally sustainable.  
While trust has been touched on in the board literature about accountability, the 
findings from the present investigation add further new insights about how trust helps 
mitigate problems with operational drift, information asymmetry and mission drift. 
Prior studies about trust in the literature argue it is a vital element for a board that 
effectively discharges its legal duties (Sasso, 2003), but they do not address the 
practical issues of operational drift, information asymmetry or mission drift in the 
amount of detail that this study does.  
The governance literature that considers trust in the NFP sector is generally focused 
on trust between the NFP entity and its stakeholders (Coule, 2015; Jayasinghe & 
Soobaroyen 2009; Holland, 2002; Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002; Young, 2002). 
Particular attention is given to examining trust between an NFP entity and its external 
stakeholders (Young, 2002). A recent example of research conducted by Farwell, 
Shier and Handy (2018) supports this argument as it is focused on trust between 
members of the community and Canadian NFPs. The present study contributes to 
findings about external stakeholders but also adds to the literature with respect to 
internal stakeholders. The present investigation finds that the board was highly 
conscious of its need to communicate with its internal and external stakeholders about 
how it was fulfilling its values as well as remaining sustainable financially and 
operationally. This study extends understandings of the board’s methods of 
communicating legitimacy to professional and political stakeholders (Ospina, Diaz & 
O’Sullivan, 2002, p.9; Hardy & Ballis, 2013) and preventing mission drift. Of 
particular note are the findings that pertain to internal stakeholders – such as how trust 
is one of the factors that mitigates operational drift and information asymmetry 
between directors and senior managers. 
Another new theoretical insight at level three that this investigation offers is the 
concept of blended control which builds on the existing concept of blended 
strategising expressed by Morrison and Salipante (2007). The finding that formal 
accountability is often enacted with negotiable accountability shows Burgundy’s 
efforts to project an image of legitimacy to its external stakeholders using established 
measures such as financial reports with supporting narratives. One of the primary 
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rationales behind such behaviour is that if the organisation and its board are seen to be 
legitimate, it usually fosters trust between the stakeholders and the organisation. Trust 
between stakeholders and the NFP is “roughly equivalent to enhancing shareholder 
value in the for-profit sector” (Sasso, 2003, p.1528). In addition, the present research 
confirms the related notion of “pluralist” perspectives of governance outlined by 
Coule (2015). It supports the argument that NFP organisations that have a pluralist 
approach to governance tend to work to appease stakeholders either by involving 
them in decision making or providing accounts to stakeholders reassuring them that 
the organisation is fulfilling its mission (Coule, 2015; Balser & McClusky, 2005; 
Ospina, Diaz & O’Sullivan, 2002). The data from the present case study revealed that 
Burgundy was focused on providing accounts to both internal stakeholders (Sasso, 
2003) and external stakeholders (Holland, 2002) to reassure them that it was 
achieving its mission and values. This emphasis on fulfilment of mission and values is 
evident in the Chair and CEO’s report published in the annual report for the 
organisation. In addition, conversations at the board level revealed a high degree of 
consciousness with respect to how the organisation was perceived by the government 
and its clients – some of Burgundy’s external stakeholders. 
The concept of pluralist governance is related to the concept of blended control and 
blended strategising because of its focus on stakeholders and how the board 
negotiates accountability with them. According to Coule (2015, p.93), pluralist styles 
of governance contain aspects of “negotiable accountability to a broad range of 
stakeholders” because it “is often seen as central to organizational mission and 
legitimacy within society”. Findings chapter eight (about the board control role) 
provides examples where board members exercise formal and negotiable 
accountability to convey an image of legitimacy to stakeholders. Such findings are 
also similar to those from Hardy and Ballis (2013, p.553) who argue in their case 
study of Sanitarium Health Food Company that informal, socializing accountability 
was enacted by organisational leaders to “give legitimacy to Sanitarium’s charitable 
status”. Another comparison can be made with Parker’s (2014) research. He argues 
that industrial leaders of the 19th and 20th centuries exercised “accountability through 
action” where they balanced the philanthropic mission of the organisation with 
business and social objectives. The present investigation confirms the findings of 
Coule (2015), Hardy and Ballis (2013) and Parker (2014), all of which suggest that it 
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is possible for organisational leaders to strike a balance between moral and business 
objectives. The practice of a board working conscientiously to achieve a balance 
between commercial and moral objectives can be argued as their way of preventing or 
managing mission drift. 
Contributions to theorising of settings 
The third theoretical contribution is at level four theorising – the theorising of 
settings. Theoretical contributions to the theorising of settings have been made in two 
respects. First, this study sheds light on the effect of contextual factors on the exercise 
of board member roles. Second, the enactment of board roles and accountability has 
been analysed at multiple levels.  
Considering the first contribution to theorising of settings, the influence of internal 
and external contextual factors was a key focus of the researcher while analysing the 
three primary roles of the board member. It was often found that internal and external 
factors had some bearing on board member behaviour and the enactment of 
accountability. According to Shaoul, Stafford and Stapleton (2012), making 
assessments of the context in which the organisation is operating is essential to 
understanding how accountability operates. Similar arguments are made by Pugliese, 
Nicholson and Bezemer (2015), Machold and Farquhar (2013), Ostrower and Stone 
(2006) and Ebrahim (2003) about the importance of context in board studies and 
accountability. 
The second contribution to the theorising of settings is the multi-level approach 
adopted by the researcher in their analysis of board member behaviours. Following 
the recommendation of Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014), this study has 
adopted the view that confining analysis to a single level such as the individual board 
members is limited in understanding the multiple factors in board work. As a result, 
the researcher theorises at two different levels – the individual board member level 
and the collective board level. Arguably, this study considers a third level of 
theorising – at the organisational level. This is because the researcher often 
considered of the effect of contextual factors on the organisation. For example, the 
age of the organisation and the sector in which it was operating. Such factors were 
often taken into account to the extent that they may condition the exercise of board 
roles. In addition, the data collected and analysed from observations, interviews and 
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documents from senior managers provided the researcher with insights at the 
organisational level.  
The analysis of factors at multiple levels requires further explanation to illustrate how 
the multi-level approach was applied to the data and the key factors that were 
considered. In their article, Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014, p.252) provide a 
table with examples of factors at the multiple levels of analysis in board studies. The 
scholars group the factors into themes that describe the broad topic for the factors. At 
the individual director level, the themes of: human capital, structural position, 
personality and motivation were considered in this study. For example, with respect to 
human capital, factors such as board member expertise and skills were considered. 
This was especially apparent in the findings pertaining to the exercise of the board 
member control role where some individuals were champions of particular issues. The 
theme of structural position was also analysed by the researcher in the present 
investigation. For example, the effect of the new Board Chair and their impact on the 
board as well as the perspectives of other board members with regard to strategy was 
analysed. The themes of personality and motivation were also taken into account in 
the present study as factors such as experience, active participation and 
conscientiousness of individual board members were explored especially with respect 
to how individual board members managed information asymmetry and operational 
drift. 
Analysis of factors at the collective board level covered the themes identified by 
Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014, p.252) including meeting routines, 
boardroom culture and balance of power. The observation in board meetings that the 
welcome item was designed to explore an aspect of Burgundy’s mission and values 
reveals meeting routine. It also uncovers an aspect of the boardroom culture where the 
board wished to keep its mission and values as a primary consideration. Further 
analysis of the meeting welcome item revealed that it had the effect of accountability 
at both the individual and collective levels. This was because the individual board 
member’s reflection generated accountability at their level but it also often involved 
the board as a collective. Another theme that became apparent at the board level was 
the balance of power on the board. Observations revealed a strong Chair and board 
that had a very good rapport with the CEO. Interviews confirmed that at the time that 
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the researcher was present, the balance of power was “board-dominated” more than 
“CEO-dominated” (Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, p.252). 
Factors at the organisational level that were analysed in this study can be summarised 
by the themes of: legal status, firm characteristics, environment and national context 
(Bezemer, Nicholson & Pugliese, 2014, p.252). The decision by the board to change 
from an Incorporated Association to a GLG analyses the reasons why a decision was 
made to change its legal status and what the likely ramifications were for the 
organisation. Firm characteristics including the age and size of the organisation 
(Ebrahim, 2003) were important considerations in assessing the organisation’s shift 
from the old NFP to the new NFP model. One such example was the branding and 
organisational profile change, which was largely in response to the dynamic 
environment in which it was operating. Finally, the organisation and board’s focus on 
its internal and external stakeholders (Sasso, 2003; Holland, 2002) illustrated the 
national context in which the organisation was operating. The board worked hard to 
satisfy and communicate with its stakeholders by delivering a narrative of legitimacy 
(Coule, 2015; Hardy & Ballis, 2013; Jayasinghe & Soobaroyen, 2009) where its 
mission and values were achieved as well as the financial and operational 
sustainability of the entity. The board ensured that its narrative was supported by 
information or data that added credence to its claims. This had the effect of reassuring 
stakeholders that despite the turbulent, uncertain and increasingly commercial 
environment, the organisation was in control and still achieving its mission and 
vision. 
Theoretical contributions to broad accountability concepts 
The first finding discussed in chapter six revealed an emphasis on strategic 
accountability to stakeholders and narrative and calculative accountability when board 
members exercised their strategic role. This was evident at both the individual and the 
collective board member levels. The use of narrative and calculative accountability 
practices by Burgundy supports the suggestion from Shaoul, Stafford and Stapleton 
(2012) that hybrid organisations might need to resort to more comprehensive 
reporting techniques to discharge their accountability to their stakeholders.  
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The second finding in chapter seven discovered that trust (negotiable accountability), 
and formal and informal accountability were present when board members took steps 
to avoid venturing into senior manager operational roles. Again, this was enacted at 
both the individual and collective levels.  
The third finding analysed in chapter eight found an emphasis on formal 
accountability often meant board members discharged strategic accountability to 
external stakeholders (usually consumers and government) and internal stakeholders 
(in most cases staff). Moreover, accountability was often exercised at both the 
individual and board levels where board members championed a specific topic and it 
was considered collectively as a group at the board level. Collectively, board 
members exercised formal accountability by either adopting a supportive role where 
they echoed what the individual board champion proposed or they might ask 
questions or make inquires as a group, where more than one board member engaged 
in dialogue. This dialogue was often in the form of polite questioning, seeking more 
information or making comments.  
A review of the findings from this study reveals that broad accountability concepts 
were particularly evident in the strategy and control roles because this is where most 
of the data accumulated. In the smaller number of occasions that the resource 
dependence role was exercised, concepts of broad accountability were also found to 
occur. This finding confirms the discoveries of Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) 
that accountability drives board effectiveness and leads to an enhanced understanding 
of board processes. In other words, using a lens of accountability to understand board 
processes shows that when the board roles are exercised, accountability occurs as part 
of the process, albeit in different ways and as the result of a number of factors. As the 
board process literature suggests (Collier, 2005; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles, 2005; Stiles & Taylor, 2001), boards that are accountable are 
effective boards in that they are conscious of their roles and responsibilities and 
discharge them appropriately. 
Although broad accountability concepts were present in the enactment of all three 
board roles in this case study, it would be inaccurate to conclude that simply having a 
board that discharges the three roles will create an effective board. In addition to the 
conscious decision of the organisation to improve its accountability due to a number 
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of external and internal factors, this study finds that board member effectiveness is 
also contingent on the extent to which board members enact accountability at both the 
individual and collective levels. This is a key finding from the present research. It is 
the combination of the processes of accountability through individual, collective and 
organisational efforts as much as the board roles that encourage accountability. It is 
important to note that there needs to be the conditions that generate an emphasis on 
accountability at the organisational level. Accountability also needs to be enacted at 
the individual board member level and the collective level – the board as a group. 
This finding adds to and goes beyond those of Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer 
(2015, p.17) who argue that board member effectiveness is “multidimensional” and 
context-dependent. Therefore, the context in which the board members are operating, 
the processes including the will of the board members to improve accountability and 
the skill of the board members to enact accountability are vital ingredients to create an 
effective board. 
The findings from the present study build on those from Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005) as they provide insights into accountability in the NFP sector in Australia. As 
mentioned previously, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) undertook board process 
research into a select group of companies in the UK. In addition, the present 
investigation complements the findings of NFP board process studies such as that 
conducted by Machold and Farquhar (2013). Machold and Farquhar (2013) found the 
resource dependence role to be less pervasive and not as obvious compared to the 
board roles of strategy and control. A similar finding was apparent in the present 
research. The researcher is cautious not to overgeneralise here though. It has been 
commented in the literature that the emphasis on board roles can depend on many 
factors including the age and size of the entity, at which point the organisation is in its 
life cycle and the effect of external and internal factors, as some examples (Machold 
& Farquhar, 2013; Ebrahim, 2003). The potential influence of these factors is why the 
researcher chose to adopt the multi-level analysis technique when analysing data. 
Such an approach enabled the researcher to consider individual board members, the 
board as a collective group and organisational factors. This multiple level analysis 
enabled the researcher to understand why the board in Burgundy was focused largely 
on strategy and control. The findings chapters aim to analyse and discuss the impact 
of such factors on the exercise of board roles. 
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The finding that accountability was inherent in all three board member roles supports 
the reason why the researcher chose a framework of broad accountability concepts to 
understand board roles and how they were enacted. As discussed in the Introduction 
and Literature Review chapters, there is a strong case in the literature for using a 
framework of accountability, as it is able to help explain governance phenomena. For 
example, accountability perspectives can contribute to understandings of board 
process and effectiveness. It can also provide insights into accounting practices such 
as how a board accounts for action taken or decisions made. Roberts, McNulty and 
Stiles (2005) argue that accountability is a valuable theoretical lens in board studies as 
it can shed light on how a board operates effectively as well as challenging the 
paradigm that board roles conflict and can impede the effective discharge of multiple 
roles. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) contend,  
Developing accountability as a central concept in the explanation of how boards 
operate effectively enables…[research] to both challenge the dominant grip of 
agency theory on governance research and support the search for theoretical 
pluralism and greater understanding of board processes and dynamics (Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 2005, p.S5). 
The framework of broad accountability applied in this study, with its ability to take 
into account the positive, enabling factors and the negative, constraining factors of 
governance, has enabled the researcher to uncover positive and effective aspects of 
board work as well as the potential negative and challenging aspects of board roles. 
Significantly, this perspective is more holistic than narrow or more traditional 
conceptions of governance. Rather than engendering fear or panic about the discharge 
of board roles (e.g. that the roles conflict or that information asymmetry is 
detrimental), this case study analyses board roles and processes from multiple levels 
and considers a broader spectrum of factors. Consequently, governance can be viewed 
in a more balanced way. While there are arguments for applying a broad 
accountability approach in governance, the present study is one of very few that 
employs a broad accountability framework to examine the three board roles of NFP 
directors. 
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Theoretical contributions for board studies 
Reassessing role conflict 
The findings from the present investigation refute a number of arguments from the 
literature that applies a narrower perspective of accountability such as agency theory. 
For example, the study finds that all three board roles usually work together 
harmoniously with one complementing the other. Such a finding is in contrast to the 
conventional or narrow view of governance that role conflict exists for directors (e.g. 
Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004a; Demb & Neubauer, 
1992). The findings from this research support the school of thought that board roles 
are complementary (for example: Kirwan & Brennan, 2017; Tricker, 2009; Roberts, 
McNulty & Stiles, 2005; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). This finding answers calls 
from scholars such as McNulty (2013) who argues that more research needs to be 
conducted in boards to understand whether board roles conflict or work together.  
The present research revealed that on the rare occasion that conflict arises between the 
roles, board members are equipped to exercise their judgment and discretion and 
choose which role should prevail. This is most effective if board members exercise 
their discretion individually and also as a group, explaining to other directors why 
they believe a particular course of action is suitable. Due to the complexities inherent 
in board work such as the impact of contextual factors on the exercise of board roles, 
it appears difficult to create a rule-based approach to governance dictating how to 
prevent role conflict, as the agency theory perspectives tend to suggest. As things 
stand, it appears board members are enabled by their multiple roles, flexibility 
moving between them depending on the circumstances. This perspective is radically 
different to that which asserts that role conflict exists and that it constrains board 
members in performing their duties.  
Observations and interviews confirmed that board members and senior managers 
were united in the view that the three board roles of directors are necessary for 
governance. Observations showed board and committee meetings generally struck a 
balance in covering strategic, control and resource dependence issues. Board and 
committee agendas revealed the same attempt to cover a spread of board roles. 
Common to all interviews was the view that the roles are interdependent. It was often 
said that for one role to operate such as strategy, it needs control to be exercised in the 
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form of monitoring to ensure the strategy is being enacted and achieving the 
organisation’s objectives and values. Similarly, interviewees commonly said that the 
resource dependence role was important for board members to bring appropriate 
knowledge, resources and networks to the organisation. Such skills were often argued 
to be of assistance especially during a time of increasing competition, accountability 
and performance. 
Some board members explained that some directors may favour one role over the 
other, but as long as the board works collectively and acts as a check on the balance 
of roles, it can work effectively. It was highlighted by some directors that having the 
necessary skills and understanding of governance should equip board members to 
appreciate the value of the strategy, control and resource dependence roles. Other 
board members suggested that the topics which confront the board can sometimes 
encourage directors to spend more time on one role than others. As flagged in the 
findings chapters, the external and internal contextual factors at the time the 
researcher was present did encourage board members to generally focus on strategy. 
This supports the argument from Ostrower and Stone (2006) that the contextual 
factors can influence the preference given to particular board roles. In the present 
investigation, while there were times that the strategic role was given more emphasis 
compared to the others, the other roles were still discharged, as they were necessary to 
ensure that strategic objectives were achieved. For example, KPIs were part of the 
strategic planning process so that the success of strategic goals could be measured and 
monitored. In addition to the control role featuring, the resource dependence role was 
also performed when the board considered forming strategic alliances in its service 
delivery to increase efficiencies and reduce costs in its value chain. 
Broad accountability in board roles 
Broad accountability aspects featured when board members enacted their strategic 
role. In this case study, strategy was often exercised so that the board was accountable 
to the original purpose of the organisation and respecting the ethos of the overarching 
religious bodies (the religious institution and the advocacy/lobby group). This was 
evident in the board’s focus on the vision, mission and values of the NFP 
organisation. The board’s consciousness of its mission and values during a period of 
considerable change and challenges showed its diligence in discharging horizontal 
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accountability to itself and downwards accountability to its internal and external 
stakeholder groups. The examples of the change to CLG, the use of information 
technology systems to account for performance and a new Board Chair who was 
strategically inclined were factors that fostered a forward looking focus for the board 
and the organisation. Narrative, calculative and formal accountability were exercised 
during this strategic process. Despite these topics generating a focus on strategy and 
topics such as funding, competitive ability and growth, the board often had 
conversations about the importance of remembering its mission and values. This 
practice helped the board strike a balance between being financially and operationally 
sustainable and fulfilling its mission to satisfy its internal and external stakeholders. 
The balancing of Burgundy’s mission and values with performance measurement 
revealed the form of NFP performance measurement discussed in the literature by 
Carnegie and Wolnizer (1995) and Parker (1996). This study also found negotiable 
accountability was central to the process where the board communicated a reassuring 
narrative to its stakeholders that it was satisfying its mission and values.  
Broad accountability was also exercised when board members enacted financial 
control, operational control or risk management. When the control role was exercised, 
it was usually enacted with the purpose of making senior managers accountable in an 
upwards fashion at the organisational level and the board members horizontally 
accountable at the collective board level. The board members were also individually 
accountable on occasions, for example, when a skills matrix was compiled of each 
board member’s skills and circulated to the board. Control was also linked to ensuring 
the organisation delivered quality services and that its audit, accreditation and WH&S 
requirements were met.  
The board’s focus on increasing formal controls comes through strongly in the data, 
which reflects the move from informal means of accountability to more formal. For 
instance, the decision to remunerate board members in line with developments in the 
sector to recognise board members for their services. Another example was the 
implementation of recommendations from a governance specialist to restructure the 
board so that it operates in a more formal manner, where senior managers no longer 
attend board meetings unless they are delivering a formal presentation and answering 
questions from the board.  
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Another theme that strongly emerges is the board’s focus on communicating a 
narrative to its internal and external stakeholders that it is fulfilling its mission and 
values. Such behaviour underscores the board’s consciousness of its original purpose, 
thereby preventing mission drift. The reassuring narratives were also designed to give 
stakeholders confidence in the organisation and to nurture trust between the board and 
its stakeholder groups. 
The exercise of the resource dependence role revealed that broad accountability was 
also often being performed. When board members enacted the knowledge and 
experience aspects of the role, individualizing and socializing accountabilities often 
emerged. For example, on the rare occasion that there was a conflict between board 
roles, observations and interview data show that the board member would exercise a 
degree of discretion by assessing the board roles and accountabilities and analysing 
which was most important in the circumstances. Drawing upon skills, experience and 
expertise from the resource dependence role helps board members make the choice if 
there is a conflict between their roles. In this particular case study, the resource 
dependence role performed a subtle, but important role. Rather than being perceived 
as a major role such as strategy or control, the resource dependence role often 
overlapped with elements of the strategy and control roles, which usually assisted the 
exercise of strategy and control. For instance, the resource dependence role often 
helped board members exercise strategy: by bringing resources, links or knowledge to 
the organisation. The resource dependence role also helped board members exercise 
their control role by: giving board members the ability to liaise with senior managers 
to tackle financial, operational and risk issues facing the organisation. Board members 
would often do this through respectful questioning processes, providing their opinions 
or following-up on certain topics. 
The findings from this longitudinal case study confirm the findings from similar 
board process studies where the scholars have concluded that issues such as internal 
and external contextual factors, the type of organisation and the life cycle stage of the 
organisation, the time allocated to board tasks and the particular skill sets of the 
individual board members all have a bearing on the discharge of board member roles. 
The scholars that argue these factors are important conditioning factors include 
Pugliese, Nicholson and Bezemer (2015), Machold and Farquhar (2013), Ostrower 
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and Stone (2006) and Ebrahim (2003). This single case study contains a number of 
significant contextual factors. Other NFP organisations might face similar contextual 
circumstances in which the present study can shed light on how board members may 
react to such conditions. Alternatively, the study may reveal a different approach to 
other NFP organisations operating in a similar environment. 
Managing information asymmetry 
The present research confirms that information asymmetry does exist in board 
processes, but like Brennan, Kirwan and Redmond (2016) argue, it is not detrimental 
to governance. Using a process-based approach to governance as well as an 
accountability perspective reveals a more balanced and comprehensive view of how 
board practices operate. While this study confirms that information asymmetry exists 
in line with governance literatures that apply a narrow approach to accountability, it 
diverges with respect to the finding about the impacts of information asymmetry. 
Rather than discovering that information asymmetry has a negative effect on board 
members, the present study finds it is beneficial because it encourages inquiry and 
questioning. Moreover, bearing in mind the distinction between the operational 
aspects of organisational work exercised by senior managers and the higher level 
aspects of board work, such a difference in information facilitates efficiency in the 
exercise of board roles. This finding supports and adds to the findings from Brennan, 
Kirwan and Redmond (2016) because it finds information asymmetry does not 
compromise board roles and it could be argued it makes the roles more effective than 
if no asymmetry of information existed.  
Where this study goes beyond the current literature is that it finds that board members 
adopt alternative ways of verifying or obtaining information if they feel the 
information at the disposal is not appropriate. They do this by harnessing their skills, 
knowledge and experience from the resource dependence role to address any 
perceived deficiencies in information. This process could be characterized as informal 
and socializing accountability practices. Moreover, the present investigation 
underscores the importance of trust between board members and senior managers. 
Trust is an element of negotiable accountability and where this exists, it works to 
mitigate any feelings of suspicion or doubt between board members and senior 
managers. What this study highlights is that if accountability is operating, it generally 
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enables board practices to overcome or manage issues that might be seen as potential 
problems.  
Limiting operational drift 
The findings from this study about operational drift also highlight the impact of using 
a broad accountability framework and a process based approach to investigating 
governance processes. In contrast to the more traditional view that director roles are 
challenging to observe because they are similar to senior manager roles, this study 
finds that certain aspects of the board member roles can prevent operational drift. For 
example, the knowledge and experience aspects of the resource dependence role assist 
in preventing operational drift. This is because they help the board member to 
maintain clarity concerning their roles and scope and those of senior managers. The 
present investigation identified other techniques and accountabilities that board 
members used to manage operational drift. These included ensuring adequate 
information was provided by exercising upwards or downwards accountability and 
obtaining it in a formal or informal fashion, having confidence in the information 
provided by senior managers by fostering trust (negotiable accountability) between 
the two parties, and working individually and collectively as a board asking questions 
through individualizing and socializing accountability processes. The present case 
study appears to be one of very few studies that analyses how board members prevent 
operational drift as it identifies the techniques they use to manage operational drift. 
This adds to and goes beyond the existing literature about operational drift which 
generally investigates it only to the extent that board members are either unaware of 
the practice or they acknowledge it (Parker, 2007a; 2008).  
Preventing mission drift 
The techniques board members use to prevent or manage mission drift, also known as 
mission creep, are also addressed in the findings for this study. The board’s 
consciousness and diligence in balancing the mission and values of the organisation 
with the need to be commercially viable and operationally sustainable was a strong 
theme in the chapters about the board member strategy role and the control role. The 
common accountability exercised in the management of mission drift was negotiable 
accountability. The findings chapters explain that negotiable accountability is about 
how the board negotiates or presents their accounts to internal and external 
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stakeholders. The key reason for exercising negotiable accountability from the board 
perspective was to reassure stakeholders that a balance was stuck between the 
organisation being financially and operationally sustainable as well as fulfilling its 
mission and values. This reassurance was necessary to foster trust between the 
organisation and its stakeholders. Trust operated to generate confidence that the funds 
and resources provided to the organisation were being applied in a responsible 
manner. These findings support and add to those from Morrison and Salipante (2007), 
Ospina, Diaz and O’Sullivan (2002) and Coule (2015) who all contend that negotiable 
accountability is enacted by organisational leaders when conveying an image of 
legitimacy to stakeholders and managing the potential for mission drift. The focus on 
negotiating accountability had the effect of sensitising board members to the need to 
keep the organisation’s mission and values central with respect to actions taken and 
decisions made. Observations of and documents for strategic planning days, board 
and committee meetings revealed this to a large extent. 
The present investigation provides much needed insight into how a board interacts 
with its internal stakeholders. Young (2002) notes that the board literature frequently 
considers the board’s rapport with its external stakeholders but the board’s 
interactions with its internal stakeholders is largely neglected. The present case study 
contributes to knowledge in this area by providing valuable insights into how board 
members handle their internal stakeholders – staff and senior managers. For instance, 
the second findings chapter (chapter seven) analyses how board members operate to 
limit operational drift between them and senior managers. The third findings chapter 
(chapter eight) discovers the practices board members used to manage the changes 
Burgundy was undergoing to maintain good working relationships with its staff. 
Similarly, the chapter considers how directors prevented mission drift, which had the 
benefit of appeasing internal stakeholders as well as external stakeholders. 
Limitations 
Both the Methodology chapter and the Theoretical Framework chapter discuss the 
limitations of this study. Limitations of the research can be categorised into two 
groups:  
• limitations with regard to the research methods used; and 
 256 
• limitations with respect to the theoretical lens applied.  
 
The methodological limitations expressed in the first dot point will be explored first, 
followed by the theoretical limitations. Limitations discussed in this section will not 
be repeated from the Methodology and Theory chapters, as some of the limitations 
identified in those chapters have been addressed or mitigated. This section will only 
therefore explore the limitations that remain.  
One limitation with respect to the research method is the single case study. Single 
case studies are often criticised for being too narrow in focus and a more limited basis 
from which to draw comparisons or generalisations compared to a multiple case 
study. This however is not necessarily a drawback from the perspective of qualitative 
researchers (Parker & Northcott, 2016). Generalisability is not always required in 
qualitative research. Case studies that are different, rare or confined to a specific 
setting are often considered just as insightful and valuable to qualitative researchers as 
those from which comparisons or generalisations might be drawn (Parker & 
Northcott, 2016). While some generalisations can be made from this study regarding 
board roles, accountabilities and the impact of contextual factors, these 
generalisations may be somewhat limited due to the influence of internal and external 
contextual factors as well as the complex layers of accountability enacted at 
organisational, individual and collective levels. There are positive aspects with 
respect to generalising from a single case study however. As Parker and Northcott 
(2016) contend, the conventional ways of generalising through quantitative methods 
can overlook the value of findings from a single case study. It might be the findings 
from the single case study that changes the way research in the field might be 
perceived. Whether the case is typical (similar) or atypical (different) in its findings, it 
provides a basis from where future research can grow. Furthermore, case studies can 
provide insights into future events, behaviours and phenomena, which are likely to be 
suitable for informing accounting practice and policy. 
Another limitation of the research method used in this study is the time at which the 
study was undertaken by the researcher. This is because the conditions under which 
the organisation was operating at the time of fieldwork are likely to have since 
changed, making it difficult to replicate the study even if a researcher followed the 
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research methods in the same fashion. Nevertheless, the fact that this research was 
contingent on certain factors is common to most case studies. The case study is 
designed to provide a picture of what happens inside an NFP board from a rare and 
privileged position. Although the study is contingent on certain contextual factors, it 
helps add to and go beyond understandings of the processes of NFP governance and 
reveals the nature of accountability discharged by Burgundy’s directors when 
exercising their roles. 
Finally, while the researcher attempted to construct a comprehensive broad 
accountability framework, it might not be exhaustive in terms of considering all types 
of broad accountability in NFP governance. The researcher constructed the 
framework using relevant concepts that emerged from the empirical data and the 
literature of similar board studies that had been conducted. Future research may 
extend this seminal analytical framework. 
Suggested areas for future research 
This study has paved the way for a new approach to study the accountability of the 
board of directors. In this way, it contributes to the board literatures for governance in 
every sector. The most obvious contribution is to the NFP sector and the insights it 
provides for NFP governance. There is the possibility for this type of research to be 
conducted in a range of NFP organisations ranging across education, health, welfare, 
sport and charities, thereby broadening our understanding of NFP governance. With 
the changes that are taking place in the sector, it would be worthwhile examining 
whether the governance mechanisms in the NFP sector are sufficient to reflect the 
needs of the sector (Stafford & Stapleton, 2016, p.379). In particular, more research 
could be focused on examining and improving performance measurement in non-
profit entities. Gamble and Beer (2017, p.454) explain measuring performance in 
NPFs is deficient yet critical to assessing how NFP organisations achieve their social 
and commercial objectives. 
The present investigation also opens up the possibility for accountability research of 
this nature to be conducted in the public and private sectors. As Heemskerk, 
Heemskerk and Wats (2015, p.418) suggest, “empirical studies of board processes 
and internal dynamics” need to be undertaken in the NFP sector and applied in other 
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sectors. Investigating how directors are accountable when they exercise their roles in 
other sectors will enrich understandings of how governance operates in different 
contexts. 
The present study is one of few that investigates NFP board practices in Australia. 
Further field research into board practices is needed both in Australia and globally. 
Horton Smith, Moldavanova and Krasynska’s (2018) edited book has recently been 
released and is likely to spark academic discussion and research into NFP governance 
structures and challenges in Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia. Comparative 
studies of board roles and accountabilities across countries would be valuable. This 
could yield insights on different, additional or more limited concepts of broad 
accountability within the NFP context or among NFP directors. 
More research with respect to the new finding of blended control practices should be 
undertaken to confirm or refute whether other NFP boards adopt similar behaviours. 
Furthermore, it appears that understandings of blended strategising are still limited 
(Morrison & Salipante, 2007). The reason for recommending more academic inquiry 
in blended control and blended strategising is that these findings need to be developed 
further to give researchers more confidence in the generalisability of the findings. 
The present investigation conducted multi-level analysis at three levels: the individual 
director level, the collective board level and the organisational level. Additional 
research could be conducted at other levels of multi-level analysis, as suggested by 
Bezemer, Nicholson and Pugliese (2014, p.250-251). This includes research 
conducted at the agenda item level and meeting levels. It would also be valuable to 
see more research conducted at the individual board member, collective board and 
organisational levels. Cumberland et al. (2015, p.461) suggest future research at the 
individual, organisational and societal levels to determine the effect they have on the 
emphasis given to board roles. Examining the different levels in governance should 
generate richer understandings of board processes, roles and board performance in 
NFP organisations. 
One area that remains to be addressed is that of board member recruitment, skills and 
training in the NFP sector. It is likely to be helpful knowing how NFP directors are 
chosen for their board member roles and how a board assesses where board skills are 
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required and addresses any perceived voids. Chelliah, Boersma and Klettner (2015) 
have begun to shed light on board member recruitment in the NFP sector, finding that 
boards can be constrained by their constitutions in director recruitment. For example, 
NFP entities that have membership requirements sometimes recruit board members 
who may not necessarily possess the most appropriate skills. The contributions from 
the present study to board member recruitment, skills and training are more optimistic 
than those from Chelliah, Boersma and Klettner (2015). Further research into these 
phenomena would help provide clarity on the topic. 
The researcher also suggests that there could be more focus on uncovering the 
resource dependence role in the NFP board. The boundary-spanning role of the board 
member and how it interacts with the senior manager’s role is one example. Such 
research is likely to build on or better explain the finding in the present study that the 
resource dependence role tends to be performed more as a supportive role, enabling 
the other roles to function, as well as managing practices such as operational drift and 
information asymmetry. 
Conclusion 
This longitudinal single case study has set out to investigate the three primary roles of 
the board member in the unique NFP environment using a theoretical lens of broad 
accountability. Data obtained from observations, interviews and documents has 
enabled the researcher to gain valuable insights into how the board members in an 
NFP organisation 5  performed their roles in a complex NFP environment. The 
framework of broad accountability has enabled the researcher to consider not only the 
accountabilities inherent in the exercise of the board roles, but also to take into 
account the external and internal contextual factors that faced the board and the 
organisation. In addition, the multi-level approach has provided the researcher with 
the tools to analyse the multiple layers of accountability at the individual board 
member level, collective board level and the organisational level.  
Data analysis has uncovered significant theoretical findings including contributions to 
Llewellyn’s (2003) five levels of theorising with findings pertaining to levels two to 
four inclusive (level two: differentiation theories, level three: concepts theorising and 
                                                
5 This is particularly relevant to the charities segment in the NFP sector. 
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level four: theorising of settings). In addition, this study offers significant new 
understandings to the concepts of broad accountability. A primary finding is that 
broad accountability underpins the exercise of all three board member roles. 
Examples have been given illustrating how this occurs for each of the three roles.  
Additionally, this study refutes the position taken by some studies that the three board 
roles conflict. This study finds the contrary – that the roles tend to work in a 
complementary fashion and accountability helps facilitate the effectiveness of board 
roles. In the event of role conflict, board members draw upon their skills from the 
resource dependence role to exercise judgment in reconciling the conflict. This 
research adds to the existing literature that finds that board roles and their 
accountabilities are conditioned to a fair extent by contextual factors. The 
environment in which the board is operating can influence the amount of emphasis or 
priority given to board roles. 
The present study confirms that information asymmetry does occur between the board 
and senior managers, however it is found to be a necessary element for effective 
governance. This finding contrasts with traditional perspectives that view asymmetry 
as an impediment. Moreover, the investigation of information asymmetry in the NFP 
case study revealed new insights about how board members obtain more information 
if they feel the information at their disposal is not appropriate. New and significant 
findings with respect to operational drift and mission drift have also been made by the 
present investigation. This study is one of the very few that investigates operational 
drift and mission drift and identifies the techniques board members harness to limit 
the practice.  
A standout broad accountability theme present in all three topics of information 
asymmetry, operational drift and mission drift is that of trust, derived from negotiable 
accountability. Trust was shown to play a major part in mitigating distrust between 
internal stakeholders with respect to information asymmetry and operational drift. 
Trust was also central to reassuring external and internal stakeholders with regard to 
the organisation achieving its mission and values while also remaining financially and 
operationally sustainable. Similarly, trust and negotiable accountability was central to 
the enactment of the three board roles. This was because the exercise of the three 
board roles in some way involved either professional or political relationships. 
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Negotiable accountability helped lubricate professional relations between internal 
stakeholders such as staff and political relations with external stakeholders such as 
consumers and the government. 
In summary, the broad accountability framework applied in this single qualitative 
case study has enabled the researcher to appreciate the effect of many contextual 
factors on the discharge of the three board roles. The multi-level analysis has 
provided additional perspectives from which the researcher can assess the enactment 
of accountability. The study has contributed new and significant insights both 
theoretically with regard to broad accountability and practically with respect to the 
enactment of board roles in the NFP context. It challenges dominant perceptions 
about board roles being in conflict. It finds board roles and practices are effective if 
aspects of broad accountability are present in their enactment. This is because broad 
accountability comprises of constraining and enabling aspects. Such flexibility was 
necessary for the board to address and adapt to the dynamic contextual conditions in 
which it was operating. 
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APPENDIX 16 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Dr Giulia Leoni was the replacement Associate Supervisor from 2017 onwards. She therefore became 
the Other Investigator from 2017 – 2018.  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Participant Information and Consent Form (PICF) 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
Dear Burgundy Board Member / Executive Management member / staff member, 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT 
University. Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its 
contents before deciding whether to participate. If you have any questions about the 
project, please ask one of the investigators.  
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?  
The research is being conducted by Jennifer Fuller as part of her Doctoral studies in 
Accounting – PhD (Accounting). The research project is being supervised by 
Professor Lee Parker as Principal Supervisor and Professor Garry Carnegie as 
Associate Supervisor.7  
This project has been approved by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee. 
This research is being conducted to examine the accountability-control and advisory-
strategic roles of the Non-Executive Director (NED) in Not-For-Profit (NFP) 
organisational governance.  
Our knowledge about directors - especially NEDs, is limited - particularly in the NFP 
sector which is important socially, economically and politically, especially as 
government is downsizing and outsourcing much service provision to them. NFPs 
typically have complex business structures including: many stakeholders consisting of 
volunteers, donors and employees, a vast number of assets, various resources and 
multiple agendas that present challenging corporate governance issues. Research into 
NFP organisations and their unique missions and features is relatively recent, with the 
roles of NEDs largely neglected. Furthermore there continues to be a lack of clarity 
with respect to the discharge of their corporate governance roles and responsibilities.  
NEDs’ importance in the NFP sector is also due to their often being in the majority on 
NFP organisation boards. Moreover, NEDs are often unpaid or paid little in 
comparison to NEDs in the profit sector, despite the fact that they usually encounter 
the same types of issues in their work. Therefore the social, economic and political 
                                                
7 Dr Giulia Leoni was the replacement Associate Supervisor from 2017 – 2018.  
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significance of NFP organisations and their reliance on NEDs calls for attention to 
NED roles and responsibilities with a view to enhancing the quality of NFP 
organisational governance. 
The focus of this project will be on the NED in the NFP context, involving a case 
study of a single organisation. This study is also likely to be relevant for directors in 
the profit sector given the similar issues they encounter. The study aims to examine 
the role(s) of NED’s in their control and advisory capacities with a view to more 
clearly elucidating the roles and responsibilities of the NED and to provide NFP 
Boards with reflections upon and opportunities for further enhancing the roles of 
NEDs and the performance of the NFP Board. 
Why have you been approached?  
You have been approached because you are a Board Member / Member of Executive 
Management / staff member in a NFP organisation. Your position and contact details 
have been obtained from the Burgundy website. We believe that you are ideally suited 
to provide us with the necessary information for the project because of your position 
and experience as Board Chair / Board Secretary / Board Treasurer / Board Member / 
member of Executive Management / staff member of Burgundy. 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?  
The key research question is: 
The accountability-control role and the advisory-strategic role of the Non-Executive 
Director (NED) in Not-For-Profit (NFP) entities: An untenable task or a viable 
combination? 
 
Associated research questions are geared towards achieving the following objectives: 
1. Identify the spectrum and balance of roles currently undertaken by NEDs. 
2. Investigate the legal and accounting dimensions of NED roles and responsibilities. 
3. Map the influences on how NEDs approach their responsibilities. 
4. Understand how they execute their roles and accountabilities. 
 
We are seeking to have all members from the Burgundy Board; all members from 
Executive Management and some Burgundy staff participate in the research. 
Therefore, it is expected that there will be a total of at least 14 participants in this 
project. 
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If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?  
On-site observations 
Attend and participate at in Burgundy activities as usual. For example, Board 
meetings, sub-committee meetings (where applicable) and informal meetings such as 
the meal prior to the Board meeting. Jennifer will be the only researcher on-site and 
will only take notes of meetings.  
The Board has granted permission for such observations to take place, subject to the 
following conditions: 
(a) The functions of the researcher as meeting-observer are made explicit and 
discussed with the Board; 
(b) The Board reserves the right to withdraw from the research if it concludes that the 
research is impeding the Board or the Organisation’s effectiveness; 
(c) The Board reserves the right to hold parts of the Board or Committee meetings 
without the presence of the researcher as it determines necessary. 
 
Protocols have been designed to safeguard the interests of participants and the 
Organisation. These protocols are: 
(a) Jennifer will attend Burgundy bi-monthly Board meetings and selected Sub-
committee meetings with permission from the Board Chair. Jennifer is happy to 
adopt a role which best suits Burgundy. For example, it might be decided that it is 
best that Jennifer sits nearby but not at the Board table. Jennifer is happy to 
discuss her observation arrangements with the Board, if required. 
(b) Individuals or the Board can opt out of observations if it is concluded that the 
research is impeding the Board or the Organisation’s effectiveness.  
(c) Jennifer is willing to leave Board meetings or Committee meetings when 
requested. Alternatively, if Directors wish to exit Board meetings or Committee 
meetings, Jennifer is also willing to comply with this form of action.  
 
Interviews 
Participate in an interview which is expected to be between 1-2 hours in duration. The 
interview will be conducted at a time which is convenient to you. Jennifer will 
negotiate with Board members where they would prefer their interview is undertaken. 
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The interview will only be attended by Jennifer Fuller and it will be audio recorded. 
Please advise Jennifer if you do not wish this to occur. There will be no visual 
recording of interviews.  
You might be invited to participate in follow-up interviews. 
Documentation 
The researchers would be grateful if you would provide any relevant organisational 
documentation to Jennifer to assist in the research, provided that approval from the 
Board Chair is granted. Examples of such documentation include: the organisation’s 
Board and sub-committee agendas, reports, minutes, and related financial and 
management reports. 
What are the possible risks or disadvantages?  
There is a time commitment of approximately 1-2 hours for the interview(s). 
Additional time might be needed for a follow-up interview. 
Interviews will be audio recorded. Please advise Jennifer if you do not wish this to 
occur. 
There are no other perceived risks or disadvantages associated with participation in 
this project. 
If you are unduly concerned or if you find participation in the project distressing, you 
should contact Jennifer Fuller using the contact details on page one as soon as 
convenient. Jennifer is happy to discuss your concerns with you confidentially and 
suggest appropriate follow-up, if necessary. 
What are the benefits associated with participation?  
It is expected that the research will yield the following benefits to participants: 
- Report and briefing to the Burgundy Board Chair early in 2017. 
- Reflections and advice (such as debriefing, recommendations, training) to the 
Board as and when required. 
 
The research is intended to provide useful information to you as a Board member in a 
NFP organisation with respect to your accountability-control role and your advisory-
strategic role. It is expected that the findings from this project will help inform NEDs 
of their roles and their responsibilities and whether any changes to current practices 
are required. In the event that change is required, recommendations as to how change 
could be implemented will be suggested. This should facilitate more effective 
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organisational governance for NFPs and should also have relevance for entities more 
generally, such as in the profit sector. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide?  
Confidentiality 
The data gathered from observations, interviews and document analysis will be stored 
electronically on the RMIT University network system. The computer system is 
password protected. Hard copy data will be stored in a locked office and upon 
completion of the project will be kept securely at RMIT University for a period of 5 
years after publication, before being destroyed.  
Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if: (1) it is to protect you or 
others from harm, (2) is specifically required or allowed by law, or (3) you provide 
the researchers with written permission.  
Other safeguards in place to facilitate confidentiality include: 
1. Jennifer Fuller is the only researcher involved in the on-site observations. 
2. Confidentiality of all Burgundy documentation is preserved. The organisation will 
not be named in the Doctoral thesis or any related research papers.  
3. First draft thesis chapters and papers will be supplied to the Burgundy Board 
Chair for scrutiny – regarding any misstatements of fact or any confidential or 
sensitive issues. 
4. Resulting thesis and papers will preserve the confidentiality of the organisation, 
its board members and officers. 
5. Sensitivity of data will also be mitigated by the lengthy time period between data 
collection, data analysis, write-up, thesis completion and any papers designed for 
research conferences and journals. 
Data will be only accessible to the researcher, Jennifer Fuller and to a lesser extent, by 
her two Supervisors, Professor Lee Parker and Professor Garry Carnegie. 
Anonymity 
Results of the research will be disseminated in a thesis, published journal articles, 
progress seminars and conference papers. Of the list of publications - all publications, 
save for progress seminars, are publicly accessible. For example, the thesis will 
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ultimately be published in the RMIT Library Repository, which is a publicly 
accessible online library of research papers. Your name will not be used in our 
research findings.  
Data 
The data used will be potentially identifiable. It will be coded data. Where data is 
used in the thesis and associated publications such as journal articles, the upmost care 
will be used to make the data non-identifiable, using pseudonyms in place of actual 
names. 
What are my rights as a participant?  
As a participant, you have the following rights: 
• The right to withdraw from participation at any time. 
• The right to request that any recording cease at any time.  
• The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can 
be reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the 
participant.  
• The right to have any questions answered at any time.  
Whom should I contact if I have any questions?  
If you have any questions regarding this project, please contact Jennifer Fuller using 
the contact details provided on page one. 
What other issues should I be aware of before deciding whether to participate?  
We do not believe there are any other issues which you should be made aware before 
you decide to participate in this research project.   
What do I do if I have a complaint? 
If you have any complaints about the conduct of this research project, please contact 
the Chair, RMIT Business College Human Ethics Advisory Network, GPO Box 
2476V, Melbourne, 3001, telephone +61 3 9925 5596, email bchean@rmit.edu.au. 
Details of the complaints procedures are available at 
http://www.rmit.edu.au/browse;ID=2jqrnb7hnpyo.   
 
 292 
Yours sincerely 
 
(Signature) 
Jennifer Fuller 
Master of Accounting (University of South Australia) 
Honours Laws and Legal Practice (Flinders University) 
Bachelor of Arts (University of New England) 
 
(Signature) 
Professor Lee Parker 
Senior Supervisor 
Doctor of Philosophy (Accounting/Management) (Monash University) 
Master of Philosophy (Accounting) (University of Dundee) 
Bachelor of Economics (Commerce) (University of Adelaide) 
Certified Professional Manager (Australian Institute of Management) 
FAIM Fellow (Australian Institute of Management) 
F.C.A. Fellow (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia) 
F.C.P.A. Fellow (CPA Australia) 
 
(Signature) 
Professor Garry Carnegie 
Associate Supervisor 
Doctor of Philosophy (Flinders University) 
Master of Commerce (Deakin University) 
Bachelor of Commerce (Deakin University) 
Diploma of Business Studies (Gordon Institute of Technology) 
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PARTICIPANT’S CONSENT 
Project Title 
The accountability-control role and the advisory-strategic role of the Non-Executive 
Director in Not-For-Profit entities: An untenable task or a viable combination? 
Name of participant:  
 
 
1. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the information sheet. 
2. I agree to participate in the research project as described. 
3. I agree to: 
 
- be interviewed; 
- have my voice audio recorded; 
- participate in follow-up interviews; 
- be observed while undertaking organisational activities such as Board meetings, 
sub-committee meetings and informal meetings, for which the Board has given 
permission; and 
- provide relevant organisational documentation such as the organisation’s Board 
and sub-committee agendas, reports, minutes, and related financial and 
management reports, provided that approval from the Board Chair is granted. 
 
4. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw from the project at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data 
previously supplied (unless follow-up is needed for safety). 
(b) The project is for the purpose of research. It may not be of direct benefit to 
me. 
(c) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and 
only disclosed where I have consented to the disclosure or as required by 
law.  
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(d) The security of the research data will be protected during and after 
completion of the study. The data collected during the study may be 
published, and a report of the project outcomes will be provided to the 
Burgundy Board Chair. Any information which will identify me will not be 
used. 
Participant’s Consent 
 
Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this PICF after it has been signed. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
An example from the record of key themes from observations 
 
- Strategy  
- Business case 
- Aged care and community housing 
- Challenges and opportunities 
- Timelines (for decision making) 
- Corporate governance 
- Change (including uncertainty, challenges and opportunities) 
- Government (State and Federal. Includes policy) 
- Funding 
- Efficiency 
- Skills matrix 
- Risk appetite 
- Synergies 
- Benchmarking 
- Reputation 
- Accreditations 
- Innovation 
- Competition, competitors 
- Commercialisation (including becoming more business-like) 
- Alliances/partnerships 
- Branding 
- Control (including financial control, operational control, risk management) 
- Accountability 
- Agenda 
- Complexities 
- Legal change potential: Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG) 
- Mission/values/objectives 
- Value for money 
- Value-adding 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Interview guide 
 
 
Introduction: role & background 
Thank you for making the time to attend this interview. 
Reminder of the purpose of the study. 
Would you kindly tell me your name and position? 
Tell me about your work in this organisation and tell me a bit about yourself. 
 
Definitions board members (BMs) and senior managers 
BMs: Could you describe to me your role and how you see it? 
or 
Senior Managers: What do you see to be the role of directors?  
Senior Managers: Do you see any difference between the Senior Managers and the 
BMs, and what is the difference? 
 
Accountability 
How would you define accountability? 
To whom are you accountable? 
For what are you accountable? 
Who do you think are the priority stakeholder groups? Is there any particular order? 
Why did you answer that way? (You’ve listed xx groups, any reason why?) 
What role and importance do you see legislation, the Constitution, ccc and ddd in 
your thinking about the board’s accountability? 
How do you exercise your accountability role(s)? 
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Strategy 
BMs: What is your strategic role?  
or  
Senior Managers: What do you see to be the strategic role of the directors? How do 
you compare it to your role? 
How do you approach strategy (including strategic thinking and strategic decision-
making)? 
Do you conceive your strategic role as an “approval house” or being actively involved 
in strategy, or somewhere in between, i.e. continuous strategising. 
 
Control 
When you think about organisational control in your organisation, how would you 
define it? 
What types of control are present? E.g., financial control, operational control, risk 
management? 
How do you exercise your control role(s)? 
[Inserted additional Q] I’ve heard about the change to board meetings where Senior 
Managers no longer sit with BMs. Can you tell me more about that? 
[Inserted additional Q] What’s your view about the change? 
 
Resource dependence 
Consider the BM roles we discussed earlier – accountability, strategy and control… 
BMs: How do you view and manage the balance between these multiple roles and 
responsibilities? 
or 
Senior Managers: How does it compare to your roles? 
Do you think BM roles are inter-related?  
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If so, why? If not, why not? 
BMs: Of the various roles you have as a BM, do you see them constituting tension or 
as a workable combination? Why or why not? 
or 
Senior Managers: Of the various director roles, do you see them constituting a tension 
or a workable combination? Why or why not? 
BMs only: Are there any factors which influence how you carry out your work? For 
example: time, information, resources at your disposal? 
BMs only: Are there any issues or problems with the roles of the BM, in your view? 
Why are you saying that’s a problem? Could you explain a bit more? 
Given what we’ve talked about, is there anything you think I should ask you about, 
that you think I should? (Are there any other roles for the directors that you see 
relevant, that we haven’t talked about?) 
If I need to speak to you again, which may not be the case, would you be available? 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
Original themes and refined codes: some examples 
Original themes Refined codes 
Strategy 
- Challenges, opportunities and change 
- Competition and competitors 
- Benchmarking 
- Reputation 
- Commercialisation (including more 
business-like) 
- Vision, mission and values 
 
 
- Strategic conditioners 
- Strategic role 
- Strategic inputs 
- Strategic focus 
 
Control 
 
- Corporate governance 
- Timelines for monitoring and 
decision-making 
- Accreditations 
- KPIs and KRAs 
- Financial control 
- Operational control 
- Risk management 
 
 
- Formal controls 
- Financial control 
- Operational control 
- Risk management 
- Control leadership 
- Governance review and 
organisational review 
Resource dependence 
- Alliances and partnerships 
- Value for money 
- Value adding 
- Skills matrix 
- Reputation 
 
 
 
- Internal accountability (individual 
and collective levels) 
- External accountability (to external 
stakeholders) 
- Knowledge 
- Enhance position of organisation 
- Resources 
 
Accountability 
 
- Internal and external accountability 
to stakeholders 
- Formal and informal accountability 
- Accountability exercised individually 
and collectively 
- Accountability through action that 
goes beyond the business case 
- Upwards, downwards and sideways 
accountability 
- Accountability to whom, for what 
and how? 
 
 
- Internal and external stakeholders 
- Formal and informal accountability 
- Negotiable accountability (inc. trust) 
- Measuring effectiveness of board 
accountability 
- Accountability exercised individually 
and collectively  
- Upwards, downwards and horizontal 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
Excel spreadsheet used to map key themes and codes in the data: an example 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
Academic colloquia and conferences attended 
 
RMIT University Higher Degree Research (HDR) Students’ Summer Conference  
6 – 9 February 2018 
At this Conference, I presented my Third PhD Milestone to a panel of senior 
academics on Tuesday, 6 February 2018. 
 
Accounting & Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ) 
Doctoral Symposium and AFAANZ Conference  
2 – 4 July 2017 
I was selected as RMIT University’s PhD student representative from the School of 
Accounting to attend the 2017 AFAANZ Doctoral Symposium in Adelaide. I 
delivered a paper from my Doctoral thesis at the Symposium as well as acting as a 
Discussant for a PhD student in a similar field of accounting.  
 
RMIT University HDR Students’ Summer Conference  
14 – 17 January 2017 
At this Conference, I presented my Second PhD Milestone to a panel of senior 
academics on Wednesday, 15 February 2017. 
 
8th Asia-Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting (APIRA) Emerging 
Scholars’ Colloquium and Conference  
13 – 15 July 2016 
I presented a paper from my PhD thesis at the July 2016 Emerging Scholars’ 
Colloquium and was appointed Discussant for a paper at the Conference. 
 
RMIT University HDR Students’ Summer Conference  
15 – 18 January 2016 
I presented my First PhD Milestone to a panel of senior academics at the HDR 
Students’ Summer Conference on Tuesday, 16 February 2016. 
 
 303 
Accounting & Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ) 
Doctoral Symposium and AFAANZ Conference  
5 – 7 July 2015 
I was invited by the Head and Deputy Head of School of Accounting at RMIT 
University to be one of two representatives from RMIT to attend the AFAANZ 
Doctoral Symposium and Conference in Hobart in July 2015. I presented a paper to 
the Doctoral Symposium attendees and Senior Academics about my research. I was 
also a Discussant for a colleague’s paper in the Management Accounting group. 
 
